Items Posted by Jim Kalb
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Article: 8082 of talk.philosophy.misc
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From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.atheism,talk.religion.misc,talk.philosophy.misc,alt.atheism.moderated
Subject: Re: Why is there a "here" here?
Date: 9 Aug 1993 17:57:04 +0100
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srat@erg.sri.com (Ray Trent) writes:
>>1. Everything has an explanation.
>
>Actually, modern scientific theories, without being copouts at all,
>propose only statistical explanations. Everything is composed of
>sub-atomic particles that behave non-deterministically. The only
>determinism that exists is the Law of Large Numbers. Again, this is
>hard to understand and even harder to accept, but the universe behaves
>(and is verified repeatably through experiment and theory to behave)
>as though *nothing* has a direct non-statistical explanation.
The theory seems to be that the world consists of a large number of
particles that are constantly changing state, that the changes in state
are predictable only statistically, and that determininistic laws of
nature are statements about how large numbers of particles act. If
accepted as the ultimate truth about things, such a theory certainly
implies that deterministic explanations can't be given for particular
events because there is an element of randomness in each event. It
doesn't seem to imply that there are events for which no explanation at
all can be given. For example, if an electron goes from state A to
state B, I suppose (physicists will have to correct me) that the
explanation is that state B is one of the states it is possible for an
electron to enter from state A, that there is a specific probability
that the transition will be made in any specific period of time, and
that at the particular time the probability happened to be realized.
>>2. The universe as we know it doesn't provide an explanation for
>>itself.
>
>Whatever that means.
It means we don't have a non-theistic explanation for the existence of
the universe.
>>4. That explanation may have another explanation, which may have yet
>>another explanation, but an infinite series of explanations is no
>>explanation at all.
>
>I'm not sure what the "but" clause of this sentance means. It sounds
>like Zeno's paradox mysticism. Yes, folks, infinite numbers of
>infinitely small things *can* add up to finite, even large, sums.
Sometimes they do, sometimes they don't. Would an infinitely long
explanation explain anything to you?
>>5. Therefore, at some point in the series of explanations the universe
>>has a final explanation based on something that provides an explanation
>>for itself as well as everything else. That something is called "God".
>
>There's this really interesting, and really long proven theory known as
>Conservation of Mass-Energy [ . . . ] The only rational conclusion is
>that all of the mass/energy of the universe has existed for all time.
The theory seems to be "the universe exists because it's always existed
and it has never gone away because of C. of M.-E." That's not
satisfactory if you demand that the world be comprehensible at least in
principle, because it suggests no possible explanation why M.-E. ever
existed or why it is conserved. Remember that the argument is that for
the existence of the universe to be comprehensible there has to be some
special kind of entity somewhere by reference to which the reasons for
its own existence can be comprehended.
--
Jim Kalb Nirgends bleibt sie zurueck, dass wir ihr ein Mal entroennen
jk@panix.com und sie in stiller Fabrik oelend sich selber gehoert.
Sie ist das Leben,- sie meint es am besten zu koennen,
die mit dem gleichen Entschluss ordnet und schafft und zerstoert.
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Aug 9 19:40:53 EDT 1993
Article: 629 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: Aquarius
Date: 9 Aug 1993 17:08:05 -0400
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deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>I think by gimmick, Michael Walker was thinking in long range historical
>terms, in which a few centuries - say, from the Enlightenment til now -
>would be a mere blink of an eye.
I'm surprised he comes out with his mag as often as once a year.
>However, we one refers to the USA meating the fate of the USSR, one need
>not think that it will follow the same pattern. My hunch is that a long
>period of stagnation, political paralysis, and ultimate social and
>economic breakdown would precede any ultimate political breakup - which
>might not come suddenly, or might not even last long before some new
>force reunified the pieces.
It's hard to know how to begin predicting such things. Are there any
good sci-fi writers with counterrevolutionary sympathies who are also
steely-eyed realists?
Speaking of steely-eyed realism, good luck in the SCA wars!
--
Jim Kalb Nirgends bleibt sie zurueck, dass wir ihr ein Mal entroennen
jk@panix.com und sie in stiller Fabrik oelend sich selber gehoert.
Sie ist das Leben,- sie meint es am besten zu koennen,
die mit dem gleichen Entschluss ordnet und schafft und zerstoert.
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Aug 9 19:40:54 EDT 1993
Article: 630 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: An exposition of Heidegger's philosophy
Date: 9 Aug 1993 17:10:20 -0400
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deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>I intend to stay closer to the "middle of the road" between subjectivism
>and objectivism.
We'll leave it at that, then. As a side comment, I would say that it
seems easier for religious perspectives to stay in the middle of that
road than nonreligious perspectives. If you are religious then
absolutes can exist and be more real than anything else to you even
though you are convinced that you will never come close to fully
possessing them.
>But [Heidegger] might say that that is beside the point; that it is up
>to the conflicting Worlds of Being to look after themselves, and it does
>not matter what petty philosophers and "comparative evaluationists" say
>is better or best. Perhaps that is what he would say?
I don't know. For my own part, I can't help but feel that we are
responsible for what one might call the metaphysical nature of the world
we live in, at least to the extent it results from the cumulative effect
of the things to which we pay attention all our lives. If Nietzsche
thinks that the will to power is all there is and 57% of the readers of
_Newsweek_ think that comfort and career success are all there is and
Simone Weil thinks that God and his creation is all there is, maybe part
of the difference is that each has developed the habit of turning his
attention in a particular direction and maybe each could have done
differently. It also seems to me that different metaphysical worlds can
be comparatively evaluated. For example, the world I just attributed to
Nietzsche makes no sense because "power" makes no sense without a
preceeding concept of value. The world I attributed to many _Newsweek_
readers leaves out too much to be acceptable. The one I attributed to
Simone Weil, though, doesn't seem subject to either objection.
>Well, [ants] communicate - using chemical scents, etc. Is this making
>use of universals? I'm not sure I agree with your use of the word
>"universals" here. Clearly, when we think about particular objects, and
>their relationships to other objects, we make use of abstractions -
>i.e., words, language. But is this a "universal"? I don't think so. The
>word universal implies a scheme or world view with tries to take account
>of everything - language need not do this for it to be language.
I'm not sure where this discussion is going or coming from. You
mentioned that Alain de Benoist is a nominalist. A "nominalist", I
think, is someone who denies the reality of abstract qualities like
"redness". I'm not sure how we can use language meaningfully if
abstract qualities aren't real. On the other hand, if abstract
qualities are real I'm not sure where things stop. ("Redness" =>
"color" => "quality" => metaphysics involving substances and essential
and accidental qualities?)
>If two persons share the same language, they can talk about these things
>because they both share the same set of abstractions - though there will
>be personal differences (as in differing understandings of "honor").
>Moreover, they can still talk, even if they believe in radically
>different "universals" (an atheist and a Christian, for instance).
If a language implies a metaphysics, then maybe they don't really
believe in different universals but one of them is just confused. Or
maybe if they really do believe in different universals their languages
aren't really the same.
Once again, our discussions have taken me far beyond my depth. That's
what usenet is for, though.
--
Jim Kalb Nirgends bleibt sie zurueck, dass wir ihr ein Mal entroennen
jk@panix.com und sie in stiller Fabrik oelend sich selber gehoert.
Sie ist das Leben,- sie meint es am besten zu koennen,
die mit dem gleichen Entschluss ordnet und schafft und zerstoert.
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Aug 10 07:24:59 EDT 1993
Article: 632 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: Aquarius
Date: 10 Aug 1993 07:17:29 -0400
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aaiken@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (Andrew C. Aiken) writes:
But there are many examples in modern literature of the
counterrevolutionary position as against modernism. My own
favorite is _The Poorhouse Fair_ by John Updike. Written in
1959, but set in 1979, it is a tragic little book, a defense of
an older mankind against humanism. It is written in a modern
style, but it is not merely nostalgic.
I'll have to take a look at it. I haven't read much Updike lately. I
always liked his essays but never finished any of his novels.
--
Jim Kalb Nirgends bleibt sie zurueck, dass wir ihr ein Mal entroennen
jk@panix.com und sie in stiller Fabrik oelend sich selber gehoert.
Sie ist das Leben,- sie meint es am besten zu koennen,
die mit dem gleichen Entschluss ordnet und schafft und zerstoert.
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Article: 8113 of talk.philosophy.misc
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From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.atheism,talk.religion.misc,talk.philosophy.misc,alt.atheism.moderated
Subject: Re: Why is there a "here" here?
Date: 10 Aug 1993 18:29:17 +0100
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Paul Crowley writes:
>>>1. Everything has an explanation.
>
>Everything we've explained so far has an explanation, anyway. Or more
>accurately, there are some phenomena for which we have a model that
>predicts them.
Do you think your way of putting it captures what people do when they
look for or use an explanation? Suppose we have a model that predicts
that the sun will rise tomorrow. Why is it rational to draw conclusions
from that model about the events that will occur over the next 24 hours
if we don't accept that in general the world has features (future events
will be like past events; our abstract concepts have enough purchase on
the world to allow us to tell when one event is like another; simple
theories are more likely to be true than complicated theories) that make
explanations possible?
>>>2. The universe as we know it doesn't provide an explanation for
>>>itself.
>
>An explanation is just a theory that would have predicted whatever
>phenomenon you're discussing.
Why say that? We can explain how we know that the Pythagorean theorem
is true by presenting a proof that it is true. Is the proof or its
presentation a theory that predicts our knowledge? Does it predict the
theorem? Is the theorem a phenomenon? For that matter, you've just
explained what you think an explanation is but you didn't present a
theoretical model that predicts a phenomenon.
>An explanation of the existence of the Universe is by its own terms
>impossible; a meaningless concept.
That might be right, but an argument based on an account of what
explanations are that only deals with one particular type of explanation
doesn't help me see that it is right.
>>>5. Therefore, at some point in the series of explanations the universe
>>>has a final explanation based on something that provides an explanation
>>>for itself as well as everything else. That something is called "God".
>
>Look, if you were going to deduce the existence of something and then
>call that something "God", why go to all this bother? Why not call my
>cat God? Then debates about the existence of God would be much shorter.
I doubt that your cat has the properties generally attributed to God. A
self-caused cause of the sort under discussion could be reasonably
thought to have such properties. Such an entity, as the cause of itself
and everything else, would be omnipotent at least in the sense that
anything it could not bring about would be impossible, and anything it
could bring about could not be prevented from occuring by some other
thing. If you think that "goodness" is part of the world that exists
independently of every finite observer and is not something that is
constructed by human beings, and that "evil" is in some way subordinate
to, dependent on or less real than goodness, then it makes sense to
attribute purpose and benevolence to the creator of goodness. But an
omnipotent and benevolent entity is recognizably God as traditionally
conceived.
--
Jim Kalb Nirgends bleibt sie zurueck, dass wir ihr ein Mal entroennen
jk@panix.com und sie in stiller Fabrik oelend sich selber gehoert.
Sie ist das Leben,- sie meint es am besten zu koennen,
die mit dem gleichen Entschluss ordnet und schafft und zerstoert.
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Aug 10 20:24:44 EDT 1993
Article: 637 of alt.revolution.counter
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From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: Aquarius
Date: 10 Aug 1993 20:23:13 -0400
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deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>[Michael Walker] works a regular job to earn a living.
Out of curiosity, what does he do? And why is he in Germany?
--
Jim Kalb Nirgends bleibt sie zurueck, dass wir ihr ein Mal entroennen
jk@panix.com und sie in stiller Fabrik oelend sich selber gehoert.
Sie ist das Leben,- sie meint es am besten zu koennen,
die mit dem gleichen Entschluss ordnet und schafft und zerstoert.
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Aug 10 20:24:44 EDT 1993
Article: 638 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: An exposition of Heidegger's philosophy
Date: 10 Aug 1993 20:24:40 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>I would assume that Nietzsche would say that one chooses one's values,
>and to the extent that one adheres to those values, one is exercising
>one's will to power? I think Nietzsche would say that values precede the
>will to power, but I can't vouch for that.
Nietzsche is thoroughly incoherent, but he typically seems to say that
one's values are an expression of his will to power. The w. to p. comes
first, and each of us chooses values with a view to increasing his
power.
>Alas, I can't place Simone Weil. Who he?
She. A Frenchwoman who starved herself to death in England during the
Second World War because she didn't want to eat more than people were
eating in France. She got odd at times, but she was unusually
intelligent, perceptive and independent-minded on both social and
spiritual issues.
>I'm not sure that a nominalist would deny the reality of abstract
>qualities; rather, I was under the impression that the nominalist would
>insist on emphasizing that the concept of redness IS an abstraction, and
>not a concrete thing in itself. That is, abstractions are nominal - we
>use them because they are useful. The abstractions do not exist apart
>from the things they describe, but they do exist.
My impression is that people called nominalists typically take a more
radical position.
>If we really want to get into trouble, we could start discussing what we mean
>by "real".
Why not? Nobody here but us CRs.
--
Jim Kalb Nirgends bleibt sie zurueck, dass wir ihr ein Mal entroennen
jk@panix.com und sie in stiller Fabrik oelend sich selber gehoert.
Sie ist das Leben,- sie meint es am besten zu koennen,
die mit dem gleichen Entschluss ordnet und schafft und zerstoert.
From panix!not-for-mail Wed Aug 11 06:22:08 EDT 1993
Article: 14531 of talk.politics.theory
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,alt.politics.libertarian
Subject: Re: Libertarianism, Capitalism and Happiness
Date: 10 Aug 1993 20:27:21 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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auld@qed.uucp (Chris Auld) writes:
>Third, utility theory says only that people can ordinally rank states of
>the world; therefore, stating that ``happiness'' is not equivalent to
>utility directly implies that people don't know what's in their best
>interests (depending on how ``happiness'' is defined).
It implies that people can mistake their best interests. That seems
obviously true. If people didn't believe that about themselves, why
would they ever ask other people for advice?
>That is, if someone prefers state A but you claim he would be
>`happier' in state B, that person doesn't really know what he wants,
>but you do.
In that situation, you think the person is making a mistake as to what
is in his best interests. I think most of us on occasion have thought
that about someone. Is the point that it is incoherent to think such a
thing, because "what I want now" and "what is in my best interests" are
definitionally identical?
--
Jim Kalb Nirgends bleibt sie zurueck, dass wir ihr ein Mal entroennen
jk@panix.com und sie in stiller Fabrik oelend sich selber gehoert.
Sie ist das Leben,- sie meint es am besten zu koennen,
die mit dem gleichen Entschluss ordnet und schafft und zerstoert.
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Article: 8143 of talk.philosophy.misc
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From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.atheism,talk.religion.misc,talk.philosophy.misc,alt.atheism.moderated
Subject: Re: Why is there a "here" here?
Date: 11 Aug 1993 14:26:54 +0100
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I3150101@dbstu1.rz.tu-bs.de (Benedikt Rosenau) writes:
>>1. Everything has an explanation.
>
>The first claim is dubious
Explanatory power is a criterion for theory choice. It seems to me it
wouldn't be if we didn't assume that things have explanations, so that
the theory that explains most and best is the theory that is most likely
to be true.
>[Y]ou need finiteness as an axiom.
What would an infinitely long explanation be like? To whom would such
an explanation explain anything?
>However, it is not said how something can be the explanation of its own
>existence other than the example that we would not observe something if
>there were nothing because we weren't there, too.
I don't see how the example is an example of something explaining its
own existence. You are right that I didn't discuss how something could
explain its own existence, I just observed that unless such an entity
exists and is comprehensible the world becomes incomprehensible.
The ontological argument for the existence of God is one attempt to show
how God's existence can be self-explanatory. I don't understand the
argument well enough to say whether it is successful. It seems to me
all I need in the present discussion is the claim that some such attempt
may be successful because then we have a choice of the atheistic "things
are incomprehensible for sure" theory and the theistic "maybe things are
comprehensible" theory.
>Lastly, calling that something god will most likely be understood as
>giving this something the attributes usually associated with a god.
I commented on this in a recent posting in this thread.
>Given the assumptions it just shows that there is AT LEAST one primary
>and self-explanatory explanation. Imagine two gods building a universe.
If there were two such gods they would be dependent on each other in the
sense that one could not exist in the absence of the other. (If "A
exists" and "B exists" are both necessary truths then each would imply
the other.) But then it might make more sense to think of the two gods
as aspects or persons of a single God, rather in the manner of the
Christian Trinity. I would think, though, that Occam's razor suggests
that the "single god" theory should be preferred to the "multiple gods"
theory unless there is some reason to believe the latter theory is true.
--
Jim Kalb Nirgends bleibt sie zurueck, dass wir ihr ein Mal entroennen
jk@panix.com und sie in stiller Fabrik oelend sich selber gehoert.
Sie ist das Leben,- sie meint es am besten zu koennen,
die mit dem gleichen Entschluss ordnet und schafft und zerstoert.
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Article: 8144 of talk.philosophy.misc
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From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.atheism,talk.religion.misc,talk.philosophy.misc,alt.atheism.moderated
Subject: Re: Why is there a "here" here?
Date: 11 Aug 1993 14:26:58 +0100
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I3150101@dbstu1.rz.tu-bs.de (Benedikt Rosenau) writes:
>>Suppose we have a model that predicts
>>that the sun will rise tomorrow. Why is it rational to draw conclusions
>>from that model about the events that will occur over the next 24 hours
>>if we don't accept that in general the world has features (future events
>>will be like past events; our abstract concepts have enough purchase on
>>the world to allow us to tell when one event is like another; simple
>>theories are more likely to be true than complicated theories) that make
>>explanations possible?
>
>However, your claim is everything has an explanation, and there is simply
>no connection between that claim and your line of arguing above.
The point is that the "an explanation is a model" theory leaves out a
great deal. For example, we can't treat a model as an explanation of
anything without assuming a great many things that are unproven and very
likely unproveable. I've listed some of the things in the parenthetical
language double-quoted above. I would add that the entire enterprise of
building models and otherwise trying to explain things presupposes that
things have explanations. If we didn't assume that things have
explanations why would we view theories of greater explanatory power as
more likely to be true than other theories? If you want, I could
rephrase "everything has an explanation" as "claims that there is no
explanation for something should be rejected if possible".
>>>An explanation is just a theory that would have predicted whatever
>>>phenomenon you're discussing.
>
>>For that matter, you've just
>>explained what you think an explanation is but you didn't present a
>>theoretical model that predicts a phenomenon.
>
>He did.
I don't see how the triple-quoted language above constitutes a
theoretical model that predicts a phenomenon.
>And you were selling a red herring by shifting the discussion to
>mathematics. Anyway, one can interpret mathematical explanations as
>predictions made on axioms, if you wish.
We are discussing whether a particular object does in fact exist that
exists necessarily if it exists at all. I don't see why mathematics is
a worse analogy than (say) physics. And if you want to interpret
mathematical explanations in the manner you suggest I suppose you can do
the same with theological explanations.
>>>An explanation of the existence of the Universe is by its own terms
>>>impossible; a meaningless concept.
>
>>That might be right, but an argument based on an account of what
>>explanations are that only deals with one particular type of explanation
>>doesn't help me see that it is right.
>
>Well, how about presenting a better one?
A better account of what explanations are in general? It seems to me
all I need is to give an account of the features of explanations on
which I am relying.
>Don't forget that you need some objectivity in order to claim that
>everything has an explanation. Or the question an explanation to whom,
>and how can we generalize from explanation a certain group likes to the
>claim that everything has an explanation?
One feature of explanations is that an explanation is an explanation to
a particular mind or type of mind. For example, an infinitely long
explanation could only be an explanation to a mind of unlimited speed
and memory, and it doesn't seem that it would constitute an explanation
in an atheistic universe.
>Anyway, I am still waiting for an answer to my objection of the first
>cause/first explanation god `proof'.
My original reply to your posting apparently got lost somewhere between
my site and the moderator of alt.atheism.moderated. I have composed a
new reply and reposted.
>I don't know if you are aware that you are crossposting to alt.atheism,
>since that argument is dealt with in the a.a FAQ, too.
I will look at the FAQ.
--
Jim Kalb Nirgends bleibt sie zurueck, dass wir ihr ein Mal entroennen
jk@panix.com und sie in stiller Fabrik oelend sich selber gehoert.
Sie ist das Leben,- sie meint es am besten zu koennen,
die mit dem gleichen Entschluss ordnet und schafft und zerstoert.
From panix!not-for-mail Wed Aug 11 16:08:56 EDT 1993
Article: 640 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Arbitron survey results!
Date: 11 Aug 1993 13:40:32 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 35
Message-ID: <24baug$5vr@panix.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
The following is from the USENET readership report for Jul 93:
+-- Estimated total number of people who read the group, worldwide.
| +-- Actual number of readers in sampled population
| | +-- Propagation: how many sites receive this group at all
| | | +-- Recent traffic (messages per month)
| | | | +-- Recent traffic (kilobytes per month)
| | | | | +-- Crossposting percentage
| | | | | | +-- Cost ratio: $US/month/rdr
| | | | | | | +-- Share: % of newsrders
| | | | | | | | who read this group.
V V V V V V V V
[irrelevant cybernoise deleted]
1819 10000 168 9% 17 55.5 100% 0.00 0.4% clari.sports.olympic
1820 10000 167 42% 101 420.3 3% 0.03 0.4% alt.revolution.counter
1821 10000 167 23% - - - - 0.4% alt.sex.bondage.particle.physics
[loser newsgroups deleted]
Some might say we're not doing too well, since the only reason we were
able to edge out alt.sex.bondage.particle.physics (which only half as
many sites get and never has any messages anyway) is that we're ahead of
them in the alphabet. The way I look at it, though, is that 10,000
readers is big, BIG, *BIG* , especially when you consider that last I
heard _Chronicles_ has fewer than 20,000.
How about hearing more from the silent majority out there?
--
Jim Kalb Nirgends bleibt sie zurueck, dass wir ihr ein Mal entroennen
jk@panix.com und sie in stiller Fabrik oelend sich selber gehoert.
Sie ist das Leben,- sie meint es am besten zu koennen,
die mit dem gleichen Entschluss ordnet und schafft und zerstoert.
From panix!not-for-mail Thu Aug 12 08:35:26 EDT 1993
Article: 647 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: USA & Communism
Date: 12 Aug 1993 08:35:20 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 50
Message-ID: <24dde8$h08@panix.com>
References:
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
tomshaw@consvtv.neosoft.com (Tom Shaw) writes:
>Ever heard of Jane Fonda,Ed Asner,Ted Turner,Peter Arnet, Bill Clinton,
>etc. [ . . . ] I just posted on that very subject last night about
>socialism and the professors having their annual meeting in New York.
>They are calling it socialism today but it is Marxist from the get go.
Any comments from people associated with colleges and universities on
the current status of Marxism in the academy?
Marxism has both a view of the goal of economic, political and social
development and a social-scientific theory. The Marxist goal is the
Revolution: the creation of an actual society in which the activity and
development of each individual in accordance with his actual purposes
and characteristics is free from all constraints other than those
imposed by the equally free activity and development of all other
individuals. The Marxist social-scientific theory (technology => most
efficient mode of economic cooperation => class system => politics and
ideology) is reductionist and materialist but not specifically leftist.
Marxism may be the natural viewpoint for academics at present. The
Revolution has been the predominant political goal of our society for a
long time, and the success of the natural sciences continues to lend
prestige to materialist and reductionist theories in all fields of
study. So what people need is a theory that shows that the history of
the world can be reduced to a material process that will lead to the
final success of the Revolution, and Marxism satisfies that need.
It remains to be seen what effect the collapse of communism and other
practical failures of the left will ultimately have on all this. My
guess is that the loss of Marxism would be too much to bear, so academic
Marxists will redouble their efforts to preserve the faith in hard
times. To reject Marxism is either to reject the Revolution in
principle, or to accept that the Revolution will not succeed, or to
accept that there are factors not reducible to material factors at work
in history. To reject the Revolution or to accept that it will not
happen is to accept that there is a necessary difference between what is
good and what is materially real and thus to be forced to choose between
nihilism and a transcendental faith. To accept non-material factors in
history leading to the final victory of the Revolution seems somewhat
self-defeating, since the point of the Revolution is that it will create
a wholly materialist utopia. I expect that leftists will stick to what
they have for quite some time rather than accept such difficult choices,
and will deal with difficulties by becoming more intolerant and
fanatical.
--
Jim Kalb Nirgends bleibt sie zurueck, dass wir ihr ein Mal entroennen
jk@panix.com und sie in stiller Fabrik oelend sich selber gehoert.
Sie ist das Leben,- sie meint es am besten zu koennen,
die mit dem gleichen Entschluss ordnet und schafft und zerstoert.
From panix!not-for-mail Thu Aug 12 08:38:27 EDT 1993
Article: 648 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: Whatever Happened to the Monarcho-Integrists?
Date: 12 Aug 1993 08:36:25 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 17
Message-ID: <24ddg9$h5j@panix.com>
References:
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
monaghan@zanskar.avc.ucl.ac.uk (N.O. Monaghan) writes:
>>Wasn't this newsgroup founded by monarchists and Integrists? I haven't
>>seen much of them in quite a while.
>
>Yes. I am still around, but have not seen anybody else for some time.
>The problem I think is that this newsgroup does not reach all sites.
If that's a problem, I set up a procedure some time ago for distributing
it by email. It would be no problem adding more names to the list if
limited distribution is a problem. (People who get the newsgroup by
email can post through one of the mail-to-news gateways.)
--
Jim Kalb Nirgends bleibt sie zurueck, dass wir ihr ein Mal entroennen
jk@panix.com und sie in stiller Fabrik oelend sich selber gehoert.
Sie ist das Leben,- sie meint es am besten zu koennen,
die mit dem gleichen Entschluss ordnet und schafft und zerstoert.
From panix!not-for-mail Thu Aug 12 08:38:28 EDT 1993
Article: 649 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: An exposition of Heidegger's philosophy
Date: 12 Aug 1993 08:38:17 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 42
Message-ID: <24ddjp$hb7@panix.com>
References: <1993Aug10.200340.23714@news.cs.brandeis.edu> <249e88$p8q@panix.com> <1993Aug12.035113.19216@news.cs.brandeis.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>Nietzsche's "incoherency" is what makes him so interesting: one is
>forced to create one's own structure for his ideas, because he has not
>done so.
He raises lots of issues, and it's up to you what to do with them.
>Physical particulars have an objective existence - that most people
>would agree on. Now, to say that universals do not have objective
>existence is not necessarily the same thing as to deny the reality of
>said u4?/mversals. I think a nominalist - at least as I understand the
>term - would say that v9{iversals have a *subjective* existence. Both
>particulars and universals exist, are real, but they are real in
>different ways. Particulars: objectively real. Universals: subjectively
>real. Our rationalist mentality assumes that subjective truths are
>unimportant, or unreal, but this is not so.
I'm inclined to think that if things are real they're real and if
they're not they're not. If I'm afraid of burglars under my bed my
fears are real but the burglars (presumably) aren't.
To move away from particulars/universals for a moment, you may have
something like honor in mind. Honor is real (someone might give his
life for honor without being unreasonable), but one might say it's not
objectively real because it can't be measured or weighed and it's
different for different men. My own inclination is to say that plainly
there are objective realities like the series of integers that can't be
investigated by the methods of natural science, and that honor should be
viewed as such a reality because otherwise there could be no mistaken
notions of honor or mistaken views as to whether an act violates a
particular notion of honor
Back to particulars and universals -- I don't see what sense it makes to
say that universals like redness or magnitude are real but not
objectively real. After all, our knowledge of objective realities such
as rocks is in terms of color, magnitude and so on.
--
Jim Kalb Nirgends bleibt sie zurueck, dass wir ihr ein Mal entroennen
jk@panix.com und sie in stiller Fabrik oelend sich selber gehoert.
Sie ist das Leben,- sie meint es am besten zu koennen,
die mit dem gleichen Entschluss ordnet und schafft und zerstoert.
From panix!news.intercon.com!digex.com!uunet!pipex!mantis!mantis!not-for-mail Fri Aug 13 12:07:14 EDT 1993
Article: 8228 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!news.intercon.com!digex.com!uunet!pipex!mantis!mantis!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.atheism,talk.religion.misc,talk.philosophy.misc,alt.atheism.moderated
Subject: Re: Why is there a "here" here?
Date: 13 Aug 1993 15:47:56 +0100
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 103
Sender: mathew@mantis.co.uk
Approved: atheism@mantis.co.uk
Distribution: world
Message-ID: <24en5j$7m1@panix.com>
References: <24akq5$sqa@panix.com> <24bsea$dct@linus.erg.sri.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: sunforest.mantis.co.uk
Xref: panix alt.atheism:58563 talk.religion.misc:60598 talk.philosophy.misc:8228 alt.atheism.moderated:704
rat@erg.sri.com (Ray Trent) writes:
>Explanatory power is *not* a rational criterion for theory choice. The
>simple explanation: we can't know what will happen because God chooses
>at each moment what will happen" is *extremely* explanatory.
To explain is to explain why things are one way rather than another. So
the "God just happens to want it that way" theory does not in general
explain particular events any more than the "we're here because we're
here" theory explains why there is something rather than nothing.
>What it is not is "predictive". Predictive power is the only rational
>criterion for theory choice besides internal and external consistency.
That might be right if our sole purpose in theorizing were predicting,
but it isn't. The purpose of moral theories, theories of evolution and
theories about who killed John Kennedy is not prediction. Nor is
theorizing of the sort you and I are now engaged in intended to predict
anything.
>I reject the theological theory because it is not predictive, nor is it
>falsifiable,
The conditions that confirm the theological theory might not have
existed. For example, the world might not have existed and if it
existed it might not have contained qualia (without which I suppose
there would have been no such thing as objective value).
>nor is it consistent with the facts unless you assume a malevolent god.
Do the facts suggest that this is the worst of all possible worlds?
How?
>If quantum mechanics is correct, there can be no explanation of the
>statement "at the particular time the probability happened to be
>realized".
Presumably people who accept the correctness of quantum mechanics
interpreted in the manner you suggest (I haven't done the homework to be
able to discuss the technical aspects of the matter) think that by
giving up hope of getting an explanation on one point they get
clarification on others. I know of no similar advantages to atheism.
>Here is an infinitely long explanation that has a great deal of meaning:
[standard proof of the infinity of primes]
>At this point, since we have finite lifetimes, it is traditional to stop
>and say: since it doesn't matter what X was, there are an infinite
>number of primes. However, it is also perfectly valid and explanatory to
>continue on: "Now, there are a finite number of primes <=Y. A new number
>M>Y can be calculated by..." The fact that there is nothing about this
>argument that depends on the value of X means that you could
>theoretically repeat this "explanation" an infinite number of times
>(i.e. contruct an "infinite explanation") and *that* is what *really*
>proves that there are an infinite number of prime numbers.
I thought the proof was usually presented as a _reductio_: if there
were a biggest prime you could multiply it by all the smaller primes and
add 1, so there can't be a biggest prime. As so stated it's not of
infinite length.
>In general, any inductive proof is reducible to and equivilent to an
>"infinite explanation".
But a finite procedure can be given that specifies each step in the
infinite explanation. Otherwise it wouldn't be a proof.
>>Remember that the argument is that for
>>the existence of the universe to be comprehensible there has to be some
>>special kind of entity somewhere by reference to which the reasons for
>>its own existence can be comprehended.
>
>This is only true if you think there has to be some "purpose" that the
>universe fulfills.
It may be true that the rational comprehensibility and the purposiveness
of the universe imply each other.
The argument is that if we are trying rationally to comprehend the
universe we should assume that the universe is rationally comprehensible
unless we get something valuable by accepting the contrary, just as if
we are trying to predict future states of the universe we should _prima
facie_ assume such states are predictable. If (as you say) r.c. implies
purposiveness that is an implication I can live with.
>My definition of "comprehensible" more closely fits "an ever increasing
>understanding of how something behaves" rather than "complete
>understanding of why something behaves the way it does where 'why'
>relates to the purpose of the something in a great cosmic plan of some
>sort".
It seems to me that every definite partial understanding is embedded in
and depends on a less definite overall understanding of what the world
is like. Trying to make our overall understanding of things more
explicit is itself a contribution to knowledge.
--
Jim Kalb Nirgends bleibt sie zurueck, dass wir ihr ein Mal entroennen
jk@panix.com und sie in stiller Fabrik oelend sich selber gehoert.
Sie ist das Leben,- sie meint es am besten zu koennen,
die mit dem gleichen Entschluss ordnet und schafft und zerstoert.
From panix!news.intercon.com!digex.com!uunet!pipex!mantis!mantis!not-for-mail Fri Aug 13 12:07:15 EDT 1993
Article: 8230 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!news.intercon.com!digex.com!uunet!pipex!mantis!mantis!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.atheism,talk.religion.misc,talk.philosophy.misc,alt.atheism.moderated
Subject: Re: Why is there a "here" here?
Date: 13 Aug 1993 15:48:06 +0100
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 115
Sender: mathew@mantis.co.uk
Approved: atheism@mantis.co.uk
Distribution: world
Message-ID: <24g1fh$30r@panix.com>
References: <23r687$53g@news.mantis.co.uk> <24akq5$sqa@panix.com> <24fmsj$2d2@news.mantis.co.uk>
NNTP-Posting-Host: sunforest.mantis.co.uk
Xref: panix alt.atheism:58567 talk.religion.misc:60600 talk.philosophy.misc:8230 alt.atheism.moderated:709
I3150101@dbstu1.rz.tu-bs.de (Benedikt Rosenau) writes:
>Anyway, you appear to assume that the theory that explains most is the
>theory that explains best. That is not given. Could you prove that?
More is better unless some advantage can be gained by accepting less.
What is the advantage of atheism?
>Further, you are still begging the question if one can just explain
>everything that can be explained, or if one can indeed explain
>everything that comes up in the course of explanations.
See my response to Ray Trent.
>Example: according to the Big Bang theory, the universe has developed
>out of a singularity: The physical laws we know do not exist in a
>singularity and we cannot extend the application of causality to the Big
>Bang or 'before'.
Because we don't know how to do it or because there is a demonstration
that no physical laws of any sort govern a singularity? If the former,
I would imagine that investigators will continue to assume that there
are laws of some sort unless they can get something (other than the
simplicity of assuming there are no laws) by accepting the contrary.
>>What would an infinitely long explanation be like? To whom would such
>>an explanation explain anything?
>
>An infinite regress in causes would be an infinitely long explanation,
>for instance. Please note that the infinity of the regress does not need
>an infinity of rules to describe it.
I am concerned only with infinitely long explanations that can't be
finitely specified. If the infinitely long explanation could be
finitely specified then the finite specification would be the finite
explanation.
>The second question appears to extend the meaning of explanation to mean
>purpose of something.
How? The issue is whether a purported explanation of irreducibly
infinite length can constitute an explanation. My approach to the
question was to observe that an explanation is necessarily an
explanation to some mind, and to ask for what sort of mind an infinitely
long explanation would be an explanation. What's wrong with that
approach? How does it add a notion of purpose that isn't already part
of our concept of explanation?
>>You are right that I didn't discuss how something could
>>explain its own existence, I just observed that unless such an entity
>>exists and is comprehensible the world becomes incomprehensible.
>
>That's what you argue. Using what you try to show with your argument in
>support of your argument is circular.
The argument is:
1. We should assume the world is comprehensible.
2. Such an assumption requires the further assumption that there is a
self-explanatory entity.
3. Therefore, we should make the further assumption.
I don't see the circularity. You may think that the argument has an
arbitrary premise, but I disagree. I don't see how we can avoid trying
to comprehend the world (that's a claim as to human nature), and what
would be irrational would be to engage in that enterprise while
believing that it could not be carried out. Moreover, it seems to me
quite reasonable to assume that something one is trying to do can be
done until one finds it can't. Why else do people who are trying to
predict the future from past events believe that the future will
resemble the past?
>What you have to show that there is something that is there in the first
>place without presupposing its existence in the proof.
For a proof of God's existence yes, for a valid argument that we should
believe in God's existence no.
>It looks as if the assumption that something is its own purpose is by
>definition contradictory, since purpose implies the intention of someone
>and taking action towards a certain result. I wonder how you can press
>it into one entity alone.
That's one of the reasons for conceiving God as a mind. Minds can be
reflexive. You and I can be self-aware, and when we are sleepy we can
will to stay awake (which is an example of consciousness willing its own
continuation).
>Lastly, it is new to me that atheism claims that things are
>incomprehensible for sure. Is it something you found out yourself or can
>you give a reference?
No, I don't have a reference. I suppose any argument for the existence
of God could be put in the form of a statement that either God exists or
things don't make as much sense as they would if he did.
>>If there were two such gods they would be dependent on each other in the
>>sense that one could not exist in the absence of the other. (If "A
>>exists" and "B exists" are both necessary truths then each would imply
>>the other.)
>
>No, that does not follow. Imagine any number of self-explanatory entities
>designing a world. It does not conflict with there being a single explanation
>for everything.
My point was that a self-explanatory entity would be a necessarily
existing entity, and as a matter of formal logic if "A exists" and "B
exists" are both necessarily true then each implies the other.
--
Jim Kalb Nirgends bleibt sie zurueck, dass wir ihr ein Mal entroennen
jk@panix.com und sie in stiller Fabrik oelend sich selber gehoert.
Sie ist das Leben,- sie meint es am besten zu koennen,
die mit dem gleichen Entschluss ordnet und schafft und zerstoert.
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Aug 14 18:06:47 EDT 1993
Article: 8258 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.atheism,talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: What is rationalism? (was Re: Irrefutable theism)
Date: 14 Aug 1993 09:44:05 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 39
Message-ID: <24iq75$d0p@panix.com>
References: <1993Aug12.163949.8929@cnsvax.uwec.edu> <14AUG199301273348@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
Xref: panix alt.atheism:58637 talk.philosophy.misc:8258
kressja@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu (KRESSJA) writes:
>In article <1993Aug12.163949.8929@cnsvax.uwec.edu>, nyeda@cnsvax.uwec.edu (David Nye) writes...
>
>>A rationalist, relying only on reason and evidence to lead him to
>>reliable and testable hypotheses [ . . . ]
>
>>As Popper has pointed out however, the rationalist must have also have
>>faith: faith in reason. If he believes that he should accept nothing
>>not supported by logic or evidence, he must discard this very belief.
>
>It sounds as if Popper is equivocating on the nature of faith. Surely,
>the distinction should be drawn between a rational and an irrational
>belief. If a reliance on reason is, in fact, rational according to
>rationalism's own standards of rationality, then how is it faith? Or is
>it not at least a very different kind of faith?
David Nye and (apparently) Karl Popper seem to have a rather strict view
of the sort of reason and evidence a rationalist will accept. Their
view seems to be that for the rationalist only formal logic qualifies as
reason and only sense perception qualifies as evidence, and to the
extent beliefs rest on other things they rest on faith. By those
standards it does seem that that there can be very, very few beliefs
that do not rest on faith. I would imagine, though, that someone who
wants to call himself a rationalist would try to make his position more
easily tenable by using a more expansive definition of "reason" and
"evidence".
Any suggestions for more useable definitions? Mr. Kress mentions
Descartes, who (as I recall) started with subjective experience in
general rather than sense perception, and thought that logical
considerations could demonstrate the existence of a benevolent deity and
therefore the general reliability of our perceptions. Most people today
would not follow Descartes at least on the second point, though.
--
Jim Kalb Nirgends bleibt sie zurueck, dass wir ihr ein Mal entroennen
jk@panix.com und sie in stiller Fabrik oelend sich selber gehoert.
Sie ist das Leben,- sie meint es am besten zu koennen,
die mit dem gleichen Entschluss ordnet und schafft und zerstoert.
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Aug 14 18:41:48 EDT 1993
Article: 14695 of talk.politics.theory
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,alt.politics.libertarian
Subject: Re: Should education be free?
Date: 14 Aug 1993 18:41:21 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 23
Message-ID: <24jpmh$icp@panix.com>
References: <24ipp2$2jv@uniwa.uwa.edu.au> <24iv94$hna@panix.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
Xref: panix talk.politics.theory:14695 alt.politics.libertarian:7453
hrubin@mentor.cc.purdue.edu (Herman Rubin) writes:
>>For one thing,
>>I've read that private schools pay teachers significantly
>>less.
>
>Considering that they do a better job in general, this is
>rather surprising, and indicates that the public schools
>are even worse.
The teachers I know who choose to take less money in order to teach in
private schools do so because they like the working environment more.
It's more enjoyable to teach children who are reasonably attentive and
well-behaved and whose parents believe in education in a school with
reasonably clear and well-enforced educational goals than the reverse.
Like other people, teachers like to feel that what they are doing makes
sense and is part of a scheme of things that makes sense, and they will
often sacrifice other advantages to get that feeling.
--
Jim Kalb Nirgends bleibt sie zurueck, dass wir ihr ein Mal entroennen
jk@panix.com und sie in stiller Fabrik oelend sich selber gehoert.
Sie ist das Leben,- sie meint es am besten zu koennen,
die mit dem gleichen Entschluss ordnet und schafft und zerstoert.
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Aug 14 20:30:42 EDT 1993
Article: 8264 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.atheism,talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: What is rationalism? (was Re: Irrefutable theism)
Date: 14 Aug 1993 18:43:56 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 16
Message-ID: <24jprc$ikr@panix.com>
References: <14AUG199301273348@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu> <24iq75$d0p@panix.com> <14AUG199315351501@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu>
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Xref: panix alt.atheism:58661 talk.philosophy.misc:8264
kressja@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu (KRESSJA) writes:
>As I read Descartes, and this is certainly a controversial reading, the
>Cartesian method of doubt results in the denial of the traditional
>Christian god of faith. The "God" that Descartes proves the existence
>of in the Meditations is in a number of ways the opposite of the
>Christian God.
Is he the opposite or the same as the God whose existence Saints Anselm
and Thomas prove? If the opposite, how so? If the same, were Anselm
and Thomas really not Christians?
--
Jim Kalb Nirgends bleibt sie zurueck, dass wir ihr ein Mal entroennen
jk@panix.com und sie in stiller Fabrik oelend sich selber gehoert.
Sie ist das Leben,- sie meint es am besten zu koennen,
die mit dem gleichen Entschluss ordnet und schafft und zerstoert.
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Aug 15 06:23:45 EDT 1993
Article: 8270 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.atheism,talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: What is rationalism? (was Re: Irrefutable theism)
Date: 14 Aug 1993 21:16:43 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 27
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Xref: panix alt.atheism:58668 talk.philosophy.misc:8270
kressja@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu (KRESSJA) writes:
>The "God" which Descartes demonstrates the existence of, if his
>properties are examined as Descartes presents them, rather than
>ascribing traditional views of God to them, show the Cartesian veracious
>God to be something like a metaphysical counterpart to the cogito, which
>serves the function of insuring the unity and coherence of knowledge as
>apprehended by reason.
In the Third Meditation Descartes speaks of his "conception of a supreme
God, eternal, infinite, omniscient, almighty, and Creator of all that
exists besides himself". His proof that such a being exists seems
rather like Anselm's proof that a being than which no greater can be
thought exists. How do the properties of the two beings (to the extent
they can be known through human reason) differ? You observe that
Descartes uses God for certain specific purposes, but that does not
imply that the being whose existence Descartes demonstrates has only
those properties he needs for his theory of knowledge.
Also, your "insuring the unity and coherence of knowledge" makes
Descartes sound rather post-Kantian. Is that more of your unorthodoxy
on these matters?
--
Jim Kalb "Good sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world;
jk@panix.com for everyone thinks himself so well supplied with it, that even
those who are hardest to satisfy in every other way do not
usually desire more of it than they already have." (Descartes)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Aug 15 06:23:50 EDT 1993
Article: 14697 of talk.politics.theory
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,alt.politics.libertarian
Subject: Re: Should education be free?
Date: 14 Aug 1993 21:43:49 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 36
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References: <24jpmh$icp@panix.com> <24k20d$ri4@panix.com>
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Xref: panix talk.politics.theory:14697 alt.politics.libertarian:7456
gcf@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) writes:
>| The teachers I know who choose to take less money in order to teach in
>| private schools do so because they like the working environment more.
>| It's more enjoyable to teach children who are reasonably attentive and
>| well-behaved and whose parents believe in education in a school with
>| reasonably clear and well-enforced educational goals than the reverse.
>
>That has been my impression from talking to teachers. And
>so existing private schools are not a probable model for
>those schools (if any) which will handle the present public-
>school clientele. In present private schools, religion,
>class and culture provide the social conditioning which is
>largely absent, or at least very different, among the
>inmates of public schools.
A voucher system could replicate some advantages of today's private
schools to some extent. I think particular schools would tend to have
clearer educational missions than is the case today, because no single
school would be expected to serve everyone. If schools have more
definite missions and are able to demand that students who attend them
go along with the program then students are more likely to pay attention
to the things the program requires, especially if the program makes
sense. Finally, parental choice requires at least some parental
involvement and involvement has some tendency to promote interest.
(Certainly, lack of responsibility tends to inhibit interest.)
The most important point, I think, is the first one. Collective
enterprises are more likely to be successful and enjoyable for the
participants if they agree on what the purpose is, and common purpose
seems to be missing from a lot of American public education.
--
Jim Kalb "Good sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world;
jk@panix.com for everyone thinks himself so well supplied with it, that even
those who are hardest to satisfy in every other way do not
usually desire more of it than they already have." (Descartes)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Aug 15 14:34:11 EDT 1993
Article: 8280 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.atheism,talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: What is rationalism? (was Re: Irrefutable theism)
Date: 15 Aug 1993 07:20:25 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 17
Message-ID: <24l65p$pag@panix.com>
References: <14AUG199318261447@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu> <24k2pr$sf2@panix.com> <14AUG199321224386@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu>
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Xref: panix alt.atheism:58693 talk.philosophy.misc:8280
kressja@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu (KRESSJA) writes:
>The question revolves around the relationship of faith and reason; I
>would say that faith has lost a great deal when God becomes an "infinite
>substance who cannot deceive."
My usual authority for intellectual history (Bartlett's _Familiar
Quotations_) tells me that in the Middle Ages "a sea of infinite
substance" was the most widely quoted definition of God. I don't
question that Descartes has an unChristian attitude toward faith. By
itself, though, his choice of method doesn't seem to show that any of
his particular conclusions are anti-Christian.
--
Jim Kalb "Good sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world;
jk@panix.com for everyone thinks himself so well supplied with it, that even
those who are hardest to satisfy in every other way do not
usually desire more of it than they already have." (Descartes)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Aug 15 14:34:18 EDT 1993
Article: 14700 of talk.politics.theory
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,alt.politics.libertarian
Subject: Re: Should education be free?
Date: 15 Aug 1993 07:18:07 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 27
Message-ID: <24l61f$p7p@panix.com>
References: <24ipp2$2jv@uniwa.uwa.edu.au> <24iv94$hna@panix.com> <93Aug15.002633edt.48136@neat.cs.toronto.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
Xref: panix talk.politics.theory:14700 alt.politics.libertarian:7461
cbo@cs.toronto.edu (Calvin Bruce Ostrum) writes:
>On the other hand, if you are a fan of Charles Murray, as many on
>the net seem to be, you might favour the argument he offers in
>"In Pursuit of Happiness and Good Government", which (as I recall
>it) suggests teachers should be paid even less than they are now
>(in the USA), because that way, the lousy ones who are in it solely
>for the money will leave, and the people who end up teaching will
>be those who are doing it because they want to, which will
>be an improvement.
I don't think Murray proposes that the current system could be improved
by lowering salaries. His argument is that if you had a system of
education established and paid for solely by parents, state funding
could very well make things worse even though on its face it would pay
for things that ought to make things better (like higher teacher
salaries). The reason is that such a change would convert a system
based on common understandings among people who are directly involved
and who care very much about how the system works (parents and teachers)
to a system based on standards, rewards and sanctions established by a
third party for its own purposes. Like Mr. Ostrum, though, I am
speaking from memory.
--
Jim Kalb "Good sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world;
jk@panix.com for everyone thinks himself so well supplied with it, that even
those who are hardest to satisfy in every other way do not
usually desire more of it than they already have." (Descartes)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Aug 15 15:40:06 EDT 1993
Article: 14710 of talk.politics.theory
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,alt.politics.libertarian
Subject: Re: Should education be free?
Date: 15 Aug 1993 15:38:07 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 40
Message-ID: <24m3av$mjm@panix.com>
References: <24iv94$hna@panix.com> <93Aug15.002633edt.48136@neat.cs.toronto.edu> <24len7$2mg@panix.com>
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Xref: panix talk.politics.theory:14710 alt.politics.libertarian:7470
gcf@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) writes:
>Murray's theory violates classical liberal theory, just as I pointed
>out. In fact, it supports the theory I've been advancing lately that
>capitalism, like other economic systems, are self-designed to make
>people unhappy. In this case, if someone does something many like
>(teach) then the monetary reward for doing it falls, and of course so
>does his social status (because in a liberal, as opposed to a
>classical-conservative arrangement, you're not supposed to have a
>structure of status independent of popular will and market values). The
>more people like to do something, the less doing it will be worth; so,
>unless you have unusual likes or talents, to make money you have to do
>something you don't like; or if you do something you like, you have to
>accept bad living conditions (apartment in a dangerous slum perhaps),
>the disrespect of your community, and so on.
Murray argues in essence that some classical-conservative arrangements
will evolve in a society with classical-liberal legal institutions, at
least if the society can resist the temptation to evolve toward modern
liberalism. The reason is that such arrangements permit individuals to
satisfy goals that they can't easily satisfy by simply paying cash.
He gives the example of educating children and observes that if parents
have to pay the whole cost they are unlikely to be able to make teaching
positions competitive in cash terms with other occupations open to the
people they would want to have as teachers. So what they are likely to
do is to find people who are particularly fond of teaching and don't
need a lot of money to live on (recent college graduates, for example)
and make the job attractive in non-cash ways, for example by displays of
respect. The argument is that if parents who treat teachers with only
the amount of consideration and respect that their pay would usually
command have a hard time getting their kids educated adequately, parents
will get into the habit of treating teachers and teaching as something
special and (in your terms) structures of status independent of market
values will arise.
--
Jim Kalb "Good sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world;
jk@panix.com for everyone thinks himself so well supplied with it, that even
those who are hardest to satisfy in every other way do not
usually desire more of it than they already have." (Descartes)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Aug 16 15:16:45 EDT 1993
Article: 8308 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism,talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: A Perverse Truth. What do you make of it?
Date: 16 Aug 1993 08:32:39 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 18
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References: <1993Aug15.175511.52621@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu>
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Xref: panix alt.philosophy.objectivism:4132 talk.philosophy.misc:8308
miner@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu writes:
>I can think of once warlike peoples who did not excel culturally (the
>Vikings, the Caucasians, etc.); but offhand I cannot think of peaceful
>folk who became cultural leaders.
When the Vikings settled down a little, some of them wrote the Icelandic
sagas, which I think are quite wonderful. Also, net libertarians seem
quite taken with the political constitution of mediaeval Iceland.
It's true that these things developed after the great age of plunder,
rape and murder had ended, but I doubt they would have come about if the
customs of the Vikings had always been those of their decendents today.
--
Jim Kalb "Good sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world;
jk@panix.com for everyone thinks himself so well supplied with it, that even
those who are hardest to satisfy in every other way do not
usually desire more of it than they already have." (Descartes)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Aug 16 20:23:32 EDT 1993
Article: 14761 of talk.politics.theory
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Should education be free?
Date: 16 Aug 1993 18:12:05 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 39
Distribution: usa
Message-ID: <24p0nl$2g1@panix.com>
References: <1993Aug16.184403.23350@kadsma.kodak.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
pajerek@telstar.kodak.com (D. J. Pajerek) writes:
>The question that needs solving is "what do we do about the fact that
>many students aren't attentive and well-behaved, with parents who don't
>believe in education, etc.".
It seems to me that students are most likely to be attentive and
well-behaved if they are in a system in which it is clear what is
expected of them and why, and which is run for purposes that they can
understand and accept. In a voucher system no school would have to be
all things to all students, all government agencies, and all political
pressure groups. Since the people running the schools would be free to
define and enforce the purposes of the school, students would likely be
confronted with a system that at least has more clarity than at present.
In addition, students would tend to go to schools with purposes that at
least their parents understand and accept. That doesn't guarantee that
students will agree with or even comprehend those purposes, but I think
it makes that outcome more likely than the present system.
There's also no guarantee that vouchers will make parents interested in
education. It seems to me, though, that parents do tend to take an
interest in what happens to their children, and to the extent social
arrangements put the responsibility for things affecting their children
on other people that interest tends to wither. So by putting the
responsibility back on the parents vouchers may change a system that now
inhibits the parental interest that would otherwise exist.
>A related question is, "Do we care that many students don't receive a
>good and useful education, and therefore grow up to be non-contributing
>members of society?".
Sure. The issue as I understand it is how to bring it about that as
many students as possible receive as good and useful an education as
possible.
--
Jim Kalb "Good sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world;
jk@panix.com for everyone thinks himself so well supplied with it, that even
those who are hardest to satisfy in every other way do not
usually desire more of it than they already have." (Descartes)
From panix!news.intercon.com!digex.com!uunet!pipex!mantis!mantis!not-for-mail Tue Aug 17 09:04:13 EDT 1993
Article: 8331 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!news.intercon.com!digex.com!uunet!pipex!mantis!mantis!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.atheism,talk.religion.misc,talk.philosophy.misc,alt.atheism.moderated
Subject: Re: Why is there a "here" here?
Date: 17 Aug 1993 12:02:36 +0100
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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Xref: panix alt.atheism:58832 talk.religion.misc:61040 talk.philosophy.misc:8331 alt.atheism.moderated:748
I3150101@dbstu1.rz.tu-bs.de (Benedikt Rosenau) writes:
>The important question is if you can explain everything with just one
>model, or if you need more (mutually incompatible models) in order to
>increase the quality of the explanations/predictions. In order to prove
>your claim, you have to show that this can be ruled out.
We should choose single models in preference to mutually incompatible
ones unless there are important advantages to the latter choice. Does
anyone disagree with that? Also, it seems to me that truth is at least
one of our goals in theorizing, and since it is difficult to see how
mutually incompatible models can both be true it is hard to view a
situation in which we use mutually incompatible models as satisfactory.
>Something that can explain everything (your justification of the theory)
>but cannot make predictions is equivalent to the claim: "Everything is
>the way it seems" or "nothing is the way it seems". Irrelevant and
>trivial if it weren't for the burden of the various axioms you have to
>use from now on.
There are true and non-trivial theories that don't make predictions.
"The window is broken because my daughter threw a metal can through it"
is an example.
>Physical laws as we know do not exist in a singularity. It can be the
>case that there are other laws (altough this term alone seems to imply
>something we can understand or even establish), but you claim that there
>is an explanation there. Prove it, your argument relies on it.
All my argument needs is that it is rational to assume there are laws
unless there is a good reason to believe the contrary.
>The laws just are, unless you are going to ask questions of their
>purpose.
Why isn't it rational to investigate the reasons for things that appear
to be simply brute facts, and to assume that reasons exist unless we can
gain something by accepting the contrary?
>You still do not say what that concept of explanation is. There are
>entirely different concepts. And the claim that everything has an
>explanation gives you opposition when you confine explanation to cause.
I don't have a general theory of what explanations are, but I don't
think I need one to make and rely on particular assertions about
explanations, like "no explanation is irreducibly infinite in length"
and "'it just is' is not an explanation".
>Anyway, does your argument require that the explanation is understood?
>By everyone?
I don't think something can be an explanation unless it could be
understood by some mind.
>Trying to turn a heuristic approach "let's see if we can't model it
>somehow" into the assertion that everything can be comprehended is off.
Our heuristic approaches, our assumptions about what the world is like,
and our criteria for choosing theories are all very closely connected.
The discussion seems to be losing its cohesion as each post increases in
length, so I'm not going to deal with each of your comments and
objections. If there are any to which you particularly want me to
respond please let me know. Also, if you can think of a good way of
focusing the discussion let me know. (I should mention, though, that I
will be away from the net for a couple of weeks after August 20).
--
Jim Kalb "Good sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world;
jk@panix.com for everyone thinks himself so well supplied with it, that even
those who are hardest to satisfy in every other way do not
usually desire more of it than they already have." (Descartes)
From panix!news.intercon.com!digex.com!uunet!pipex!mantis!mantis!not-for-mail Tue Aug 17 09:04:13 EDT 1993
Article: 8332 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!news.intercon.com!digex.com!uunet!pipex!mantis!mantis!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.atheism,talk.religion.misc,talk.philosophy.misc,alt.atheism.moderated
Subject: Re: Why is there a "here" here?
Date: 17 Aug 1993 12:02:59 +0100
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 107
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Xref: panix alt.atheism:58835 talk.religion.misc:61041 talk.philosophy.misc:8332 alt.atheism.moderated:762
rat@erg.sri.com (Ray Trent) writes:
>There's absolutely no point in simply comprehending the universe unless
>it is useful to do so in order to decide how to meet the future in more
>effective ways. I.e. I disagree with the platonic ideal.
Is it your view that the sole purpose of theorizing is increasing the
likelihood of success in carrying out one's purposes, whatever they may
happen to be?
>>Do the facts suggest that this is the worst of all possible worlds?
>>How?
>
>They don't, they just suggest that it is not the best of all possibly
>worlds.
I know too little about world-construction to say. For me, the shocking
thing about the world is that good exists in it.
>Well, I could get snotty and say that refusing to compromise one's
>intellectual integrity by believing in superstition is an advantage in
>the sense of being a useful trait to have.
Your forbearance in refraining from saying such a thing is admirable. A
pedant might observe, though, that intellectual integrity can not be a
separate argument for atheism.
>Again, the proof I gave demonstrates, finitely, that all of the
>matter/energy of the universe must have existed for all time.
Based on assumptions treated as simply given as a matter of brute fact.
>In order to prove a "creation" event, one needs to explain how or why
>conservation of mass/energy was violated in that event (which we've
>never observed to happen, or even have come up with a theory explaining
>how it *could* happen for more than a Planck time (something like 1E-43
>seconds)).
Of course, one need not do nearly so much to show that a creation theory
is the best theory.
>The question "but how did the matter get created in the first place" is
>a meaningless question that doesn't require an answer. It's always been
>around as long as there's *been* a "first place". It's meaningless to
>ask where something came from before time existed because the word
>"before" is nothing more than a meaningless noise in that context.
I don't think that people who ask the question are interested in
temporal sequences. The question is: why not nothing ever?
>If you want, the advantage of atheism is that it allows you to accept
>some *extremely* useful definitions of mass/energy.
How does theism prevent acceptance of those definitions?
>>I don't see how we can avoid trying
>>to comprehend the world (that's a claim as to human nature), and what
>>would be irrational would be to engage in that enterprise while
>>believing that it could not be carried out.
>
>Of course it can't be "carried out". To do so would require a human
>being with infinite mental capacity, which is inconsistent with
>reality.
Why infinite? I agree that it might make sense to try to comprehend the
world even though no human being could ever be smart enough actually to
do so as long as the world was in principle comprehensible. (I realize
I need to do some work on what "comprehensibility in principle" is, and
the relationship of that thing to irreducibly infinite explanations.)
>Also, your use of "human nature" and "irrational" as though the 2 were
>incompatible is rather laughable.
Instead "human nature" I should have said "the nature of human rationality".
>Actually, for any traditional definition of "God" (I'd like to see
>your's, BTW), I think that believing in the existance of "God" causes
>the universe to make much *less* sense than not. Let's start with the
>contradiction of "omniscient" and then move on to the contradiction of
>"omnipotent"...not to mention "good", "wise", and all the other
>adjectives typically applied.
You're worried about God's ability to invent a pun so bad even he can't
keep from groaning? It seems to me that all of the traditional attributes
can be made sense of.
>Tautologies are also universally accepted as containing absolutely zero
>useful information.
That strikes me as a definition of "information". Presumably, if you
were convinced that the ontological proof for the existence of God works
you would say that "God exists" is not information because it is
logically true. Nonetheless, it might be useful to keep it in mind just
as it is useful to keep the multiplication table in mind.
This discussion has been useful to me in clarifying issues, but it seems
to have lost its way. If you want to continue it I will -- the issue
that interests me most is your rejection of what you call Platonism in
favor of what sounds like pragmatism. I should mention that after
August 20 I will be off the net for a couple of weeks.
--
Jim Kalb "Good sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world;
jk@panix.com for everyone thinks himself so well supplied with it, that even
those who are hardest to satisfy in every other way do not
usually desire more of it than they already have." (Descartes)
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Aug 17 13:51:25 EDT 1993
Article: 14774 of talk.politics.theory
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,alt.politics.libertarian,misc.education
Subject: Re: Should education be free?
Date: 17 Aug 1993 11:34:00 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 132
Message-ID: <24qtp8$ij3@panix.com>
References: <93Aug15.002633edt.48136@neat.cs.toronto.edu> <24qh1k$t58@panix.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
Xref: panix talk.politics.theory:14774 alt.politics.libertarian:7548 misc.education:9931
gcf@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) writes:
>*Murray may indeed feel, as a conservative would, that education is not
>a mere product but an important environment; that teachers must,
>therefore, be people of good character as well as efficient technique,
>and that it would be better not to attract people into the profession
>for mere material gain. This would seem to be the suggestion of
>*Murray[pas] that teachers should gain "respect, safety, flexibility,
>and autonomy", of *Murray[jk] that teachers will be attracted to
>"consideration and respect" regardless of monetary reward.
I don't think the contrast between character and technique is at issue.
People who like their jobs, who think their jobs make a concrete and
valuable contribution to some important goal, and who feel that other
people value them for what they do are likely to do a technically better
job than people who feel the contrary.
>In a liberal society, respect, safety, flexibility and autonomy almost
>invariably flow from funds, and are accompanied by further funds. That's
>simply how liberal societies work. To the extent that this
>characteristic is modified, it tends to be modified by influences that
>are orthogonal to the purpose at hand, to wit, seniority, unionization,
>political and social influence, and the like.
One point of the education example is to show that societies governed by
liberal legal institutions do not always work that way, and that the
tendency to make money the measure of all things can be modified by
influences internal to the purpose at hand if the purpose at hand is
something that money can't buy, or at least something that most people
need but few people have enough money to buy purely for cash.
>Now, a conservative society provides other rewards, but it does so
>_materially_. That is, respect, safety, flexibility, autonomy, and
>consideration are not allowed to just happen to arise if they will, but
>are mandated by rule and law. They are institutionalized.
It is characteristic of conservatism to view informal social
institutions that arise without conscious planning (generally accepted
moral standards, for example) as prior to positive enactments of rules
and laws. (See Burke's _Reflections on the Revolution in France_.)
It's true that conservatives also tend to think that it's appropriate in
a proper case to protect or foster those institutions by rule and law,
but rule and law are not primary. One might think of Murray as a
liberal conservative or conservative liberal, who believes that many and
the most important of the informal social institutions that most
conservatives value prosper in a liberal legal order. (See Tocqueville
on morality and religion in the United States.)
>It's the _market_, and those teachers are just going to be out there
>with everybody else, trying to climb up the old greasy pyramid.
I think you're reifying the market here. If "market" simply means
"social relationships that exist under a liberal legal order", Murray's
argument is that the market is a lot more diverse than you think and
includes a lot of non-cash relationships that people take very seriously.
>The business about non-monetary compensations is, basically, a sham;
>it's just getting shined on for awhile instead of getting value. They
>could do as well in a used-car lot.
Working as a teacher is not like buying a used car. In long-term
relationships, non-monetary compensations work a lot better if they're
real. Also, I think you are treating these issues as if all people ever
do is perform individual calculations as to how they will achieve
whatever goals they happen to have and act accordingly. That's not
accurate, though. Suppose we rephrase the argument:
1. People tend to act in accordance with their general attitude toward
life rather than by making particular calculations of profit and loss.
2. People end up adopting an attitude toward life that on the whole
works for them.
3. As a result, whatever attitude toward life (including toward other
people) generally works best for most people tends over time to become
the accepted social attitude.
3. If parents have to pay for education themselves, they won't be able
to make teaching competitive in strictly cash terms and will be able to
educate their children adequately only if they act in a way that makes
teaching an attractive occupation for non-cash reasons.
4. The only way they can get what they want is to join together with
other parents who do things like treat the teachers they hire with
*actual* respect and consideration that goes beyond the respect and
consideration paid to money. (Sham respect and consideration won't do
the trick.)
5. Therefore, since an attitude that treats money as the only thing
that is ever of consequence will not work for most people, over time
people will abandon it and take a contrary attitude as to certain things
(including teaching). Since the contrary attitude will work only if it
is real, over time social standards will come to incorporate a genuine
sense that there is something special and admirable about teaching.
A way to summarize the argument is to say that in a liberal legal order
self-interest rightly understood will transcend itself because it can
not otherwise attain its own ends. It is consistent with Murray's
argument to observe that one way in which that can fail to happen is for
the liberal legal order to be replaced by the modern welfare state, in
which self-interest need not transcend itself because the function of
the state is to provide the things people find they can't pay for
themselves in cash.
>What I notice is that this eclectic system chooses elements from
>conservatism and liberalism in accord with which is cheapest.
It's true that the prediction that things will evolve this way is
consistent with the view that over time a liberal legal order favors
efficient outcomes. (I hope the economists will let me use the E word.)
It's worth noting that the system is not designed for cheapness, though,
because it is not designed at all. So your use of the word "choose" is
metaphorical.
>This seems like sophistry to me, although it is of a more subtle form
>than first reported, as I requested.
I think sophistry comes into it if you think that particular people are
nothing but rational calculators of economic advantage. In that case
the honor paid to teachers would in fact be fraudulent.
It may be a good objection to Murray's theory that in modern
technological society a liberal legal order makes individual
calculations of economic advantage so habitual that self-interest can't
transcend itself, especially once the welfare state has become a
possibility. (I'm somewhat undecided, but am inclined to find that
objection convincing.)
--
Jim Kalb "Good sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world;
jk@panix.com for everyone thinks himself so well supplied with it, that even
those who are hardest to satisfy in every other way do not
usually desire more of it than they already have." (Descartes)
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Aug 17 20:11:02 EDT 1993
Article: 2704 of alt.society.conservatism
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From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.society.conservatism
Subject: Re: Am I reaching?
Date: 17 Aug 1993 20:08:48 -0400
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In <1993Aug17.220343.24359@afit.af.mil> wbralick@afit.af.mil (Will Bralick) writes:
>Could just one person (even a liberal) send me an ACK if they can read
>this? Thanks ;-)
It came through.
--
Jim Kalb "Good sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world;
jk@panix.com for everyone thinks himself so well supplied with it, that even
those who are hardest to satisfy in every other way do not
usually desire more of it than they already have." (Descartes)
From panix!cmcl2!yale.edu!spool.mu.edu!howland.reston.ans.net!europa.eng.gtefsd.com!uunet!pipex!mantis!mantis!not-for-mail Wed Aug 18 06:15:30 EDT 1993
Article: 8362 of talk.philosophy.misc
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From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.atheism,talk.religion.misc,talk.philosophy.misc,alt.atheism.moderated
Subject: Re: Why is there a "here" here?
Date: 18 Aug 1993 10:41:46 +0100
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I3150101@dbstu1.rz.tu-bs.de (Benedikt Rosenau) writes:
>Quantum Mechanics and General Relativity are mutually incompatible. Both
>are used, sometimes even in the same context.
But isn't their mutual incompatibility a very good reason to believe
that their conjunction is false though useful, and to believe that a
better and consistent theory is possible?
>>There are true and non-trivial theories that don't make predictions.
>>"The window is broken because my daughter threw a metal can through it"
>>is an example.
>
>In other words, that the observed follows from the theory does not alone
>lend truth to the theory.
Certainly true. The truth of a theory can not be reduced to the
evidence for the theory.
>The certainty comes from assumptions that are in their turn based on
>predictive systems.
No theory is ever certain, although we may have more or less evidence
for it. Testing predictions is a very good way to get evidence for the
truth or falsity of a theory, but testable predictions are not the only
thing that can be evidence. That observations follow from a theory is
evidence for the truth of the theory, and if that's the only evidence
that is available then that is the evidence we have to rely on, together
with our criteria for theory selection.
>Concluding from possibility of something to its existence can only be
>justified by assigning probabilities and showing that the resulting
>probability is beyond a threshold [ . . . ] The null hypothesis is the
>default.
I don't see how the null hypothesis can be the default for reasonable
beliefs about the world. It might be useful to take that approach for a
particular project of inquiry (e.g., modern physical science) that
assumes that certain things are already known, but if that approach is
taken as an epistemological absolute I don't see how one can avoid
present-tense solipsism.
>Example: an infinite chain of events governed by a finite set of laws.
>Is that a finite explanation or not?
It's a finite explanation of the events. (Note that as yet no
explanation of the laws has been given.)
>Does your understanding of explanation include the data: an explanation
>is a state plus the description of the transformation into the next
>state? Do you accept that this definition of explanation demands that
>the states can be described in finite terms?
I don't think so, but it's not a question I had given any thought to.
It's worth thinking about.
>Is explanation rules plus cause of rules? In other words, are the rules
>actually the mechanism by which the world works as opposed to something
>that describes how the world is, which can be established by observation?
An explanation is an answer to the question "why?" Commonly there are
successive explanations each of which gives a mechanism for the
preceding explanation explaining why it holds true. An explanation that
consists of rules for which there is no mechanism but which are
presented as holding as a brute fact about the way things are seems to
be a defective explanation because it doesn't really answer the question
"why?"
>Even those who would grant that everything is governed by laws would not
>grant you that it is possible to understand these laws.
I'm not sure that the conception of a law that is in principle
impossible to understand makes sense.
>You have not addressed the question how something can be self explaining
>without presupposing its existence or that of something else.
The argument is that we should assume that such a thing can and does
exist because otherwise there can't be finitely-long explanations of
everything. In particular, there can't be such an explanation of why
there is something rather than nothing.
>Nor have you answered how the first explanation can be reasonably called
>benevolent, which appears to imply a personality behind it.
By observation and experience we find that goodness exists and can not
be identified with any human construction. Therefore, goodness is a
feature of the world that must be explained by reference to whatever it
is that explains the world in general. On the other hand, goodness
seems to make sense only by reference to purpose and subjectivity.
Therefore purpose and subjectivity must be attributed to the general
explanation of the world. (This argument depends on the claim that evil
is in some way ontologically inferior to goodness.)
>Or that your argument would actually support any positive number of
>gods.
A plurality must not be asserted without necessity.
--
Jim Kalb "Good sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world;
jk@panix.com for everyone thinks himself so well supplied with it, that even
those who are hardest to satisfy in every other way do not
usually desire more of it than they already have." (Descartes)
From panix!news.intercon.com!udel!gatech!europa.eng.gtefsd.com!uunet!pipex!mantis!mantis!not-for-mail Thu Aug 19 06:44:29 EDT 1993
Article: 8381 of talk.philosophy.misc
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From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.atheism,talk.religion.misc,talk.philosophy.misc,alt.atheism.moderated
Subject: Re: Why is there a "here" here?
Date: 19 Aug 1993 11:15:41 +0100
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rat@erg.sri.com (Ray Trent) writes:
>>I don't think something can be an explanation unless it could be
>>understood by some mind.
>
>I think the main difference of opinion here is that I don't think
>"explanations" don't have to be "understandable" by any mind in order
>to be "explanations". All the need to be is "provably correct" from
>some set of useful "axioms" in order to contain useful information.
I'm not sure there's a distinction. It may be that "provably correct"
is a formalization of what I mean by "understandable". On the other
hand, it may be that complete formalization is not possible. In any
case, by "some mind" I meant "some possible mind" rather than "some
actually-existing human mind.
>In order for you to be "shocked" by the existance of "good", you'd
>have to define "good" first. In order to do that, I hypothesize that
>you'd have to observe an example of "good" in order to have any
>referent at all. Therefore, I hypothesize that your "shock" is an
>irrational response.
I would describe it as a matter of being raised in an environment in
which it is assumed that serious people have views on knowledge and
reality not unlike those you have expressed, and then noticing that it's
impossible to imagine how such views could account for the world as it
is.
>I guess I'm curious what you mean by "brute fact". Conservation of
>mass/energy follows logically from a particular definition of
>"mass/energy" that has proven to be extremely useful and to be an
>extremely good theory of how the universe actually works.
If there is no explanation of why that definition applies to something
that actually exists, then its applicability to the world is a matter of
brute fact.
>If you accept "conservation of mass/energy", it is logically necessary
>to believe that the mass/energy of the universe has always existed, for
>at least as long as it makes sense to talk about causality (note: it may
>never make sense to talk about causality if the universe is non-causal)
>[ . . . ] Therefore, it it logically inconsistent to be a "theist" using
>the definition I've posited for "theist" and also accept the useful
>definition of "mass/energy" that implies its conservation.
Why couldn't one believe that the mass/energy of the universe has always
existed for as long as it makes sense to talk about causality under the
particular set of rules to which the definition of "mass/energy"
relates?
(Several of your points I have not responded to, either because I think
we've gone over them as much as is likely to be productive or because I
don't think there is enough time to deal with them before I drop off the
net for a while. Again, I thank you for your comments.)
--
Jim Kalb "Good sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world;
jk@panix.com for everyone thinks himself so well supplied with it, that even
those who are hardest to satisfy in every other way do not
usually desire more of it than they already have." (Descartes)
From panix!news.intercon.com!eddie.mit.edu!europa.eng.gtefsd.com!uunet!pipex!mantis!mantis!not-for-mail Thu Aug 19 16:39:23 EDT 1993
Article: 8394 of talk.philosophy.misc
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From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.atheism,talk.religion.misc,talk.philosophy.misc,alt.atheism.moderated
Subject: Re: Why is there a "here" here?
Date: 19 Aug 1993 18:22:06 +0100
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I3150101@dbstu1.rz.tu-bs.de (Benedikt Rosenau) writes:
>>>Quantum Mechanics and General Relativity are mutually incompatible.
>
>Their inconsistency is the reason why it is tried to develop a unified
>and consistent theory, but it is not evidence for the success. Unless
>you are assuming that every directed action is evidence for its possibly
>succeeding (wouldn't your argument need a necessarily succeeding?)
A person who engages in a directed action assumes the possible success
of that action. In addition, a person who necessarily engages in a
directed action necessarily assumes that the world is such that the
action makes sense. So if man is a rational animal that by nature
engages in rational inquiry, then man by nature assumes that the world
lends itself to rational inquiry (e.g., is not self-contradictory).
>I still wait for your justification of the statement that everything
>has to have an explanation in the light of that it is neither a priori
>true nor is it backed up by models used.
The statement is that it is a rational assumption that it is not
practical to avoid making, in the same way that my assumption that I am
not a brain in a vat is a rational assumption that it is not practical
for me to avoid making.
>A theory without consequences is meaningless.
That sounds right. However, testable predictions aren't the only
possible consequences. One consequence of the existence of God is the
existence of the universe; one consequence of the nature of God is the
presence of qualia and therefore of good and evil in the universe.
>In the case of broken window, the assumption that your daughter did it
>gets its meaning from your reaction to it. Telling her not to might
>reduce the number of broken windows in future, yet it is interesting to
>note that this is also consistent with that the conclusion is wrong.
It is interesting because it demonstrates that the truth or falsity of
the theory does not depend on my reaction to it or to future events of
any kind.
>Your argument suffers even more from the fact that you are using an
>assumption which you cannot verify (as opposed to broken windows in
>the vicinity of your daughter) nor can you falsify the conclusions you
>make. It is a typical case of pure speculation.
You seem to be saying that theories as to whether on a particular
occasion my daughter broke the window or whether it got broken in some
other way are simply meaningless. I believe that view does follow from
your outlook, and that is a reason for rejecting your outlook.
>Why does an explanation need an explanation? Everything is described.
Why bother with the first explanation? To predict the future, you say,
but the broken window example shows that predicting the future is not
the sole goal of theorizing. Also, why predict the future? Why not
just go with the flow? Why believe that just because you've been
successful in doing it in the past your future attempts won't fail
miserably, or make life far worse for you? For that matter, why believe
that your memories of past successes are accurate? Or if you really
want certainty as to your future experiences, why not hang yourself? (I
assume you don't believe in an afterlife!) If that's too radical,
wearing a blindfold would increase your certainty as to your future
visual experiences and stuffing your ears with cotton would do the same
for auditory experiences. (The last string of questions, of course,
aren't meant to be answered. They're meant to dramatize the difference
between trying to control future experiences and what we are doing when
we investigate and theorize.)
>>By observation and experience we find that goodness exists and can not
>>be identified with any human construction.
>
>That is not the case. I won't grant it, and as a matter of fact, I have a
>hard time to find out who would accept that. Can you elaborate on the
>observations and experiences that support that?
It is important whether something is good or bad, and it makes sense to
question our own opinions as to good and bad and the moral institutions
of our society. Do you disagree?
>[A]n omipotent being could create a world where there is no evil needed
>to create surplus good - be it choice or something else.
I know too little about world creating to say. For all I know "a world
where there is no evil needed to create surplus good" is a meaningless
string of words on the order of "fluffy decade". It might be true, for
example, that "evil" simply means "the absence of God", so that a world
from which evil was absent would be a world that was not distinct from
God and therefore not a world at all. I don't know.
>A plurality that is without consequences can/should be ignored. Having
>many gods in a world can lead to fully different interpretations of good
>and evil, for instance, and has to be considered therefore. You can't
>rule it out a priori.
If you show at least one, why not assume only one until there is reason
to assume more than one?
--
Jim Kalb "Good sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world;
jk@panix.com for everyone thinks himself so well supplied with it, that even
those who are hardest to satisfy in every other way do not
usually desire more of it than they already have." (Descartes)
From panix!news.intercon.com!eddie.mit.edu!europa.eng.gtefsd.com!uunet!pipex!mantis!mantis!not-for-mail Fri Aug 20 15:04:57 EDT 1993
Article: 8433 of talk.philosophy.misc
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From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.atheism,talk.religion.misc,talk.philosophy.misc,alt.atheism.moderated
Subject: Re: Why is there a "here" here?
Date: 20 Aug 1993 18:52:33 +0100
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I3150101@dbstu1.rz.tu-bs.de (Benedikt Rosenau) writes:
>Anyway, it looks as if we are engaging in rational inquiry because it is
>our nature, and this does not allow us to conclude that it will have
>success or that every rational inquiry is reasonable.
Certainly not every particular rational inquiry is reasonable. It can
only be known in hindsight that one was not reasonable, though -- while
we are making an inquiry we necessarily assume that the inquiry is
reasonable. So if we necessarily try to make sense of the world at
large we necessarily assume that the world is such that it can be made
sense of, and a statement of the conditions under which the world would
make sense overall is a statement of assumptions that we will accept if
we are thinking coherently.
>>>I still wait for your justification of the statement that everything
>>>has to have an explanation in the light of that it is neither a priori
>>>true nor is it backed up by models used.
>
>Sorry, but evidence does not point your way. To be correct, it points
>the other way. There are working models that contradict your assumption.
Are there working models that contradict the assumption that in choosing
working models you should choose the one that explains more over the one
that explains less, and that you should reject the one that asserts that
something in principle can not be explained unless there is a major
advantage in accepting it?
>Further, the brain in a vat assumption is cut out by Occam's Razor when
>it does not allow to make extra conclusions - quite like your argument.
How about the assumption that something exists other than one's own
present experience?
Incidentally, I still don't understand how you dealt (if you did deal)
with theories as to particular past events like broken windows. Do you
accept that the truth and meaning of such theories can not be reduced to
their relationship to future events?
>> For that matter, why believe that your memories of past successes are
>> accurate?
>
>I guess that is supposed to mean: you did something and you failed. However,
>you think now that you succeeded - and you are doing something that will
>make you fail again. Another assumption that locks itself up immediately.
Assuming you are right about locking up, how does that show the contrary
assumption is true? Also, why do you say we lock up immediately unless
we assume that future events will be like past events and that we can
remember the past events correctly? Many gamblers, for example, take
the view that past failures make it more likely that there will be a
success on the next try, and some people tend to forget about the past
and future and just do what they feel like doing in the present.
>As a matter of fact, everything you offer here would likely lead to an
>decrease in my subjective well being.
Is that what defines truth and reality for you? If not, what does
validate your view that does not require you to make unproven and
unprovable assumptions?
>>>By observation and experience we find that goodness exists and can not
>>>be identified with any human construction.
>>It is important whether something is good or bad, and it makes sense to
>>question our own opinions as to good and bad and the moral institutions
>>of our society. Do you disagree?
>
>The former does not follow from the latter. Are you going to give the
>evidence and experience that supports the position now?
I want to see whether you already agree with my position. Do you
disagree with either the former or the latter?
>[F]or every world with evil there is another world where exactly the
>same can be acheived without evil (evil cannot be acheived of course).
What grounds can you have for saying that?
>>It might be true, for
>>example, that "evil" simply means "the absence of God", so that a world
>>from which evil was absent would be a world that was not distinct from
>>God and therefore not a world at all.
>
>The redefinition game.
Only in the sense that defining water as H2O is the redefinition game.
>Maybe god cannot create a world that is not distinct from it. But that
>does not explain suffering - or are you arguing that intentionally
>causing unnecessary suffering is not evil?
Why would suffering be unnecessary from the standpoint of an inhabitant
of a world distinct from God if worlds distinct from God necessarily
contain suffering and other evils?
>I still miss some answers. Like on how you can assume the existence of
>something before the big bang and tan explanation of the Big Bang
>without becoming circular.
The only assumption is that there's an explanation for why the Big Bang
happened and the only claim is that we shouldn't give up that assumption
unless it can be shown to be false by some theory that gives us
something more important.
Because of my schedule, I may be unable to deal with any comments on
this posting. (It's possible that the discussion may be played out for
now anyway.)
--
Jim Kalb "Good sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world;
jk@panix.com for everyone thinks himself so well supplied with it, that even
those who are hardest to satisfy in every other way do not
usually desire more of it than they already have." (Descartes)
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Sep 4 21:17:47 EDT 1993
Article: 676 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: music
Date: 4 Sep 1993 17:36:28 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 58
Message-ID: <26b1os$oir@panix.com>
References: <1993Aug30.194057.23753@news.cs.brandeis.edu> <1993Aug31.181500.11859@news.cs.brandeis.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>Evola is not for everyone.
Out of curiosity, what or who is Evola?
>I should
>think, though some might faint dead away at the sight of the Arno Breker
>sculpture on the "Aurora" CD cover.
More curosity. What does the sculpture show?
>Ain Soph is on another Cthulhu Records production . . .
And who is Cthulhu, anyway? I've seen the name here and there on the
net. I think there's even an alt.horror.cthulhu newsgroup. And how
come these people call themselves "Ain Soph" if they're Italians?
>I would imagine that most counter-revs are either into classical music
>or not interested in music at all. I would have fit into such a mold,
>until recently.
I'm not particularly musical, but my tastes run mostly to what's called
classical. I don't go to many concerts but I studied the piano for
about 5 years, until very recently, and liked to work on Bach and
Mozart. (I stopped only because of a dispute with my piano teacher over
personal issues.)
>So, anyway, what are the connections between music and politics? Between
>cultural and political issues?
It seems to me that music (at least the best music) is in some sense
about something, and the thing it is about is beyond politics. So one
connection between music and politics is that by its existence music
refutes the supremacy of politics. I'm not sure how to describe what
music is about. A mode of being that transcends daily life and the
things we are able to bring about through action and will, I suppose.
If music does express some ideal mode of being, the apprehension of that
mode of being through music can affect conduct in practical matters,
including politics. Maybe if music is an important part of your life
you are likely to think that politics, like music, should express some
ideal reality. (Whether that's good or bad depends on a lot of things.)
The ideal reality you think politics should express might depend on your
specific musical tastes. For all I know the political views of people
who like plainsong and people who like Wagner may vary systematically.
Also, music seems to affect how we perceive and respond to things. For
example, musical culture in general should make people less rigid and
narrow, but also less sloppy, and particular sorts of music may
encourage people to be optimistic and adventurous, melancholy and
resigned, or whatever.
--
Jim Kalb "Good sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world;
jk@panix.com for everyone thinks himself so well supplied with it, that even
those who are hardest to satisfy in every other way do not
usually desire more of it than they already have." (Descartes)
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Sep 4 21:17:48 EDT 1993
Article: 677 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: What Counter-revoultion?
Date: 4 Sep 1993 17:38:46 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 42
Message-ID: <26b1t6$ort@panix.com>
References: <1993Sep1.130242.7610@wvnvms.wvnet.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
nc312022@wvnvms.wvnet.edu writes:
>I tried to figure out what this counter revolution was about, but all I
>find is that someone is back from vacation, its been very quiet since he
>was gone, and some music reviews. Anybody kanid enough to clue me in?
As I understand it, the idea of the counterrevolution is the idea that
the Revolution (meaning the tendency away from a social order based on
some transcendent good and toward a social order based to the extent
possible on equal and maximum gratification of actual desires) has been
enormously successful and destructive, and a good or even tolerable life
requires that it be reversed.
There is no single coherent counterrevolutionary movement. Most
American counterrevolutionaries, I think, are conservatives who believe
they have been beaten often and badly enough in the political, social
and cultural wars that they don't see much left they want to conserve
and so have turned radical. Look at _Chronicles_ magazine if you want
something in print dealing with the views and concerns of such people.
The issues American counterrevolutionaries have to deal with include
what things associated with the Revolution they should continue to
accept (the American Revolution? the free enterprise system? the
universal electoral franchise?) and to what they will give their
political allegiance of they reject the Revolution (the Founder's
constitution? their ethnic group? their church?)
There are also European counterrevolutionaries and their American
sympathizers about (Monarchists, Integrists and so on) who come from a
tradition that never accepted any part of the Revolution. We haven't
heard much from such people here lately.
The European New Right (Mr. Deane is an American sympathizer) also
reject the Revolution root and branch, but unlike old-line European
counterrevolutionaries they have no particular interest in bringing back
anything like the European old regime. In particular, the ENR tends to
reject Christianity and to base political allegance on ethnicity and
culture.
--
Jim Kalb "Good sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world;
jk@panix.com for everyone thinks himself so well supplied with it, that even
those who are hardest to satisfy in every other way do not
usually desire more of it than they already have." (Descartes)
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Sep 4 21:24:49 EDT 1993
Article: 680 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: music
Date: 4 Sep 1993 21:22:05 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 29
Message-ID: <26bevt$hg0@panix.com>
References: <1993Aug31.181500.11859@news.cs.brandeis.edu> <2661ve$r55@news.acns.nwu.edu> <1993Sep4.202907.5119@news.cs.brandeis.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>But what about traditional painters existing, say, in the middle ages.
>Were their paintings suggestive of a "possibility of a new world" or
>were they simply expressing their existing cultural world?
Presumably an artist doesn't view his own painting as suggestive of the
possibility of a new world, but rather as expressing or invoking a
reality. To the extent the reality is not the physical and social world
in which the artist lives it might be thought of as a "new world". It's
possible, though, that the reality is one that the social institutions
of the artist's actual world already recognize as an ideal.
>Also, the ENR has adopted a "cultural strategy" for the reasons you've pointed
>out. In the long run, they feel that cultural issues are *more* decisive then
>political issues.
In a way, there is something odd about the notion of a cultural strategy
in politics. If cultural issues are more decisive than political issues
it is because they are more fundamental. A cultural strategy, though,
appears to be a strategy of manipulating the more fundamental cultural
matters as a way of attaining the less fundamental political goals. Can
culture be an instrument serving purposes? If so, what defines the
purposes?
--
Jim Kalb "Good sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world;
jk@panix.com for everyone thinks himself so well supplied with it, that even
those who are hardest to satisfy in every other way do not
usually desire more of it than they already have." (Descartes)
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Sep 4 21:24:51 EDT 1993
Article: 681 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: What Counter-revoultion?
Date: 4 Sep 1993 21:24:38 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 79
Message-ID: <26bf4m$hqe@panix.com>
References: <1993Sep1.130242.7610@wvnvms.wvnet.edu> <1993Sep4.194253.4464@news.cs.brandeis.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>More radical critiques of the FR, like those of the European New Right
>(which I favor), argue that [ . . . w]hat is revolutionary about the
>revolution is the absolute rejection of the past, and of tradition, a
>tradition which implicitly recognized the inequality and particularism
>which are the very essence of the natural world, and of human nature as
>well.
This was one of the main objections Burke made in his _Reflections on
the Revolution in France_. I'm not sure that Mr. Deane would view Burke
as one of the FR's more radical critics, though. Do ENR types have
anything to say about him?
>Where things get sticky is when the European New Right (best represented
>by G.R.E.C.E., a French acronymn roughly translated as "research and
>study group for a European civilization) argues that the historical
>roots of this egalitarian, universal revolution lies in Christianity
>itself [ . . . ]
If so, it that the ENR is going to have a problem finding
particularistic traditions for them to accept as the things that define
Europe. That may be a problem with the notion of having a
counterrevolution in the name of tradition and particularism in the land
that gave birth to the Revolution. If Christianity is one of the things
that made Europe, and if Europe has given rise to "Western Civilization"
(in the ENR sense), and if Christianity made it Europe's destiny to do
so, then does European particularism really make sense?
If you want a European particularism, the solutions that come to mind
are:
1. Say that the the Revolution and "Western Civilization" are Christian
heresies and that true Christianity preserves and sustains the
particularisms of the peoples that adhere to it.
2. Accept the Revolution and "Western Civilization", only to transcend
them in some manner that restores the possibility of particularism. I
haven't the foggiest notion of what such acceptance and transcendance
would be like.
>Other issues of debate on this newsgroup: is the American Revolution of
>the same sort as the French Revolution?
A particularist order of things makes sense only if it is supported by
history and tradition. Obviously, any historical event can be given a
number of interpretations. Nonetheless, someone who is trying to
interpret his own country's history and traditions in support of
particularism will have an easier time of it if he is an American
dealing with the American Revolution than if he is a Frenchman dealing
with the French Revolution.
>At several points, the FR could have stablized, and established a
>constitional monarchy, or a constitional republic - with a minimum of
>bloodshed and upheaval. Had it done so, the same objections to
>Enlightenment thought would have still applied.
Yes, but it would have been easier to distinguish between the rhetoric
of the Enlightenment and the beliefs that Frenchmen actually were acting
on when they made their revolution.
>I would argue that the American Revolution has simply been a version of
>the French Revolution, only in slow motion. Of course, looking at it
>this way, I consider the Civil War, Reconstruction, the "Civil Rights
>Revolution", etc., to be part and parcel of this Enlightenment version
>of the American Revolution.
That's certainly the way things look from the standpoint of the present
situation.
>Mr. Kalb has not responded, so I guess he's out of town.
I was, but now am back. While you were going south to Pennsylvania, I
was going north to Vermont, Quebec, and Bar Harbor.
--
Jim Kalb "Good sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world;
jk@panix.com for everyone thinks himself so well supplied with it, that even
those who are hardest to satisfy in every other way do not
usually desire more of it than they already have." (Descartes)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Sep 5 13:57:04 EDT 1993
Article: 42314 of comp.sys.atari.st
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: comp.sys.atari.st
Subject: CD-ROM for ST
Date: 5 Sep 1993 13:56:30 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 10
Message-ID: <26d98e$ct2@panix.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
I have a 520ST (upgraded to 1 meg) with TOS 1.0 that I want to add a
CD-ROM reader to. What are the choices? Can I use one of the units
designed for the IBM world (with the aid, maybe, of a PC emulator)?
Thanks for any info.
--
Jim Kalb "Good sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world;
jk@panix.com for everyone thinks himself so well supplied with it, that even
those who are hardest to satisfy in every other way do not
usually desire more of it than they already have." (Descartes)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Sep 5 13:57:10 EDT 1993
Article: 15205 of talk.politics.theory
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,alt.politics.libertarian,alt.politics.economics
Subject: Re: Medical Services and A Priori Reasoning
Date: 5 Sep 1993 07:49:12 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 43
Message-ID: <26cjno$kmo@panix.com>
References:
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
Xref: panix talk.politics.theory:15205 alt.politics.libertarian:8289 alt.politics.economics:408
arromdee@jyusenkyou.cs.jhu.edu (Ken Arromdee) writes:
>> The whole _point_ of insurance is that the cost of the people who get sick
>> will be paid for by the people who don't get sick.
Sounds more like the point of a welfare system. The point of insurance
is to deal with uncertainty by spreading risk. If health problems could
be predicted with 100% certainty, then there would be no place for
insurance because a system under which well people compensate sick
people by making payments to them would be purely a welfare system.
(The difference matters because it's a whole lot easier to see how
profit seeking within a free market can lead to an insurance system that
performs as intended than a welfare system that does so.)
>>If you change jobs, or if you change policies in midstream, suddenly all
>>of your "chronic illnesses developed while insured, which shouldn't make
>>your premiums go up" all turn into "pre-existing conditions" for the new
>>policy. If the insurance covered the whole country and did not require
>>people to switch when they switched jobs, that problem would not happen.
Another possibility would be for each insurance contract to provide that
if coverage terminated for someone who developed a chronic illness while
covered the terminating employee would receive a payment sufficient to
cover the additional premium needed to get coverage for the illness
under a new policy. Under such an approach chronic illnesses would be
treated consistently as losses that accrue at the time they are first
diagnosed to be paid by whoever provided insurance coverage at that
time.
I don't see why policies could not include such provisions in a free
market. The reasons that occur to me for their absence are that
employees don't look so far ahead and employers would rather not pay
extra for policies that protect people who are no longer working for
them, especially if existing employees are not very conscious of the
issue. I seem to recall that there are economist's categories like
"information costs" that might cover the situation. (Maybe some of the
libertarians or economists in the group can inform us better.)
--
Jim Kalb "Good sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world;
jk@panix.com for everyone thinks himself so well supplied with it, that even
those who are hardest to satisfy in every other way do not
usually desire more of it than they already have." (Descartes)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Sep 5 22:31:17 EDT 1993
Article: 691 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: What Counter-revoultion?
Date: 5 Sep 1993 22:28:19 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 22
Message-ID: <26e783$nd6@panix.com>
References: <1993Sep1.130242.7610@wvnvms.wvnet.edu> <26b1t6$ort@panix.com> <1993Sep5.191425.19092@news.cs.brandeis.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>I would say that, to the extent that Europeans are still Christian, then
>to that extent one would base one's allegiance on a Christian culture.
Do you mean something like "to the extent what is best in Europeans is
explicable only by reference to Christianity . . . "? Surely
allegiances can't be based on social science surveys of what people on
average are actually like!
>In Western Europe, there is hardly any Christianity to speak of - a sort
>of drawing room conformism on the one hand (with outbreaks of "Christian
>Socialism" and other forms of leftism), and the usual assortment of
>fundamentalists on the other (fundamentalists who have no conception of
>culture at all).
Is this true? Are there any European readers who can advise us?
--
Jim Kalb "Good sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world;
jk@panix.com for everyone thinks himself so well supplied with it, that even
those who are hardest to satisfy in every other way do not
usually desire more of it than they already have." (Descartes)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Sep 5 22:44:34 EDT 1993
Article: 692 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: What Counter-revoultion?
Date: 5 Sep 1993 22:31:01 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 84
Message-ID: <26e7d5$nju@panix.com>
References: <1993Sep4.194253.4464@news.cs.brandeis.edu> <26bf4m$hqe@panix.com> <1993Sep5.204211.20079@news.cs.brandeis.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>Burke is interesting because he is so slippery. How do you deal with a
>philosopher opposed to philosophical principles?
Get in practice by reading Nietzsche.
>Well, I do not consider "Christianity" to be an adamantine monolith,
>that cannot be broken down and it's constituent components examined.
Any religion with creeds, a Bible, and a hierarchy that was generally
accepted for most of its long history is going to have a certain
coherence, especially if it's a religion that developed among people who
are contentious and like to think systematically.
>In fact, one might almost expect the country (France) that gave us the
>Revolution, to give us its nemesis as well. Why not?
There are limits on what forms the nemesis can take. If it was French
culture and tradition that led to the revolution then it may be
difficult for the nemesis there to take the form of traditionalism.
>> If Christianity is one of the things
>>that made Europe, and if Europe has given rise to "Western Civilization"
>>(in the ENR sense), and if Christianity made it Europe's destiny to do
>>so, then does European particularism really make sense?
>
>But if Western Civilization is dead, does your syllogism still apply?
If the hypotheses are correct, it shows that Europe is dead as well and
the attempts of the ENR to save or revive Europe are pointless.
>I've suggested some answers already. Such as accepting some, but not all
>of the Western heritage.
You mean the European heritage? The issue, then, is how much of that
heritage is left if everything the ENR objects to is removed. Do you
happen to know what the ENR thinks of classical European philosophy
(Socrates and later)? Most of it tends away from paganism and
polytheism and toward universal reason. Even some of the pre-Socratics
said things that sound universalistic:
"One god, greatest among gods and men, similar to mortals neither in
shape nor even in thought." (Xenophanes, Fragment 23)
"Although the logos is common to all, the many live as if they had
private understanding." (Heraclitus, Fragment 2)
"The descent to Hades is the same from every place." (Anaxagoras)
Then there is the view of Parmenides that everything is One. (The
ultimate in reductionism!) It seems that all this stuff should be
objectionable to the ENR. But if both European philosophy and
Christianity get kicked out of the European heritage, how much is left?
(Speaking of European philosophy, it seems to me that our current
problems (the democratic consumer society, its problems, and its descent
into tyranny) were described by Plato in books viii-ix of the
_Republic_, so they can't be attributed to Christianity.)
>I disagree with you about France, though: people still think of France
>in particularist and ethnic terms (maybe even more so today than in the
>recent past).
I know very little about France, but I was under the impression that le
Pen was considered a monster by respectable people in part because he
openly opposed immigration on particularist and ethnic grounds. Any one
who can inform me?
>The Revolution has never been able to swallow France: France existed
>before the Revolution, and will exist long after it.
A statement of faith. Would you say the same about England? (I ask
because I know slightly more about that country than about France.) For
what it's worth, my impression is that American multiculturalism is
providing inspiration for many people in Europe just as European social
legislation once inspired many people here. Again, I ask to be
informed.
--
Jim Kalb "Good sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world;
jk@panix.com for everyone thinks himself so well supplied with it, that even
those who are hardest to satisfy in every other way do not
usually desire more of it than they already have." (Descartes)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Sep 6 08:06:39 EDT 1993
Article: 693 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: music
Date: 5 Sep 1993 22:48:16 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 74
Message-ID: <26e8dg$pdj@panix.com>
References: <1993Sep4.202907.5119@news.cs.brandeis.edu> <26bevt$hg0@panix.com> <1993Sep5.195910.19585@news.cs.brandeis.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>I do not, however, agree with the distinction over the "more" or "less"
>fundamental nature of culture and politics. Ultimately, these are one
>and the same.
I suppose that's right if "culture" and "politics" are both used to mean
"social life in all its modes and manifestations". I am inclined to
think of "politics" as those parts of social life that involve conscious
decisions binding on the whole of society, and "culture" as those parts
that precede such decisions. If that distinction is accepted, then I
think de Maistre tells us that culture is more fundamental. His way of
putting it is to say that at least some components of culture are given
by God.
>One favorite ENR maxim is "Politique d'Abord" (if memory serves), which
>means, "politics above everything". What is meant here is not the
>*politicization* of everything, as in totalitarian regimes, but the
>rejection of the false notion that *politics* are by nature dirty, or
>evil, or somehow corrupt.
It's a strange way of putting it if that's what it means. In English
"above everything" is not used to mean "OK", but maybe the French are
more given to dramatic statements. In the alternative, maybe some in
the ENR have take Nietzsche too much to heart, giving the will to power
a political interpretation.
>Politics are the destiny of humanity. Politics are what humans naturally
>do amongst themselves.
Here it sounds like "politics" is being used to mean "social life in all
its modes and manifestations".
>The attempt to abolish politics with "morality" (see Carl Schmidt) or
>economics, leads, in the long run, to totalitarianism.
Here it sounds like the point is that morality or economics can't be the
ultimate authority in all aspects of social life. Or possibly that
decisions binding on society as a whole can't be based solely on those
things. In either case, I agree with the thought, at least if a
suitably narrow interpretation is placed on "morality". What does Carl
Schmidt say, by the way? (I haven't read him.)
>Political activety within a culture that is hostile to one's worldview
>is pointless - the object must be, first, to change the culture. Hence,
>the cultural strategy.
Here "political activity" seems to mean "activity relating to conscious
collective decisions".
Maybe what's troubling to me in the phrase "cultural strategy" is the
suggestion of an attempt to change culture for the primary purpose of
getting people to make the right political decisions (vote for the right
candidates who will enact the right laws and so on). If there is
something fundamentally wrong with culture then there is something
fundamentally wrong with people's sense of what is real and what is
valuable, and it seems odd to combat such an error primarily on account
of its narrowly political consequences. I don't really understand how
the term "politics" is being used, though.
>To get back to your questions...can culture be an instrument serving
>purposes? Well, all cultures assume that there are certain things which
>are right for that culture, and certain things that are wrong...that
>certain things are beautiful, and certian things ugly, and so on.
I would leave out the "for that culture". Culture is a good and
necessary thing, but it's not an end in itself. That's one reason de
Maistre says its components are given by God.
--
Jim Kalb "Good sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world;
jk@panix.com for everyone thinks himself so well supplied with it, that even
those who are hardest to satisfy in every other way do not
usually desire more of it than they already have." (Descartes)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Sep 6 09:06:46 EDT 1993
Article: 695 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: What Counter-revoultion?
Date: 6 Sep 1993 08:11:22 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 55
Message-ID: <26f9da$ra7@panix.com>
References: <26cvqs$i5l@balsam.unca.edu> <1993Sep5.181653.18343@news.cs.brandeis.edu> <26dnvi$j0q@balsam.unca.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
kepley@photon.phys.unca.edu (Brad Kepley) writes:
>"Capitalism" and "consumerism" and "internationalism" are things that
>arrive through free choices. If G.R.E.C.E. intends to create a new
>European culture that opposes these free choices, it sounds like it
>could get pretty grim.
You raise an issue that Americans take very much to heart: on what
grounds can the government restrict individuals from doing what they
want to do? Here are some possibilities:
1. Individual desires can conflict directly. X is angry with Y, but he
likes Y's car. X's desire to beat up Y and swipe his car very likely
conflicts with Y's desires, and laws protecting property and personal
security say that Y wins.
2. The desires of an individual can conflict with social arrangements
that promote the satisfaction of the desires of a great many other
individuals. I desire not to pay taxes. If I failed to pay taxes it
wouldn't hurt anyone to any extent whatever (I am ignoring the
possibility that some busybody might have desires directly relating to
my conduct). Nonetheless, the laws justly punish my failure to pay
taxes because such conduct would thwart the satisfaction of the desires
of a great many other people if engaged in by as many people as would
engage in it if it were not illegal.
3. The desires of an individual can conflict with something that is
valuable without reference to the desires individuals happen to have. X
finds a baby in a basket on his doorstep. He takes it inside, kills it
and throws it out in the garbage. What X did is wrong and can be justly
punished for reasons that have nothing to do with the desires anyone
happens to have.
Do any of these possibilities seem objectionable in principle to you?
If not, you may still be bothered by the question of who will decide
what values other than the satisfaction of actual individual desires are
worthy of government protection, and what social institutions advance
values worthy of government protection and what sort of support they
should receive.
There is certainly something bothersome about the notion of a government
agency somewhere with unrestricted power to determine such issues.
Libertarians try to avoid the bother by accepting only possibility (1)
above, and modern liberals by accepting only (1) and (2). My view is
that such attempts have failed. The conservative approach is to let
culture, tradition and institutional arrangements that decentralize
power determine such issues, and the counterrevolutionary problem as I
see it is how to implement that conservative approach today.
--
Jim Kalb "Good sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world;
jk@panix.com for everyone thinks himself so well supplied with it, that even
those who are hardest to satisfy in every other way do not
usually desire more of it than they already have." (Descartes)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Sep 6 09:06:47 EDT 1993
Article: 696 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: What Counter-revolution?
Date: 6 Sep 1993 08:14:04 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 24
Message-ID: <26f9ic$rea@panix.com>
References: <26b1t6$ort@panix.com> <1993Sep5.191425.19092@news.cs.brandeis.edu> <26doug$j10@balsam.unca.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
kepley@photon.phys.unca.edu (Brad Kepley) writes:
>But let's give Christianity its due. If "ethnicity" is a powerful
>force, there is nothing that distinguishes and spices up an ethnic
>culture, or that gives it such strength and immortality as a strong
>religious base. Consider the Jews, the Eastern Orthodox countries, the
>Irish Catholics, or the Southern Baptists here. Christianity is
>fundamentally involved with ethnicity, for sure. And that obviously
>means the reverse is true.
At the risk of boring people, I will put in my usual comment that
culture and ethnicity are not final ends, but derive their value by
reference to something more fundamental, and that just as there are
problems with using culture as an instrument to promote political ends
there are problems with using religion as an instrument to promote
cultural ends. Politics is what you consciously do. The whole point of
culture is that it's bigger than you and your conscious purposes, and
that goes even more for religion.
--
Jim Kalb "Good sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world;
jk@panix.com for everyone thinks himself so well supplied with it, that even
those who are hardest to satisfy in every other way do not
usually desire more of it than they already have." (Descartes)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Sep 6 09:06:48 EDT 1993
Article: 697 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Neopaganism, Christianity and the present situation
Date: 6 Sep 1993 09:06:18 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 104
Message-ID: <26fcka$9d@panix.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
Recent comments in a.r.c. have led to the following rather incomplete
thoughts, which have some relevance to the possibility of a cultural
renaissance based on neopaganism and the rejection of Christianity:
We require and will have some way of making sense of ourselves and the
world. Nihilism is not possible because things necessarily have meaning
for us. Although the consumer society makes a variety of modes of
distraction and intoxication available to everyone, and irrationality is
always a possibility, it seems to me that at present stoicism and slave
religion are the two coherent ways of making sense of things, and that
of the two slave religion is far more workable for most people.
Slave religion is the religion of someone who has nothing that he can
call his own. It seems to me that is the status of most of us and
perhaps all of us today.
Each of us needs to know who he is, and the properties of a thing
(including a man) determine what that thing is. Today, though, we are
men without qualities. People usually base their sense of who they are
on their position in society, but in a society based on contract as
modified by the requirements of government policy one's position visibly
depends wholly on the will of other people. No doubt the degree to
which social position depends on contract and government policy would be
reduced if the ideology of liberty and equality were abandoned and
people's natural tendency to organize themselves in accordance with sex,
age, kinship, ethnicity, religion and class were given freer play, but
even so it seems unlikely that in the foreseeable future people's social
identities will attain enough fixity to give rise to any very profound
sense of who one is.
Libertarians or liberals want to say that regardless of the wills of
other people we still have our property or human rights, but no one at
present seems to be able to ground such rights in anything more solid
than subjective preferences and the social rules that promote their
satisfaction under particular circumstances. Such things change and can
be variously construed, and in any case their effect is determined by
the view of them held by whoever happens to hold power.
Possibly one might say that his personal characteristics are his own,
but that's not true either in any very deep sense. We didn't make them
ourselves, because some are due to heredity, some to education, and some
to chance development. We can be deprived of any of them at any moment
by disease, accident, or the action of other people. But if we didn't
make them and can't keep them it's hard to think of them as
fundamentally our own.
One way to escape slavery is to define the conditions on which one will
live, and to accept death if they are violated. That was what many
ancient pagans did and the approach still draws at least rhetorical
support. (New Hampshire license plates display the legend "Live Free or
Die".) I'm not sure, though, that a way of life can be built on such a
principle today. If I am a nobleman in traditional European society I
know what is due me because I was born into a family and a class that
has clear standards on such things. If someone denies me my due I can
challenge him and either receive satisfaction or fight a duel to the
death, thus vindicating my honor. However, that sort of conduct makes
no sense if my standards regarding what is due me are my own invention.
It would be very hard for us to admire someone who killed someone
because he felt insulted, or who committed suicide because he lost his
job and the bank was about to foreclose on his house and car. Possibly
G.R.E.C.E. will find a way to bring back codes of honor, but it's not
clear to me how that would come about.
The stoic answer to the problem of slavery is to say that the one thing
that is truly my own is my will. Regardless of what happens, I can keep
on trying to know what is good and to do my duty with respect to that
good. However, it's not clear how many people (if anyone) can live
sufficiently in accordance with such a principle to make it the basis of
their sense of who they are. Many of us find that the will is wavering,
divided, and sometimes deceitful. People are often mistaken as to their
own motives and purposes, and St. Paul has not been alone in his
discovery that "what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do
I".
It seems that the only answer for most people is to accept that one owns
nothing and to concentrate not on one's own will or other supposed
possessions but rather on a transcendent source of value outside oneself
(that is, on God). Accordingly, for most people today the alternative
to spiritual death (e.g., insanity or always keeping oneself diverted or
stupefied) seems to be slave religion.
Slave religion has certain specific characteristics. Because a slave
has nothing, not even merits, such a religion must permit any person to
regard himself as possibly justified (that is, what he should be as a
being of recognized value) without regard to any merits of his own.
Since the only way such justification can be understood is as a gift and
the only explanation for such a gift is love, a slave religion is based
not on law or justice but on love. Therefore, a slave religion will
draw on everything that can increase the love between God and man: God
will be the creator of everything out of nothing and the source of all
value and therefore the appropriate object of the greatest love
possible. God will also be as close to man as possible: he will know
man's inmost thoughts and feelings and will understand them because he
made man and man's world, and still more because he himself once became
man and suffered and felt everything man feels, even the deprivation of
everything he loves most that is the slave's fate.
--
Jim Kalb "Good sense is the most fairly distributed thing in the world;
jk@panix.com for everyone thinks himself so well supplied with it, that even
those who are hardest to satisfy in every other way do not
usually desire more of it than they already have." (Descartes)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Sep 6 14:29:18 EDT 1993
Article: 706 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: What Counter-revolution?
Date: 6 Sep 1993 14:13:41 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 33
Message-ID: <26fukl$48o@panix.com>
References: <26dnvi$j0q@balsam.unca.edu> <26f9da$ra7@panix.com> <26fds8$lmf@balsam.unca.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
kepley@photon.phys.unca.edu (Brad Kepley) writes:
>"isms" are not exactly the same thing as desires. I have no problem
>with a government trying to regulate actions, but when they try to
>enforce "isms" it seems to me that they will always fail.
It's very difficult to enforce belief directly. On the other hand,
action, custom, attitude and belief blend into each other so much that
to regulate one is to affect the others, and such effects should be
taken into account. American right-wingers often express concern about
the connection between the welfare system (which on the face of it
doesn't even regulate actions very much except by changing their
consequences to the people involved) and attitudes toward work, family
responsibilities, illegitimacy and so on. Such concerns seem legitimate
to me, and policy should not ignore them.
My own view is that the test of a government is its effect on what
society is like, and the test of a society is what kind of people it
produces and how they live. In short, the ultimate purpose of
government is virtue and the good life. That ultimate purpose can't be
achieved at all directly through government, which is one reason for
thinking that politics is in fact *not* above everything, but it ought
to be at least the background of our political thinking. So if Mr.
Deane is right that our current scheme of government leads to the
consumer society, and that the consumer society is a worse form of human
life than other possible forms, then it is appropriate for him to try to
develop and propose other schemes that seem likely to lead to a better
outcome.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Sep 6 14:33:48 EDT 1993
Article: 707 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: What Counter-revolution?
Date: 6 Sep 1993 14:32:23 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 19
Message-ID: <26fvnn$617@panix.com>
References: <26f9da$ra7@panix.com> <731GB8ED@math.fu-berlin.de>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
monaghan@zanskar.avc.ucl.ac.uk (N.O. Monaghan) writes:
>>X
>>finds a baby in a basket on his doorstep. He takes it inside, kills it
>>and throws it out in the garbage.
>
>I was not quite sure exactly how this example fitted in, unless you see
>the child as having no desires.
I was thinking of an abandoned newborn, which presumably has no
conceptions (and therefore no desires) regarding death. My point was
that our judgment that X's act was wrong is not based on any beliefs as
to the desires of the baby or anyone else.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Sep 6 15:58:07 EDT 1993
Article: 709 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: What Counter-revolution?
Date: 6 Sep 1993 15:17:45 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 29
Message-ID: <26g2cp$bd8@panix.com>
References: <1993Sep5.181653.18343@news.cs.brandeis.edu> <26dnvi$j0q@balsam.unca.edu> <1993Sep6.171532.4234@news.cs.brandeis.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>The Universalism of Christianity is always at odds with the
>particularism of ethnic groups: "there is neither Jew nor Greek, free
>nor slave..." (pardon if I misquote from memory).
In the sense that ethnic groups sometimes treat their particularisms as
the things that are of final concern, and Christianity disagrees.
"There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there
is neither male nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus" did not
mean that Paul thought that Greeks had to give up their own customs and
follow the same customs as the Jews, or that slaves should rebel, or
that men and women should have the same roles. He specifically asserts
the contrary. As I understand the Christian view, it is that created
things (such as ethnic particularisms) are real and good, but they are
not the thing that is most real and most good.
>My intuition is that Christianity in Europe is dead [ . . . ]
What do you think is alive there? My own (very slight) acquaintance
with modern European culture peters out about the time of the Second
World War, and at that time there were Christians contributing to
culture at the very highest levels.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Sep 6 18:21:05 EDT 1993
Article: 711 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: What Counter-revolution?
Date: 6 Sep 1993 16:02:17 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 48
Message-ID: <26g509$fu3@panix.com>
References: <1993Sep5.204211.20079@news.cs.brandeis.edu> <26e7d5$nju@panix.com> <1993Sep6.184820.5999@news.cs.brandeis.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>As for Europe, I gather that GRECE considers the prime cultural values
>of Europe to be skepticism, and pursuit of the truth, and GRECE
>considers Galileo and Copernicus (not to mention Faust!) to be exemplars
>of the European spirit.
GRECE wants to establish neopagan ethnic particularism on the foundation
of skepticism and pursuit of the truth? A neat trick if they can do it.
By the way, these cultural values sound universalistic to me. Galileo
and Copernicus, I think, wanted to find out how things are in
themselves, not how things were for early modern Italians and Poles. If
they had wanted the latter, why would they have bothered with skepticism
rather than simply going with what their own feelings and culture told
them? And how do you go about pursuing the truth if it's already with
you in your culture? "Pursuit" seems the wrong metaphor.
>"Our concept of the world does not refer to one theorist, but instead to a
>given number of ideas, i.e., cognitions that refer to specific heritages within
>common European values. We refer to the research works of those theorists who
>have not handed down the dogmatic "deciphering" of the world phenomenon:
How does the pursuit of truth as exemplified by Galileo and Copernicus
differ from the attempt to decipher the world phenomenon and set the
results forth in formulaic propositions?
>"Our School stresses the primacy of life over all transmitted world views; the
>primacy of soul over spirit, the primacy of feelings over intellect, and
>finally of character over reason..."
Sounds like their School doesn't emphasize skepticism.
>"Hence, it follows that our school is unconditionally opposed to all systems of
>absolute characteristics, given that these systems imply the idea of
>determinism, of a single truth or of a monotheism, in which we thnk to be able
>to discern the roots of totalitarianism.
Again, it doesn't sound like they would much like "the pursuit of truth"
as an ideal.
Ignore my comments if I am simply rehashing old objections that you have
already responded to -- I will not take silence for consent.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Sep 6 21:31:27 EDT 1993
Article: 725 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: music
Date: 6 Sep 1993 21:31:19 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 48
Message-ID: <26go97$foa@panix.com>
References: <1993Sep5.195910.19585@news.cs.brandeis.edu> <26e8dg$pdj@panix.com> <1993Sep6.191014.6288@news.cs.brandeis.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>>>Well, all cultures assume that there are certain things which
>>>are right for that culture, and certain things that are wrong...that
>>>certain things are beautiful, and certian things ugly, and so on.
>>
>>I would leave out the "for that culture".
>
>Really? Then why do standards of right and wrong, and of beauty, differ from
>culture to culture? For starters: do you think that there is a single standard
>of beauty applicable to all cultures?
By "standard of beauty" I take it you mean a particular understanding of
beauty. I agree that such understandings vary from culture to culture,
from person to person, and from time to time. That does not imply that
beauty varies, any more than differing understandings of the cause of
malaria implies that the cause of malaria varies.
The standards of beauty in early modern Germany and in pre-Columbian
Central America varied a great deal. Nonetheless, Albrecht Duerer was
profoundly struck by the beauty of objects from the New World that he
happened to see on a visit to the Netherlands.
On a slightly lower level of aesthetic perception, I myself have been
greatly moved by Southern Sung landscapes, which were produced in a
culture very distant from my own. Many other things that people whose
views I respect admire greatly have left me cold. My reaction has been
to assume that the things really are beautiful even though I don't yet
see it, rather than to conclude that they're not beautiful because I
don't find them so and beauty is in the eye of the beholder.
In any case, the issue is what cultures assume, and it seems to me that
cultures assume that certain things are beautiful, not that certain
things are beautiful by the culture's own standards.
>> Culture is a good and
>>necessary thing, but it's not an end in itself. That's one reason de
>>Maistre says its components are given by God.
>
>Is anything an end in itself?
The good life.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Sep 6 21:38:03 EDT 1993
Article: 726 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: What Counter-revolution?
Date: 6 Sep 1993 21:35:35 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 76
Message-ID: <26goh7$gbq@panix.com>
References: <26f9da$ra7@panix.com> <26fds8$lmf@balsam.unca.edu> <1993Sep6.200932.7157@news.cs.brandeis.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>Thus, it is not the gulags or concentration camps or secret police which
>define a totalitarian state. Rather, it is the ends which define it: "It
>is a 'form of polity' (O.E.D.) which brooks no oppositions, which seeks
>to occupy the _totality_ of life of all, from cradle ot grave. In order
>to achieve this totality it seeks to reduce all aspects of life and all
>variation in life to a single phenomenon, one total tuth, immutable and
>which cannot be questioned."(Michael Walker)
>
>For the National Socialist, this one truth is race, for the Marxist, it
>is class, and for the liberal, it is the individual.
For the cultural relativist, is the one truth culture? One advantage of
a view of truth as something that is the same for all, independent of
what people think, and at least partially accessible to inquiry is that
it permits an appeal to a standard that is not in the possession of any
human institution. Galileo is famous for making such an appeal.
>"[ . . . ] The totalitarian temptation is always the same: the easy way
>out. The free man is a fighter." (Michael Walker)
>
>No slave religion for Michael Walker. Nor for myself, either.
"Listen coppers -- you'll never take me alive." (100 Hollywood movies)
"du moechtest dir ein Stichwort borgen -, allein bei wem?" ["you'd like
to borrow a slogan -- but from whom?"] (Gottfried Benn, "Verlorenes
Ich")
>>>The conservative approach is to let
>>>culture, tradition and institutional arrangements that decentralize
>>>power determine such issues, and the counterrevolutionary problem as I
>>>see it is how to implement that conservative approach today.
>>
>>I agree.
>
>And when the center can no longer hold, and "mere anarchy" is loosed
>upon the world, what then? When the best lack all conviction and the
>worst are filled with a passionate intensity? When, in other words,
>culture and tradition have failed, how are we to rely on them to
>"decentralized power"? You may be relying on a broken lawnmower to
>magically mow your lawn, without human intervention... By reasoning
>thus, are you not just as guilty as the libertarians in thinking that if
>you do nothing, things will automatically work themselves out? The
>question then, is this: is there enough cultural and traditional
>strength left, that, if left alone, these would restore things to "the
>way they were"? And if not, does that not suggest some more active
>measures need to be taken?
You don't like either my forlorn hope approach ("bring back the
Republic") or my unsentimental analysis approach ("in universal empires
the aristocrats become stoics and the masses adopt a slave religion, so
if the universal empire doesn't have any aristocrats everyone will adopt
a slave religion"). You prefer a "let's defy fate through struggle and
action" approach, talk about neopaganism and about transforming culture
through "active measures", and quote a bunch of Germans who think the
idea of objective truth is a bad thing and who want to go with their
feelings, and some Frenchmen who proclaim that the more Christianity
disappears the more it is with us and that a particularistic social
order can be based on skepticism and the search for truth. I am
convinced by your views no more than you by mine.
What's the conclusion? Possibly that we're faced with a catastrophe in
which political action is useless and the best any of us can do is try
to work out his own salvation and perhaps form communities that will
preserve as much civilization as possible through the times to come. On
the other hand, you never know something will be useless until
afterwards. So for the time being I expect that I will continue to
prefer my forlorn hope to yours.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Sep 6 21:39:15 EDT 1993
Article: 727 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: What Counter-revolution?
Date: 6 Sep 1993 21:37:57 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 31
Message-ID: <26goll$gjh@panix.com>
References: <1993Sep6.184820.5999@news.cs.brandeis.edu> <26g509$fu3@panix.com> <1993Sep6.204557.7746@news.cs.brandeis.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>>GRECE wants to establish neopagan ethnic particularism on the foundation
>>of skepticism and pursuit of the truth? A neat trick if they can do it.
>
>Simpler then you think. All interpretations of reality are particular to the
>observer.
If it's that simple, then everything, including Western Civilization, is
automatically particularistic, and I don't see what GRECE gains by
proclaiming particularism. Unless they happen to have a taste for
lecturing cultures they reject (e.g., Western Civilization) on what
their misconceptions are.
>>By the way, these cultural values sound universalistic to me. Galileo
>>and Copernicus, I think, wanted to find out how things are in
>>themselves, not how things were for early modern Italians and Poles.
>
>Then why weren't people in other cultures doing the same, or more
>precisely, why weren't they doing the same things, in the same ways, for
>the same reasons? The argument here is that there is Western Science,
>and Chinese Science, and Hellenic Science, but no such thing as Science
>itself.
Is that what G. and C. thought? If not, and if that is your view, why
view them as heroes?
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Sep 6 21:40:48 EDT 1993
Article: 728 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: What Counter-revolution?
Date: 6 Sep 1993 21:39:08 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 15
Message-ID: <26gons$gpj@panix.com>
References: <731GB8ED@math.fu-berlin.de> <26fvnn$617@panix.com> <1993Sep6.210224.8183@news.cs.brandeis.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>>I was thinking of an abandoned newborn, which presumably has no
>>conceptions (and therefore no desires) regarding death.
>
>I'm a little baffled here. How does it follow that a lack of conceptions
>means a lack of desires?
If something has no conception of death it can't fear death or desire
not to die.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Sep 7 06:43:15 EDT 1993
Article: 729 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: Korzybski
Date: 6 Sep 1993 21:40:42 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 27
Message-ID: <26goqq$h16@panix.com>
References: <1993Sep6.220210.9169@news.cs.brandeis.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>The problem we are having, I think, is that Mr. Kalb is an Aristotelian
>- one who reasons linearly according to a series of questions which can
>only be answered "yes" or "no", and who treats these abstractions as
>concrete realities - and I am not an Aristotelian, or rather, I seem to
>be becoming a non-Aristotelian.
I draw conclusions in all sorts of ways -- some rational and linear,
some non-rational and some (probably) irrational. When I examine my
conclusions to see exactly what and how good they are, and when I
discuss them with other people, I try to set them up in a linear fashion
because that makes things clearer and easier to deal with. I try not to
use abstractions uncritically -- I try to think about the categories I
am using so that if they are questioned I can explain what I understand
by them, why they are useful in the setting, and how far they can be
relied on.
It's hard for me to respond to the quote you posted, in part because he
doesn't give examples. Also, he seems to believe that no one had ever
thought critically about anything until he came on the scene.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Sep 7 13:10:26 EDT 1993
Article: 732 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: religion
Date: 7 Sep 1993 09:44:40 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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Message-ID: <26i388$467@panix.com>
References: <1993Sep6.233002.10902@news.cs.brandeis.edu>
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My Aristotelian incomprehension continues:
>Following the consolidation of the Judeo-Christain belief in Europe, the
>world and world phenomena came to be observed according to fixed
>concepts and categories governed by the logic of "either-or", "true or
>false", "good or evil"--with seldom any shading in between.
As you observe, Miller must mean Greco-Judeo-Christian. Is there much
evidence for what the Celto-Germanic logic and ontology are like that
(it appears) are the true heritage of Europe?
>Miller, nevertheless, doubts that Judeo-Christian monotheism can
>continue to be a valid approach in understanding the complex social
>reality of the contemporary world, a world that is replete with choices
>and intricate social differences which stubbornly refuse all
>categorization.
I don't see why this should be so. If things are too complicated or
subtle to categorize a complicated logical system won't make them easier
to deal with than a simple one. KISS applies *especially* when you're
dealing with troublesome things .
>Thus, Molnar writes, the aim of the New Right is not so much to return to the
>worship of ancient European deities as it is to forge another civilization, or
>rather, a modernized version of 'scientific and cultural Hellenism', considered
>a common receptacle for all European peoples...
Hellenism, I thought, was a cosmopolitan civilization that existed from
Spain to Central Asia and India. I also thought that Hellenistic
intellectuals tended toward substantial monotheism and the downplaying
of particularism. Also, it's notable that the only particularisms that
seem to be taken seriously here are pan-European particularisms.
>There is no question of conquering the planet but rather to promote an
>oikumena of the peoples and civilizations that have rediscovered their
>origins.
The relation between the oikumena and the rediscovery of origins puzzles
me. Also the distinction between conquering the planet and promoting an
oikumena. If you can't have those things in Christianity, why can you
have them in Hellenism?
>One believes in rehablilitated paganism in order to restore to the
>peoples their genuine identity that existed before monotheist
>corruption...
Genuine identities must be durable to survive millenia of corruption.
Also, the corruption seems to have been one the old genuine identities
were prone to.
>[ . . . ] the majority of modern political principles are secularized
>theological principles. They bring down to earth a
>_structure_of_exclusion_; the police of the soul yield its place to the
>police of the state; the ideological wars follow up on the religous
>wars. . .
I was under the impression that prosecutions for impiety were rather
common in Athens, and that the Druids were not the most tolerant of men.
It seems to me that an emphasis on particularism automatically means
structures of exclusion. Ask your local multiculturalist.
>By cutting themselves from European polytheistic roots, and by accepting
>Christianity, Europeans gradually began to adhere to the vision of the
>world that emphasized the equality of souls, and the importance of
>spreading God's gospel to _all_ peoples, regardless of creed, race or
>language. . .
Does a vision of the world that emphasizes respect for all cultures
differ fundamentally from a vision of the world that emphasizes the
equality of souls?
>The consequence of Christian belief in ontological oneness, i.e., that
>there is only one God and therefore only one truth, results in an effort
>to obliterate or down play all other possible 'truths' and values.
And relativism results in the view that there's no point in
investigating anything or listening to other people because there can't
possibly be a truth that's truer than what seems to be true to you right
now.
The result you describe here occurs when people rush things by assuming
that they already have the truth in its perfection. As discussed,
that's not what St. Paul or St. Thomas thought.
>According to the authors of the New Right, the Judeo-Christian
>rationalization of historical process precludes the reassessment of
>one's own national past, and in additions, it significantly contributes
>to the 'desertification' of the entire world. . .
Wouldn't reassessment of one's national past involve rationalizing it in
accordance with some principle? Christianity at least says that all
created things are good, including national pasts, that everything is
part of God's plan, and that how things contribute to God's plan is very
often inscrutable.
>The New Right refutes the idea of some of its critics that Christian
>religions, notably Catholicism, are also able to preserve the sacred. De
>Benoist writes that Catholicism owes its manifestation of the sacred
>(holy sites, pilgrimages, Christmas festivities, and pantheon of
>saints), to the indomitable undercurrent of pagan and polytheistic
>sensibility that has kept resurfacing in Catholic beliefs. Paganism, as
>he sees it, is less a religion in the Christian sense of the word, but
>rather a certain 'spirtual equipment' that stands in sharp contrast to
>the religion of Jews and Christians.
If paganism is not a religion in the Christian sense, why can't it exist
within Christianity? The Christian objection is to making the things
pagans hold dear (one's country and its habits and institutions, for
example) into a religion, not to holding those things dear.
By the way, "Judeo-Christian" and similar expressions are probably
somewhat misleading in this context because the two religions have a
different relation to particularisms. As I understand it, Judaism is
specifically the religion of the Jews and incorporates Jewish
particularisms, while Christianity is a universal religion that is
consistent with a variety of particularisms. One thing the ENR seems to
do is to attribute Jewish intolerance of non-Jewish particularisms
(which makes sense in a religion specifically for Jews, just as
prosecutions of Athenians for violations of their own particularisms
made sense in Athens) to Christianity.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Wed Sep 8 09:22:40 EDT 1993
Article: 739 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: Time!
Date: 8 Sep 1993 09:22:34 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 83
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References: <1993Sep7.231855.2837@news.cs.brandeis.edu>
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deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>We agree that there is a single reality. Mr. Kalb keeps assuming that
>one who argues from an understanding of the relativeness of perceptions
>of the subjects (subjectivism) must therefore believe in a relativeness
>of the object - or rather, that there is no object at all, only
>perceptions of the object. Why this follows, I cannot say [ . . . ]
If reality is one, why isn't truth one? Or if truth isn't one, how can
reality be one? If two truths contradict each other, how can they both
be true of the single reality that you say exists? But if all truths
necessarily are consistent with each other, why can't we call the
collection of all truths the single truth about the single reality?
Maybe the foregoing just shows that I am a narrow-minded Aristotelian.
But if you reject that kind of narrow-mindedness why insist that there
is only a single reality? It seems to me that as reality is, so truth
is.
>Mr. Kalb sees Beauty, as I understand him, as something objectively
>real, such that, in theory, one could come via reason to a universal
>concept of beauty which would account for all beauty in the universe. My
>concept is that there is in fact no such thing as "beauty" in this
>sense, but rather, many things have qualities we find beautiful in them,
>and in so doing our minds create the concept of beauty.
In what I was responding to, you seemed to put truth and beauty on the
same footing. Applying what you say here to truth, it seems that you
would say that truth is nothing more than something we construct out of
the way things seem to us. If that's so, then it's unclear to me that
you think there is any necessary connection between truth and reality.
Maybe my basic objection to your outlook is that you don't seem to
distinguish between truth and belief.
>I suppose my objection to Mr. Kalb's "rise of universal reason" argument
>[ . . . ]
I'm not sure which argument you are referring to.
>The analogy is hierarchical - everything exists for a higher purpose,
>nothing (except presumably God) exists as a thing in itself (why Mr.
>Kalb mentions "the good life" as such a thing in itself I do not know).
I'm not sure what you mean by "a thing in itself". If you simply mean
"real", one point of the doctrine of creation is that created things are
real. It may be true that in some sense all things other than God must
be understood in relation to other things and ultimately in relation to
God. I don't think that means I deprive the things we see around us of
their value or reality, though.
As to the good life, I believe I said that it is an end in itself --
something desired for its own sake and not for the sake of something
else.
>My understanding seems to be the reverse - non-hierarchical (that is,
>God or Truth or whatever, as immanent rather than transcendent), with
>everything a thing in itself, these things also being part of larger
>things, and themselves divided into smaller things. Thus, there is a
>hierarchy, but each level, each thing, is still a thing in itself.
Here it appears that you believe that everything must be understood as
part of a system of things. I'm not sure why you think that makes each
individual thing more of a thing in itself than it would be if one of
the things that exist (God) existed as a self-sufficient reality.
>In Mr. Kalb's conception, as I understand it, there are abstract ideas,
>transcedent things, call them God or Natural Law or whatever, hovering
>above the plain. These things are like puppeteers - they control what
>is going on down on the plain.
Such a conception would deny the reality of created things.
>All transcendent things are within nature. It is their nature to be so.
Here again you seem to be saying that all things necessarily exist as
part of a system of things called "nature". So each thing gets its
reality from everything else. Sort of like the town where the people
all make a living taking in each other's laundry.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Wed Sep 8 09:24:03 EDT 1993
Article: 740 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: What Counter-revolution?
Date: 8 Sep 1993 09:23:58 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 22
Message-ID: <26kmde$7v8@panix.com>
References: <1993Sep6.200932.7157@news.cs.brandeis.edu> <26goh7$gbq@panix.com> <1993Sep7.234000.3104@news.cs.brandeis.edu>
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deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>[T]ruths become monsterous when they are taken out of their natural
>context and made into something greater then they can, by their nature,
>be.
To me, this looks like a statement of why heresy is a bad thing.
>>"Listen coppers -- you'll never take me alive." (100 Hollywood movies)
>
>The hero's cry was ever thus! Better a short and valiant life,
>then the dull yoke of slavery.
But is rebellion is a good thing when it is not in the service of some
transcendent principle to which one submits? I suggest the works of the
Divine Marquis for an exploration of the relevant issues.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Wed Sep 8 09:25:39 EDT 1993
Article: 741 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: What Counter-revolution?
Date: 8 Sep 1993 09:25:35 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 23
Message-ID: <26kmgf$85t@panix.com>
References: <1993Sep6.210224.8183@news.cs.brandeis.edu> <26gons$gpj@panix.com> <1993Sep7.235147.3263@news.cs.brandeis.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>>If something has no conception of death it can't fear death or desire
>>not to die.
>
>An interesting case of putting the cart (reason) before the horse
>(reality). If it is necessary to have a conception of something, in
>order to experience something, then there is something terribly wrong
>with the Universe.
Unlike pain, loud noises and other things newborns instinctively shrink
from, death is never experienced. Since you recently quoted Yeats I
will do the same:
Nor dread nor hope attend
A dying animal;
[ . . . ]
Man has created death.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Wed Sep 8 10:57:22 EDT 1993
Article: 742 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: religion
Date: 8 Sep 1993 09:29:20 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 107
Message-ID: <26kmng$8pq@panix.com>
References: <1993Sep6.233002.10902@news.cs.brandeis.edu> <26i388$467@panix.com> <1993Sep8.002639.3896@news.cs.brandeis.edu>
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deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>>KISS applies *especially* when you're
>>dealing with troublesome things .
>
>This may be so in an engineering problem, but it's disasterous when
>dealing with a living society (why do you think 'social engineering' is
>a slur?).
I thought the weakness of social engineering was overestimating what can
be done by comprehensive and complex government policies. My own
preference is to keep government policy simple.
>When one symplifies in this area, far too many valuable things slip
>through one's fingers...
My own view is that it's hard to do justice to more than one set of
complexities at a time. So if the material one is dealing with is
complex it is better to keep one's fundamental method of dealing with it
simple.
>It is a particular feature of Hellenism that they admire, and not the 'whole
>enchilada' as it were.
What feature is that?
>The younger ENR generation emphasizes regionalism more than the older.
With any luck, the next generation will emphasize respect for the
varying ways of life of yet smaller social units, and the generation
after that respect for the diversity of the smallest social units of all
(individuals!) and busy themselves with setting up some overall
organization to protect that diversity, so that the movement will
recapitulate the development of modern liberalism.
Somewhat more seriously, the problem seems to be keeping the various
levels of human organization (world, civilization, nation, region,
locality, family, individual) in balance, so that each respects the
others and its necessary functions, and none is treated as absolute.
The error of liberalism is to treat the individual and worldwide
organization as absolutes, with nothing in between, and the error of
fascism (as I understand it) was to treat the nation as an absolute,
with nothing above or below it that it had to respect. From what you
have said of the ENR, it sounds like it tends to treat particular
civilizations (e.g., "Europe") as absolutes rather than as part of a
larger worldwide whole of any real substance. I view that as an error
as well.
The ENR objection to monotheism is that monotheism wants to set up an
absolute worldwide organization. It seems to me that objection fails if
religious truth is understood as something that no human organization
can completely possess. On this last understanding each level of human
organization would be treated as created by God and therefore as both
real and valuable and as relative. It seems to me that such treatment
offers the best hope for maintaining the necessary balance.
>>Does a vision of the world that emphasizes respect for all cultures
>>differ fundamentally from a vision of the world that emphasizes the
>>equality of souls?
>
>Yes. Respect does not necessarily imply equality.
What sorts of cultural inequalities does the ENR believe in? Does the
existence of such inequalities imply that there are universal standards
for judging cultures? If so, what? Does respect imply belief in the
presence of some common characteristic? If so, what? Also, do such
inequalities have practical consequences in (e.g.) international
relations?
>What's the point of serving the true God if doing so doesn't make you
>better than those who do not? Regardless of how much you "admit you know
>nothing"? Beware the pride of the humble...
What's the point of favoring the ENR and authentic European civilization
if that doesn't make you better than everyone else? Regardless of how
much you proclaim your respect for all cultures no matter how inferior
they are . . .
>>Christianity at least says that all
>>created things are good, including national pasts,
>
>Does it really? Then why is there evil?
I don't have a snappy answer. One answer is that things are bad insofar
as they lack being in some fashion. Another is that evil is our mode of
perceiving the absence of God, so that it is necessary to the existence
of a created universe that is separate from God. Another is that God
has arranged things to bring good out of evil.
On the more specific point, your past, my past and every national past
has many evil things in it. But it's not evil that your, my and
national pasts exist. It may not even be evil that the pasts exist with
the particular evils they do.
>> The Christian objection is to making the things
>>pagans hold dear (one's country and its habits and institutions, for
>>example) into a religion, not to holding those things dear.
>
>No, not "a religion." A way of life.
A self-sufficient way of life that doesn't refer to anything else.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
Do let me know if you have comments of any kind.
Back to my archive of posts.