A sensible discussion by Maggie Gallagher of what is at stake with “gay marriage”. Nothing new or dazzling, but why are so many people so oblivious to these points? (My own anwer, of course, is that their metaphysics doesn’t let the issues arise no matter what the facts.)
Which points exactly? I
Which points exactly? I can’t see any, actually.
The only point Gallagher makes (apart from slogans about “recapturing and deepening our understanding of the basic meaning of marriage”) is quite pragmatic: “marriage is between men and women, […] it aims to get mothers and fathers for children, and to regulate those sexual relationships (permanent, life-giving) upon which the very existence of the next generation depends […]”
Well, you cannot win the debate with gay activists on this pragmatic level (homosexual couples are able to bring up children given to them by adoption or genetics or whatever). So you are right – “traditionalists” can only win the battle on the metaphysical level. But who is going to accept any traditional metaphyscis in the age of democracy, science and free market? Only some bunch of outsiders, I’m afraid.
What’s more, Gallagher’s argument is not sound because she overlooks heterosexual married couples who don’t have (and don’t want to have) children – what about them? Should the state protect them? Why?
I deal with your points at
I deal with your points at http://www.counterrevolution.net/vfr/archives/000143.html, http://www.counterrevolution.net/vfr/archives/000186.html, and http://www.counterrevolution.net/vfr/archives/000168.html.
The problem as I see it is that democracy, modern natural science and the free market are interpreted in a metaphysically absolute way opposed to experience, practicality and common sense – in short, to human nature. In the long run I expect human nature to win. The strongest argument to the contrary I think is that artificial intelligence will win and human nature be abolished. My reasons for doubting that will happen have to do with the way things are in general and thus are, I suppose, somewhat metaphysical.