Theodore Dalrymple has a rather slight but nonetheless helpful piece on what’s wrong with rights. His basic point seems to be that when something becomes a “right” there’s no further need for civility, reasonableness or mutual accommodation, so the more rights the more brutish social life becomes.
Do you take his view
Do you take his view seriously?
Yes, I think that an
Yes, I think that an emphasis on specific one-sided claims that individuals are entitled to make against the whole world—I take it that’s what he’s talking about—is a bad thing.
A “right” does not place a
A “right” does not place a burden on others,my “right” of free speech does not obligate you listen.We are actually discussing legal privaliages rather “rights”.The current fad of not being offended or made uncomfortable by the speech of others places a burden on speakers that violates the speakers “right” to speak.
A “right” is always a rule
A “right” is always a rule by which one person is empowered to discriminate against others in a conflict. There are no exceptions. Property is the quintissential example, but free speech also makes a fine one: the right of the free speaker discriminates in his favor against everyone (for example parents with children) who would prefer that he not pollute the air with his words.
Indeed, because every right empowers one person to discriminate against others, the very concept of “equal rights” is an oxymoron.
Matt..
That’s an interesting
Matt..
That’s an interesting view of “rights”. I’ve long thought of them as appeals to power invoked in one’s own favor when encountering third party interference (conflict, as you call it). It seems to me that this is why a regime of “negative rights” or “liberty rights” proves to be unstable over time, as an appeal to power to limit itself in favor of the appealer (which is a big part of what a “liberty right” is) is, at some level, incoherent. An appeal to power to enforce a “positive right”, a right to something, makes perfect sense, however.
This also seems to me to explain why an ever expanding menu of “positive rights” (appeals to power) is compatible with an increasingly totalitarian state; it may, in fact, require a totalitarian state.
Sam wrote:
“An appeal to
Sam wrote:
“An appeal to power to enforce a “positive right”, a right to something, makes perfect sense, however.”
Yes. As Thomas Jefferson said:
“It is a principle that the right to a thing gives a right to the means without which it could not be used, that is to say, that the means follow their end.”
What is Mr. Kalbs’ opinion
What is Mr. Kalbs’ opinion about Matt’s idea that every law is a discrimination? Matt’s idea deserves a thorough analysis, please.
Mr. Dalrymple is far too
Mr. Dalrymple is far too abstract but is an excellent issue generator. Insane people need a structured environment and any and every drug that is actually helpful. A structured life is the Cuckoo’s Nest in many minds; and state structured horrors are thought inevitable when mental health is an issue. Such a life is a blessed relief, if we refuse our elites to impose a belief on our sick brothers.
Mr. Dalrymple therefore relies on the idea that the buck stops with the politicians and not the people, yes? But he jumps to conclusions. We and the politicians are responsible for our actions; we don’t do things for abstract reasons, except occasionally, such as in a time of war.
In answer to Mr. Murgos:
A
In answer to Mr. Murgos:
A “right,” I suppose, is a statement that when A wants X and B wants not-X then A wins. On the face of it rights take sides. The liberal view though is that rights can be defined “neutrally,” that is, in such a way that they (1) do not distinguish between A and B except in regard to things A and B have chosen, and (2) do not distinguish between the substance of what A wants and what B wants (in liberal jargon, they give A’s and B’s conceptions of the good equal respect).
I don’t think a legal system can get very far taking (2) as a guiding ideal, and I’m sure Matt would agree. The point of his statement though seems to be that (1) is equally pointless as an ideal. I don’t see that.
I agree that an attempt to achieve (1) is going to be messy and incomplete, because it involves solving problems that can’t really be solved:
*Bringing children, crazy people etc. into a system that says that what happens to people should be a matter of their own choice.
*Distinguishing what people have freely chosen from what they haven’t (e.g., deciding how and to what extent government should try to counteract the effects of luck, bad heredity, environmental influences etc.)
*Deciding to what extent A’s choices whould be allowed to affect B. (Is inherited wealth OK? If not, how about inter vivos gifts? If both are bad, is it OK to allow Miss A to pick and choose when Mr. B and Mr. C both desire her favors?)
Still, it seems much easier to understand what’s being attempted than in the case of (2). To make (2) do any of the work that’s expected of it (e.g., abolishing laws about public morality) you have to adopt visibly arbitrary restrictions on what’s allowed to count as a reasonable conception of the good that merits acceptance by the system. In the case of (1) I think it’s easier to get started without obvious arbitrariness and stick the arbitrariness in the details. Since the actual implementation of any political principle is going to involve some arbitrariness I don’t see the fact there’s going to be arbitrariness in the details as a fatal objection.
Mr. Kalb writes of a
Mr. Kalb writes of a possible kind of “equal rights”:
“[that they] (1) do not distinguish between A and B except in regard to things A and B have chosen,…”
and:
“The point of his [that is, my] statement though seems to be that (1) is … pointless as an ideal. I don’t see that.”
If I understand this properly, Mr. Kalb is postulating that it may be rationally consistent to consider a class of equal rights that discriminates between one person and another only inasmuch as the distinction between person A and person B is a distinction that both have voluntarily chosen; that is, a distinction with no unchosen mode or attribute. Therefore (on that understanding) my objection to this sort of equal right is not the strong claim that it is rationally incoherent, but the weaker claim that it is arbitrary.
Whether or not this sort of equal right is rationally coherent rests, then, on the presumption that there exist distinctions between people that are a pure product of choice and nothing else.
In response to this I make two claims, one practical and one theoretical:
1) None of the actual distinctions asserted as/by actual rights in our political system are the product of pure choice; and
2) There are no distinctions whatsoever between one person and another that are a product of pure choice; indeed the concept of “pure choice” is empty, since we have not chosen our own existence, predispositions, and desires. So the set of rationally possible rights that operate only on distinctions which are a product of pure choice is also empty.
I suppose the objection is that Mr. Kalb’s distinction doesn’t require the distinction to be a product of pure choice, but simply to have followed necessarily from a choice. However, all actual distinctions (except perhaps for infants) follow in some degree from our choices. We choose, among other things, to go on existing.
So the class of political attributes that are purely chosen is empty, and the class of political attributes that are purely unchosen is also empty. Every attribute that distinguishes one person from another—and that therefore a right can operate upon—proceeds both from chosen and unchosen states of affairs.
In past discussions I have talked about this as the distinction between what we _are_ and what we _do_. My claim is that the are/do distinction doesn’t exist. A “right” always discriminates in favor of A over B, and the distinction between A and B always depends to some degree on what A and B *are* and on what A and B *do*.
So “equal rights” isn’t just an arbitrary principle; it is an _irrational_ principle.
Possibly I have misunderstood Mr. Kalb – it wouldn’t be the first time – but if I understood him correctly that is my answer. It isn’t _arbitrariness_ that is the basis for rejecting “equal rights”; it is that “equal rights” is literally a self-contradictory irrational concept.
The conception of equal
The conception of equal rights that I find comprehensible aims as much as possible to reduce discriminations that have to do with things that aren’t chosen. The point is not that some things are a result of pure choice, but that some things are not chosen at all (one’s ancestry), others (whether I shall become a millionaire) seem quite a mixture, and still others (whether I shall murder or refrain from murdering this particular person) seem overwhelmingly a matter of choice. So the conception could operate as a guiding ideal (as I think I suggested) although not as a fully operational principle.
To me, by the way, the claim that there is no are/do distinction sounds like a denial of essential qualities. Is Matt a nominalist?
It isn’t a denial of
It isn’t a denial of essential qualities in general, which would be a form of nominalism. It is a denial that there are essential qualities which are pure products of the will. Once we’ve decided that we all are not nominalists that still leaves a great deal of room for argument over what categories there are and are not, and what can rationally be said about them.
Mr. Kalb’s distinction between a guiding ideal (or a tendency) and a fully operational principle is an important one. It brings up the question of whether there is any such thing as a “right” that is merely a tendency rather than an operational principle. I say not. The strength and specificity of an operating principle is built into the concept of a “right”.
A guiding ideal can lead to
A guiding ideal can lead to unambiguous answers and therefore clear rights even though working through all the details would put you in a swamp. It’s not so clear what “down with unearned privilege” has to say about the relation between parents and children or Picasso’s ability to profit financially from his native talent, but it does make it pretty clear that hereditary monarchy, nobility and serfdom are ruled out.
“Equal rights” isn’t a
“Equal rights” isn’t a guiding ideal though. An equal right is an actual specific right that everyone has to hold equally. That is what I meant when I said that the strength and specificity of an operating principle is built into the concept of a “right”.
When Mr. Kalb is talking about guiding principles he is not talking about rights. A right is an actual claim to an actual thing, not a general slogan that says (e.g.) “down with monarchy”.
Thanks to Mr. Kalb for his
Thanks to Mr. Kalb for his response. I will need time to process Mr. Kalb’s and Matt’s ideas.