Some comments I made on the problem of evil in alt.religion.christian.roman-catholic:
Peter> one could ask, if one believes in the traditional idea
Peter> of an omnipotent, omniscient, loving God, how does one
Peter> reconcile that with the fact that this God, allows
Peter> innocent children to be periodically killed by natural
Peter> disasters?You’re asking why God would create a world in which there is natural evil. I don’t think any very definite answer is possible, because none of us know what’s involved in creating a world and it’s hard to imagine what a world with no natural evil would be like.
I suppose the general answer is that the possibility of natural evil makes possible a greater good. One can think of ways in which that might be so. For example, if there were no possibility of natural evil, if we lived in a sort of Lubberland in which all our needs and desires were taken care of without risk or effort, it’s not at all clear that would be for the best. In such a condition why would we ever look beyond our immediate sensations? Are we really best off in a world in which everything revolves around us?
That’s speculation of course. My basic response to the problem of evil is to say that the real question is how there can be a real distinction between evil and good, and whether you need the notion of purpose in the Universe—and therefore God—to make sense of that distinction. If you do, then the problem of evil becomes an objection that can be handled by pointing out that it’s possible that the presence of some evil may make more good possible.
Peter> I do not think it is compatible with the idea of an
Peter> omnipotent, omniscient, loving God because such a God
Peter> would be capable of miraculous powers if he chose to use
Peter> them. Such a god would therefore not need to introduce
Peter> evil to make more good possible.But we don’t know what making a world is like. It’s hard for me to imagine a world of finite beings with intelligence and responsibility for running their lives in which no one could get hurt. For all we know it would be impossible to create such a world in the same way it would be impossible for God to make a rock so big he couldn’t move it.
Peter> You have a point, but if it is true, it could be equally
Peter> difficult for God to provide us with a risk free heaven.Quite true. I know even less about constructing heavens than I know about constructing earths. As always though I can speculate. For example, heaven is said to involve eternity and the beatific vision, both of which suggest a sort of all-at-once quality. So quite possibly there’s no risk in heaven because “before” and “after” don’t have the same significance there as they do among us here and now. Or so one can guess.
Remember that from my standpoint all I have to do is show that the existence of evil doesn’t make an all-good and all-powerful God impossible, that there could be some reason for such a God to permit evil to exist. So I don’t have to demonstrate that a risk-free version of this world would lose something essential, or that a risk-free heaven wouldn’t. All I need is to show that those things are possible.
Mr. Kalb writes:
“My basic
Mr. Kalb writes:
“My basic response to the problem of evil is to say that the real question is how there can be a real distinction between evil and good, and whether you need the notion of purpose in the Universe—and therefore God—to make sense of that distinction. If you do, then the problem of evil becomes an objection that can be handled by pointing out that it’s possible that the presence of some evil may make more good possible.”
There is a concrete and undeniable example of this available to us all: the existence of ourselves, and everyone and everything we love. Change the past to eliminate the holocaust or the Black Death and none of us would exist. Therefore a demand for a world without evil is a demand for our own death; a complaint about evil is a complaint about our own existence (and the existence of every single concrete actual person and thing that we love).
The world we live in is this actual one, and we are dependent on it and its past for our existence. With apologies to Liebniz it may or may not be the best of all possible worlds in the abstract, but it is unquestionably the best of all possible worlds for us as we are, because without it we can’t exist at all. The presence of natural evil follows from our original sin on an Eastern Catholic theological understanding of original sin as an actual part of our constitution. We could wish ourselves out of existence and take all that we love with us; but would that constitute a greater good? The only conceivable resolution, it seems, is us as we are and some kind of profound redemption.
Some object with the question of why God doesn’t make us without making us our actual selves as we are, but that objection is self-refuting.
It is true that without love (actual love of actual people and things) the problem of evil becomes impossible to address. With love the problem of evil is a nonsense statement though—a complaint about the nonexistence of a logical impossibility.
When the problem of evil
When the problem of evil question comes up, why is the focus on the innocent children that suffer? Why never the jerks, sinners, criminals, jack@$$es…and not-so-innocent children? The question implies that if there is a God, God should only love innocent children. I have a problem with that. It displays such callousness and disregard to all of human life.
Matt, in a partial response
Matt, in a partial response to your statement:
“We could wish ourselves out of existence…but would that constitute a greater good?”
Some people would actually say, “Yes, it does. It is better to have no world, no us at all, than to have a world with evil existing. Though you may say that God may allow evil so that He may draw a greater good from it, we hold it is better to have a lesser good with no evil, than a greater good with evil. For that lesser good is still a good, and exists as a good.”
“Better to have nothing at all, better not to be at all, than live in a world with evil allowed.”
Now I think C. S. Lewis may have answered this objection in one of his writings, but I’m not sure. In any case, living in a skeptical age as we do, I think it behooves us to answer such a charge.
Comments, please. thank you.
Matt, in a partial response
Matt, in a partial response to your statement:
“We could wish ourselves out of existence…but would that constitute a greater good?”
Some people would actually say, “Yes, it does. It is better to have no world, no us at all, than to have a world with evil existing. Though you may say that God may allow evil so that He may draw a greater good from it, we hold it is better to have a lesser good with no evil, than a greater good with evil. For that lesser good is still a good, and exists as a good.”
“Better to have nothing at all, better not to be at all, than live in a world with evil allowed.”
Now I think C. S. Lewis may have answered this objection in one of his writings, but I’m not sure. In any case, living in a skeptical age as we do, I think it behooves us to answer such a charge.
Comments, please. thank you.
I am not sure I have much of
I am not sure I have much of a comment. I think Mr. Moore has it right. To complain to God about evil is to beg for death. It is more than to beg for death: it is to ask God to treat us as a terrible mistake; to beg God for the retroactive annihilation of ourselves, of everything and everyone we know, of all of our ancestors, of our entire world.
To me, looking into my little daughter’s eyes, it is manifestly clear that our existence is better than our retroactive annihilation. Even the baby in the dumpster ultimately achieves the Beatific Vision, and presumably he will think it better than personal annihilation. Perhaps we each get to face the choice at our judgement; who knows?
I do think that if someone has no love in him at all that the desire for death probably wins out.
Hmmm. The world wasnt
Hmmm. The world wasnt created evil. We made it that way.