Items Posted by Jim Kalb
From panix!not-for-mail Fri Sep 10 20:01:16 EDT 1993
Article: 752 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: Time!
Date: 10 Sep 1993 18:34:17 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>If the universe if infinite, then we, as finite creatures, not only
>can't understand the universe, we cannot approach via reason to a truth
>which defines and limits such a universe, for such a truth would itself
>be part of the universe and subject to the same influences all other
>parts of the universe undergo. Also, the subject cannot observe the
>object without itself influencing the object. So it is not a question of
>there being no object, rather it is a question of there being no final
>way to escape one's position as a subject seperated from the object.
>There is, then, for us, no such thing as a universal perspective.
>Presumably, there is no such thing as a universal perspective at all.
I'm not sure what follows from any of this. If we can't understand the
universe at all, and if we cannot approach at all via reason to a truth
that defines and limits the universe, then I don't see the point of
thought or discussion. Nothing we come up with will have any hold on
reality, so why bother with it? So it seems to me that we necessarily
believe we can do those things to at least some extent.
It also seems to me that the notion of the singleness of reality, from a
practical standpoint, is the notion that for any two perspectives a more
inclusive perspective can be found that preserves and extends whatever
truths are visible from within each of the two separate perspectives.
Do you reject that notion? If so, why waste time in philosophical
discussions?
>>But if all truths
>>necessarily are consistent with each other, why can't we call the
>>collection of all truths the single truth about the single reality?
>
>There can be, in theory, but such a truth disappears from *us* in an infinite
>series of regressions (higher and higher, or lower and lower, levels of
>reality), the universe being infinite.
Even assuming that's right, the human world is no more infinite than the
world of European civilization. So why shouldn't there be a single
human reality that is just as real, even though somewhat thinner, than
the reality recognized by European civilization?
>Socrates et al, emergence of reason as a tool for arriving at truth, leads
>to search for one truth, therefore monotheism is a logical outcome of such
>a search, etc.
Quite true. Your point seems to be that exaggerating our grasp of
universal truth can cause problems. No doubt, but so does denying that
such a thing exists and is important.
>The things of this world are not to be loved for themselves, but rather
>they are to be loved only indirectly, through love of the God that made
>them.
Is that supposed to be a requirement of monotheism or Christianity? I
think of love as the recognition of goodness, so if God made the things
of this world and made them good I don't see why it's wrong to love them
directly. St. Thomas says: "All things are good inasmuch as they have
being. But they are not called beings through the divine being, but
through their own being: therefore all things are not good by the
divine goodness, but by their own goodness." It's true that both common
sense and Christianity tell us that our love for the things of this
world should not be unlimited. As Augustine says: "For there is an
attractiveness in beautiful bodies, in gold and silver, and all things .
. . Worldly honour hath also its grace, and the power of overcoming, and
of mastery . . . Human friendship also is endeared with a sweet tie . .
. Upon occasion of all these, and the like, is sin committed, while
through an immoderate inclination towards these goods of the lowest
order, the better and higher are forsaken . . ." So it's not denied
that the goods of this world are goods, only that we should treat them
as the be-all and end-all.
>And is it sometimes better to forsake the good life for more fundamental
>values?
If you define "the good life" in such a way that it would sometimes be
better to forsake it, you're using the wrong definition.
>>>In Mr. Kalb's conception, as I understand it, there are abstract ideas,
>>>transcedent things, call them God or Natural Law or whatever, hovering
>>>above the plain. These things are like puppeteers - they control what
>>>is going on down on the plain.
>>
>>Such a conception would deny the reality of created things.
>
>Then why speak of 'laws'?
Why can't I think of natural laws as descriptions of how created things
act that are not more real than the things themselves?
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Fri Sep 10 20:01:17 EDT 1993
Article: 753 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: religion
Date: 10 Sep 1993 18:36:48 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>>>It is a particular feature of Hellenism that they admire, and not the 'whole
>>>enchilada' as it were.
>
>As I understand it: a lack of the concepts of Dogma, or Sin (esp.
>original sin). A feeling that all aspects of human life are natural.
>Hence it makes no sense to speak of sex, say, or 'hate' or 'pride' or
>whatever as being intrinsically evil.
The concept of original sin is not that sex, anger or self-esteem are
intrinsically evil, but that they're good things that have become
corrupted and so need restraint. My impression is that those in the
Hellenistic age who thought seriously about ethics (the philosophers)
also thought that such things needed restraint and in fact favored a
quite austere way of life. Is what the ENR favors Hellenism without a
brain?
>Some things - represented, for example in the darker aspects of the
>Dionysian cult - have disruptive consequences and need to be controlled
>for the good of the community. That is to say, the sense of right and
>wrong is related to what is good for the community. And what guides the
>actions of the moral person is not something like the '10 commandments'
>so much as a sense of honor.
So the ENR likes a utilitarian morality guided by a sense of honor?
Another neat trick if they can bring it off.
>Europe is a reality, whereas the world community does not exist, except
>in the minds of certain Westerners who confuse Western Civilization with
>'world civilization'.
When people live close enough to each other to be in constant
communication and have constant interactions a community of some sort
arises.
>>>Respect does not necessarily imply equality.
>>
>>What sorts of cultural inequalities does the ENR believe in?
>
>Each culture values qualities differently. This is a form of cultural
>inequality.
Cultural difference, rather.
Respect implies recognition of value. When the ENR respects other
cultures, on what is that respect based? Is the basis of respect such
that all cultures have equal value, or are some are more valuable than
others? Can European culture demand that other cultures respect it? If
so, why?
>>>What's the point of serving the true God if doing so doesn't make you
>>>better than those who do not?
>>
>>What's the point of favoring the ENR and authentic European civilization
>>if that doesn't make you better than everyone else?
>
>It makes one better at what one is.
Salvation is said to do the same.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Fri Sep 10 20:22:18 EDT 1993
Article: 755 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: Constitutions
Date: 10 Sep 1993 20:22:05 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 19
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References: <1993Sep9.182409.20041@linus.mitre.org> <1993Sep10.153201.692@news.cs.brandeis.edu> <1993Sep10.195525.11507@linus.mitre.org>
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ptrei@bistromath.mitre.org (Peter Trei) writes:
> I'm sure Nils will inform us of the details. It can't be
>pre-communist St. Petersburg, since it's explicitly dated to 1986.
>(Maybe he means St. Petersburg, Florida :-)
Since Nils is letting us guess, I'll add my conjecture that the
reference is to de Maistre's _St. Petersburg Dialogues_. That would
explain the exclusion of Freemasons, which strikes me as somewhat
antiquarian.
>FWIW: Yes, I am a Mason.
What a relief! I was afraid you were one of the Bavarian Illuminati.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Sep 11 10:38:40 EDT 1993
Article: 764 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: What Counter-revolution?
Date: 11 Sep 1993 08:45:04 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 128
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deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>But all living things experience death. It is the price for experiencing
>life.
When they're alive they don't experience death and when they're dead
they don't experience death either.
What started all this was my claim that a newborn can't have any desires
regarding its own death. Do you disagree with that claim?
>We can understand parts of it, sufficiently to manipulate it for our own
>purposes (i.e., Western science), but that does not mean that our models
>of the universe define the universe.
You sound rather like a philosophical pragmatist -- one who treats the
sole goal of thought and investigation as effective action. Is that a
common view within the ENR?
>We can 'get a hold' on reality. But only to a limited extent. And all of
>our understandings of the Universe remain nominal, open to challenge -
>which is a spur to thought and discussion, not a barrier.
I would have thought that the spur to thought and discussion would be
greatest if our ability to get a hold on reality were understood as real
rather than nominal and open-ended rather than limited.
>There is such a thing [humanity], but only to the extent that one sets
>apart the human from the non-human (the only sense in which 'humanity'
>exists).
Does Europe exist only to the extent one opposes it to what is not
Europe? If so, someone might come to feel that the value of what
Europeans hold dear can be shown only through its triumph over what
other peoples hold dear. Perhaps such a view, that values derive their
validity from their practical efficacy in the struggle with opposing
values, would go along with a view that reduces "truth" to efficacy in
attaining whatever one's purposes happen to be.
To me, it seems that any community (European, world or whatever) can
also be defined by contrast to what it has been, to what it might be, to
what it might have been and so on.
>Within humanity there will always be differentiation, interaction,
>cooperation, *and* conflict.
Ditto within Europe.
>I still don't see why 'the good life' should be a thing in itself, when
>your understanding should leave that distinction to God alone.
Not thing in itself, end in itself. I define "the good life" as "the
way of life that for us is an end in itself". If on further
investigation it turns out that a particular relation to God is for us
an end in itself then that relation to God will be at least part of the
good life.
>>The concept of original sin is not that sex, anger or self-esteem are
>>intrinsically evil, but that they're good things that have become
>>corrupted and so need restraint.
>
>No. I remember this much of my catecism class: original sin is the
>doctrine that Man is a fallen creature, such that he is intrinsicly evil
>(in stronger interpretations), or otherwise beyond all hope of
>redemption, so that no matter how good his behavior, even if 'perfect',
>he is still sinful and therefore damned.
I would like to see your catechism. If it used the word "intrinsic" I
would imagine what it meant was that the effects of original sin appear
in all men and can't be removed by our own efforts. Also, I would doubt
that it treated perfect behavior by a human being as a real possibility.
>Certain things, such as pride, envy, lust, etc. are considered sins in
>themselves, not good things that have become corrupted.
Chicken pox is considered a disease in itself, not a healthy thing that
has somehow turned bad. Something is called "pride" only if it's a sin.
Esteem for one's self is not a sin, though -- otherwise the injunction
to love one's neighbor as one's self would make no sense.
>Is what the ENR favors Hellenism without a
>brain?
>More like Hellenism without certain philosphers.
Which Hellenistic thinkers does the ENR approve of?
>Anyhow, no philosopher ever dictated ethics to the polis.
They didn't think there was any hope of doing so. That's why (as I
understand the matter) they tended to give their loyalty to an ideal
cosmopolis.
>>So the ENR likes a utilitarian morality guided by a sense of honor?
>>Another neat trick if they can bring it off.
>
>Why? It existed in Greece, and still exists in some cultures.
Really? I thought men of honor tended to be guided by their sense of
what is noble rather than what is useful. Are there any Greek writers
that the ENR views as exemplifying the blend of utilitarianism and
honor?
>>Respect implies recognition of value. When the ENR respects other
>>cultures, on what is that respect based?
>On the quid pro quo that their own culture be respected. On the
>realization that the only lasting rights are mutual rights.
That's the basis of an armed truce or at best treaty between equal
powers rather than respect. Suppose one side becomes so strong they
don't care about the quid pro quo or establishing a lasting system of
rights?
>Every culture is ethnocentric. Each provides its own values. I would
>assume that the basis of respect is on a practical basis, and not on
>some kind of metaphysical equality.
What practical basis is there for the strongest culture respecting far
weaker cultures? If there is no community of humanity, so that what we
have is a war of all against all, why not do unto others before others
do unto you?
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Sep 11 11:07:07 EDT 1993
Article: 767 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: What Counter-revolution?
Date: 11 Sep 1993 11:06:58 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 26
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kepley@photon.phys.unca.edu (Brad Kepley) writes:
>The Enlightenment was obviously necessary for the Scientific Revolution
>which was also responsible for a doubling of the life span of humans.
How is this obvious? I haven't worked out any theory on the matter, but
it seems to me that the processes of scientific inquiry are probably
consistent with a variety of views on the nature of man, society and the
universe. Also, my impression was that the Scientific Revolution
preceded the Enlightenment.
I suppose another point is that we can in good conscience enjoy the
benefits of a thing without approving of that thing in all respects. If
world history had been even slightly different it's very likely I would
never have been born. But even though I like being alive I don't think
I have to approve of everything significant that happened before the
moment of my conception.
On another point, I hope we can avoid accusations of "bitching" and
"bleating". As Donahue says, "we're all here to learn". Do any of the
participants in a.r.c. want *him* to look better than *us*?
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Sep 11 19:50:42 EDT 1993
Article: 770 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: What Counter-revolution?
Date: 11 Sep 1993 19:50:30 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 50
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kepley@photon.phys.unca.edu (Brad Kepley) writes:
>The discoveries that were made preceeded the Enlightenment, but
>scientific advances have been made in the past without any very dramatic
>effect on the general population as a whole. Without the philosophes I
>don't think much general benefit would have come from the Scientific
>Revolution. In any case the fact is that the philosophes *did* press
>the application of science to everyone.
My impression had been that the industrial revolution didn't have much
direct connection with either the advances in theoretical science or the
philosophes, but mostly had to do with practical innovations devised by
self-taught men in the provinces. I suppose that improving landowners,
as members of the gentry, may have had more in the way of formal
education and contacts with learned and literary circles than
manufacturers did. But were many of them really inspired by the
Enlightenment?
>Do you honestly think that the Scientific Revolution would have
>proceeded so far without the Enlightenment? Why did it happen here and
>not somewhere else.
The two things do seem to be connected, with each other and with the
industrial revolution. I suppose the issue is what the necessary social
and intellectual presuppositions and consequences are of the practices
characteristic of modern science. I don't have a good answer, but
modern science existed before the Enlightenment and has continued to
exist after the Enlightenment.
>Furthermore, if we are such "slaves", why did it happen in a Christian
>country?
I described a slave religion as the religion of someone who owns nothing
and deals with his situation by making a source of absolute value
outside himself the center of his life. I don't see any opposition
between such religion and the notion of natural law.
>I think that not only was the Enlightenment responsible for our great
>advance in lifespan, but Christianity was responsible for the
>Enlightenment, but I guess that argument has already been made by Deane,
>hasn't it?
No doubt the Enlightenment could not have occurred in the absence of
Christianity. I believe Mr. Deane goes beyond that, though, to say that
Christianity necessarily ends in something like the Enlightenment.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Sep 13 19:22:42 EDT 1993
Article: 772 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: What Counter-revolution?
Date: 13 Sep 1993 17:17:33 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 58
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deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>But might it not be possible that what is 'the good life' for you might
>not be 'the good life' for another?
I suppose the two would be similar to the extent we are similar and
different to the extent we are different in the relevant respects. The
best life for me doesn't include trying to become an operatic tenor but
might for someone else with more talent. I suppose social setting would
also make a difference. The best life for me is probably rather
different from the best life for someone born into the Heian court
nobility. On the other hand, to the extent the good life for me is
determined by the fact that I am a rational and social animal (I use
language, I can understand general principles and act in accordance with
them, I can understand myself as one among a number of beings forming a
community) and by other things I share with all human beings the good
life for me would be similar to the good life for another.
>>Which Hellenistic thinkers does the ENR approve of?
>
>Judging by the kind words for Karl Popper, I would assume Plato, for one.
Whose kind words? I thought KP (who I haven't read) liked the "open
society" but the ENR doesn't. Also, even though (as I understand the
matter) KP didn't much like Plato because Plato didn't much like the
"open society", I would have thought the ENR wouldn't like Plato either
because Plato thought or tended to think that at least some men could
attain to universal truths.
Incidentally, don't most people reserve the term "Hellenistic" for the
post-Alexander period?
>But Plato, for example, really did try to bring his ideal polis about in the
>real world.
He thought his ideal polis was also a possible polis, and visited the
tyrant of Syracuse a couple of times to see if anything practical could
be done. On the whole, though, he was pessimistic about the likelihood
that his ideal would ever be realized.
>>Are there any Greek writers
>>that the ENR views as exemplifying the blend of utilitarianism and
>>honor?
>
>Homer.
How so? Maybe Ulysses and Nestor blended practicality and honor.
Achilles and most of the other heroes didn't. I'm not sure how much
would be left of the heroic world and its honor if Ulysses and Nestor
had been typical. The Trojan War certainly had more to do with honor
than with utility. Also, I think the practicality U. and N. displayed
had more to do with personal advantage and helping your friends and kin
than general social utility.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Sep 13 20:13:58 EDT 1993
Article: 777 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: What Counter-revolution?
Date: 13 Sep 1993 20:13:35 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 40
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deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>In the middle east, or 'fertile crescent', for instance, Christianity
>and its kindred religions came as the natural outcome of cultural
>development, culminating in the Islamic triumph.
Which makes it surprising that Christianity all but disappeared in those
lands and caught on in Europe during the chaos of the later Roman
Empire, the Great Migrations and the Dark Ages. I would have thought
that poor communications and constant warfare would have caused
unnatural foreign impositions to drop off, but your view seems to be
that in the case of Europe and Christianity the opposite occurred.
>The Rennaissance represents the reemergence of European tendencies
>disguised as antiquarian interests in classical learning. These, and
>earlier medieval learning, are the roots of our scientific understanding
>of things, and not the Enlightenment. The reason ENR thought tends to
>look kindly on the Rennaissance and not the Enlightenment is because the
>Enlightenment acted as the vehicle for egalitarian and universalist
>tendencies which serve to alienate Europe from its roots, rather than
>reinforce said roots.
As discussed, it seems to me that Greek philosophy, Roman law and our
scientific understanding of things (which here it appears the ENR does
not object to) all have universalist tendencies.
>To quote Marlowe, Faust's sin is that "Thou didst love the world". What
>is science, indeed, if not such a love?
Science seems to me more a love of the abstract order of the world than
of the world itself. Everything in the world is particular, but science
doesn't care about particular events. (Only repeatable experiments are
of interest to science, and data points that don't fit are simply
excluded from consideration.)
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Sep 14 11:10:29 EDT 1993
Article: 780 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: Constitutions
Date: 14 Sep 1993 07:08:27 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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In article <272ocn$l4q@gabriel.keele.ac.uk> cla04@keele.ac.uk (A.T. Fear) writes:
>: Since Nils is letting us guess, I'll add my conjecture that the
>: reference is to de Maistre's _St. Petersburg Dialogues_. That would
>: explain the exclusion of Freemasons, which strikes me as somewhat
>: antiquarian.
>
>But wasn't De Maistre a Mason himself??
Was he? That would be a major problem for my theory, but then we
already know the theory is false.
Why was he a Mason (if indeed he was)?
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Sep 14 16:17:54 EDT 1993
Article: 782 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: What Counter-revolution?
Date: 14 Sep 1993 12:21:02 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 31
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cla04@keele.ac.uk (A.T. Fear) writes:
>Most Greek philosophers distinguished sharply between Greeks and other
>peoples and the way that they should be treated - this doesn't apply to
>*all* of them of course - stoicism is a notable exception.
Did any of them think that the distinction between Greeks and barbarians
had philosophical importance? My recollection is that they sometimes
said things like "when we engage in war with Greeks we should do X, but
of course when we engage in war with barbarians we can do Y", but there
was never much discussion of the matter. It also seems to me that their
discussions and conclusions typically aimed at finding principles true
for all men and didn't rely on things peculiar to Greeks or Greek life.
In his _Politics_, for example, Aristotle discusses the Carthagenian
constitution without any apparent sense that it belonged in a different
category from the Cretan and Spartan constitutions.
>Roman law was divided into the law for Roman citizens and the *ius
>gentium* but this latter did have universalist ideas behind it.
Would it be fair to say that Roman law generally developed in the
direction of universalism? As time went by Roman citizenship became
extended to more and more people and by 220 [?] was extended to everyone
in the Empire. Also, Roman law eventually did become a system capable
of universal applicability (or so I conclude from its adoption as the
basis of the legal systems on the Continent and in Scotland).
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Wed Sep 15 16:24:21 EDT 1993
Article: 15518 of talk.politics.theory
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory
Subject: Free rational choice (was: Re "Atlantic Monthly" article on environmentalism)
Date: 15 Sep 1993 12:45:09 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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Message-ID: <277gql$20h@panix.com>
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NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
cbo@cs.toronto.edu (Calvin Bruce Ostrum) writes:
>he has been certified by other well known members of this group to be an
>idiot, moron, commie, one true disciple of the one true Marxist faith,
>ignorant, and even a digusting asshole.
Why not point out that these are all nits, and that no one's perfect?
The alternatives are to ignore the comment, to come up with a rejoinder
that will reduce even the stupidest critic to silence, or to engage in a
lengthy discussion about whether one is really a disgusting asshole and
whether one's classification as such is really on-topic.
>For my part I would wonder at least one thing: to what degree is it
>that we would like people to approximate the "ideal" of free rational
>choice? That is, to what extent is this ill-defined concept actually an
>"ideal" to begin with?
It seems that the ideal would be realized by a person who always had a
perfectly clear and complete understanding of his situation and the
considerations relevant to action, and who always acted rationally based
on that understanding. I suppose it would be hard to find fault with
someone who realized that ideal.
Whether it's a good idea to try to approximate the ideal is another
question. It's hard to make the grounds of good practical judgments
fully explicit and it's tiring to go against your habits and
surroundings. So if you try to base your actions on the considerations
and reasoning that seem clearest and most rigorous to you, ignoring what
other people say or do, you're likely to do wear yourself out doing
things that are mostly very stupid. On the other hand, who knows what
might happen if you heroically stuck with it? As Blake says, "If the
fool would persist in his folly he would become wise".
For most of us non-heroic types, though, it is probably usually be best
to treat the way of life we have grown up in as a given and maybe make
some piecemeal changes in it. I suppose this view constitutes a
rejection of free rational choice as a fundamental ideal. Since this is
talk.politics.theory, I suppose I should add that this view also
suggests that political and social institutions should be judged less by
the scope they offer to free rational choice than by the way of life to
which they contribute.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Wed Sep 15 19:59:25 EDT 1993
Article: 790 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: Jean-Francois Lyotard
Date: 15 Sep 1993 18:24:41 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 53
Message-ID: <2784n9$ggr@panix.com>
References:
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
adamsb@ucsu.Colorado.EDU (Brian O'blivion) writes:
>In _The_Postmodern_Condition_ the french philosopher Lyotard argues (as
>sort of a response to the german, Habermas) that the recent
>availability of communications routes, hence immediate access to all
>kinds of information, does not bring about a goal of "consensus," rather
>a world in which more and more people can participate in the "game" of
>language and communication.
It's interesting to speculate about the significance of modern
communications. To the extent that ideas and beliefs develop within
communities, and communities have internal communications that are far
denser than communications to the outside, cheap and instantaneous
communications between every two points in the world might mean that all
communities will be swallowed up in a single world community (whatever
that would be like). On the other hand, people's ability to communicate
with just those people they want to communicate with may make it easier
than in the past for communities to arise reflecting particular
outlooks.
One issue is how cohesive such totally voluntary communities (the
participants in a.r.c., for example) would be. Any thoughts? Are
certain religious communities examples of communities that are totally
voluntary but nonetheless cohesive? Are there any other examples? If
totally voluntary but highly cohesive groups are usually religious in
nature, maybe it is such groups that will dominate the future.
>This idea is contrary to any hierarchy where ideas are dismissed because
>they don't fit into an elitist system of logic.
It's certainly true that usenet newsgroups are crank-friendly. (Polite
people won't make comments about self-referentiality!)
On the other hand, people have to come to conclusions in order to act.
So maybe in the future there will be fewer actions that can be
attributed to society as a whole, since society as a whole won't be able
to make up its mind about anything, and more that can be attributed only
to groups of like-minded people within society who may either be ruling
groups who no longer view themselves as responsible to anyone (the
Supreme Court, say) or private groups simply acting on their own behalf.
>People will always claim to have a monopoly on truth, but I think if
>just one person shows ideas contrary to that system of beliefs, that
>view should be absorbed and understood or the system is a failure.
That's true in the end (I'm assuming that "absorb and understand" can
include "satisfactorily refute"). On the other hand, it is a matter of
judgment when a system has been shown to be a failure.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Thu Sep 16 10:36:37 EDT 1993
Article: 7069 of sci.philosophy.meta
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.meta,rec.arts.books
Subject: Unjust Discrimination (was: Re: Zeleny and Homosexuality)
Date: 16 Sep 1993 08:30:13 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 28
Distribution: inet
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9121 sci.philosophy.meta:7069 rec.arts.books:61149
zeleny@athena.mit.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:
>Concerning discrimination, I submit that it may be called unjust only if
>the fundamental discriminating principle is wholly bereft of moral
>relevance. Thus discrimination against an innate characteristic is
>inherently unjust [ . . . ]
What does this mean? It sounds right if "discrimination" means
"imposition of punishment", but not if it includes employment
discrimination and so on. For example, stupidity and blindness are
often innate but are plainly relevant to some employment choices.
If the claim is that making employment and similar decisions on grounds
like sex and race is wrong because such characteristics are irrelevant
to the purposes at hand, that seems wrong as well. After all, people
who make decisions on such grounds thereby show that those grounds *are*
relevant to their purposes. One might claim that purposes that would be
legitimate in choosing the people with whom one socializes are
illegitimate in employment contexts, but the grounds for such a claim
are not clear. (Why isn't it a good thing to work with people you like
to be with? Why isn't it legitimate to confer benefits that you are not
obligated to confer on anyone preferentially on people who are to your
taste?)
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Thu Sep 16 13:27:33 EDT 1993
Article: 7074 of sci.philosophy.meta
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.meta,rec.arts.books
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination
Date: 16 Sep 1993 12:02:03 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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Distribution: inet
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9132 sci.philosophy.meta:7074 rec.arts.books:61186
zeleny@athena.mit.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:
>|If the claim is that making employment and similar decisions on grounds
>|like sex and race is wrong because such characteristics are irrelevant
>|to the purposes at hand, that seems wrong as well. After all, people
>|who make decisions on such grounds thereby show that those grounds *are*
>|relevant to their purposes.
>
>You are instantiating the naturalist fallacy here: the factual
>need not coincide with the reasonable. Your decision-makers can
>easily demonstrate the relevance of the said grounds to their
>wishes in the matter; but the relevance to their purposes will
>follow only if their wishes are rational, which is rarely the
>case.
I was treating the purpose of an actor in making a decision as something
that can be rationally constructed from the grounds on which he makes
the decision. Is there something wrong with that? (It seems to me that
people who talk of "real purposes", as opposed to ostensible or
conscious purposes, tend to do the same.)
If the requirements someone applies in hiring electrical engineers are
whiteness, maleness and technical proficiency I would say his purpose is
to hire the best white male electrical engineer he can find. No doubt
that purpose would be based on further purposes. The requirement of
technical proficiency might be intended to further profitability. The
requirements of whiteness and maleness might be intended to confer
benefits on a favored group, but might also be intended to further
profitability. (For example, the decisionmaker might believe that
smooth cooperation is easier to achieve in a non-diverse workforce.)
Part of your point seems to be that discrimination on grounds of race or
sex is rarely relevant to the ostensible or conscious purposes people
have in making employment decisions. On that issue, Richard Epstein's
_Forbidden Grounds_ contains an interesting discussion of the ways in
which those grounds can be relevant to the narrowly economic purposes of
such decisions.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Thu Sep 16 16:11:54 EDT 1993
Article: 7079 of sci.philosophy.meta
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.meta,rec.arts.books
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination (was: Re: Zeleny and Homosexuality)
Date: 16 Sep 1993 14:50:59 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 69
Distribution: inet
Message-ID: <27acij$pms@panix.com>
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NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9142 sci.philosophy.meta:7079 rec.arts.books:61214
arodgers@dcs.qmw.ac.uk (Angus H Rodgers) writes:
>(Am I imitating the Zeleny tone of voice aptly enough yet?) :)
I suspect you may be too much of a softy to get it right. No harm
trying, though.
>it is obvious that the purposes of a private company or public
>institution -- either of which is a socio-economic entity, with some but
>not all of the attributes of a person -- belong to a different logical
>category from the purposes of individual human beings [so much so, in
>fact, that the word "purposes" here is almost a pun];
But since man is a social animal, one basic way we realize our
individual purposes is through social institutions. People who love
learning or the religious life set up universities or monasteries; Ben
and Jerry, who had particular ideals regarding the proper relation among
a business, its employees, and the world at large, set up an ice cream
company. (Americana note: Ben and Jerry's is a company that among
other things limits salaries to a maximum of $60,000 and donates excess
profits to the rain forests, or some such thing.)
One issue is whether it is legitimate for people who like sports talk,
horseplay and dirty jokes, or people who like the social usages and
outlook they grew up with, to choose co-workers with a view to creating
a work environment they will be happy with. If the answer is "yes",
then it seems that sex and ethnic discrimination can rationally support
a legitimate goal.
More generally, at least in America we hear a great deal about the
superiority of diversity over uniformity. If that's right, and it
really is a source of strength for a society to have a variety of ethnic
groups, each with its own life, then a legal regime intended to prevent
any socio-economic entity from having any ethnic affiliation seems an
oddity. In what will this wonderful ethnic richness consist after that
regime has been in effect for a while?
>and it is equally obvious that the purposes of a firm or a public
>institution cannot (in a liberal democracy, at any rate) legitimately
>include that of discriminating against any class of law-abiding
>citizens;
They can if the discrimination bears a rational relation to a
permissible purpose. Universities or monasteries need not offer equal
opportunities to morons or atheists, and I suspect an Objectivist would
have trouble getting a job at Ben and Jerry's. Above, I suggested one
way in which sex and ethnic discrimination could contribute to what
appears to be a legitimate objective. Even if the only legitimate
objective of a business is maximizing the bottom line, though,
discrimination can make a contribution. For example, current
discussions of the "challenge of diversity" suggest that non-diversity
is easier to deal with and might make it possible to put more
organizational energy into increasing the bottom line instead of
personnel matters.
>If you want it in one sentence: "Individuals may discriminate as much as
>they like, against whom they (dis)like, without having to show cause to
>anybody; but organisations may only discriminate in ways which they can,
>if so required, prove to be relevant to their constituted purposes."
Suppose the constituted purpose of the Apex Grommet Company is to "make
money making grommets, and to have fun doing it". Then "we just don't
think that guy would be any fun" would appear to be a sufficient defence
to an employment discrimination action.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Fri Sep 17 06:33:51 EDT 1993
Article: 7085 of sci.philosophy.meta
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.meta,rec.arts.books
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination (was: Re: Zeleny and Homosexuality)
Date: 16 Sep 1993 20:28:25 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 55
Distribution: inet
Message-ID: <27b0b9$ehp@panix.com>
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9151 sci.philosophy.meta:7085 rec.arts.books:61251
arodgers@dcs.qmw.ac.uk (Angus H Rodgers) writes:
>I still feel that all the usual forms of discrimination are so wicked
>that something ought to be done to make them illegal [ . . . ]
The usual forms of intentional discrimination are presented in public
discussions as motivated by malice and small-mindedness. For all I know
that may often or usually be the case. I simply don't know. It's not
something people talk about freely and openly. (In the United States,
by the way, most current issues relate to statistical discrimination and
raise a different set of concerns.)
It seems to me that for most people the best life would be a life as a
member of a community with well-defined customs and standards not all of
which are based solely on universal reason and many of which are
followed as a matter of upbringing and habit rather than conscious
choice. I don't think membership in such a community can be the
organizing principle in most people's lives unless they are allowed to
engage in their day-to-day practical pursuits as members of the
community, and I don't think such a community can exist unless it is
allowed to be exclusive. So if the Mormons or the Gypsies (to pick
groups I know next to nothing about) want to have their own businesses
that don't hire outsiders I think it's wrong to interfere. I'm not sure
why the same rule shouldn't apply to other groups as well, especially in
situations like New York City in 1993 in which no single group is
dominant. (If you want arguments to the effect that in a free market
with minimal government no group can ever be dominant, at least under
modern conditions of cheap and easy communications and transportation,
post a query in one of the newsgroups dominated by the libertarians and
their sympathizers.)
It's true that my views are based on my notion of "the best life", and
that many people live lives that are far from the best life. Some such
people may be inclined to make up for the poverty of their own lives by
asserting the inferiority of other people and expressing their
conviction of that inferiority through discriminatory conduct. Such
people may be acting badly, but I'm not sure how to stop them from
discriminating without interfering with the ability of communities to
organize and maintain themselves, an ability that I think is of the
highest importance. (If you want arguments that at least under modern
conditions and in the absence of government support discriminatory
conduct isn't likely to do much damage, again you can ask the
libertarians.)
>For this bitter lesson in politics, I thank you.
[Other "you've got a good argument there" comments deleted.]
I hope you are aware that such language can result in deprivation of
usenet access.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Fri Sep 17 10:14:48 EDT 1993
Article: 7091 of sci.philosophy.meta
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.meta,rec.arts.books
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination (was: Re: Zeleny and Homosexuality)
Date: 17 Sep 1993 08:55:31 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 34
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Message-ID: <27cc43$dsp@panix.com>
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9164 sci.philosophy.meta:7091 rec.arts.books:61293
jwill@key.amdahl.com writes:
>I personally do not believe that communities have to be pure, in fact, I
>think it is admirable to want to integrate.
There are many possibilities. For example, there might be a community
the members of which preferred to deal with each other and to live in
accordance with their own ways but who were ready to deal with and learn
from outsiders when they saw a definite benefit from doing so.
>I really enjoy talking with other people and learning about their
>beliefs and cultures.
Then you may think it's a good thing for separate communities to exist,
each with its own culture and characteristic beliefs. If so, what do
you think the effect will be on that desirable situation if it is
illegal or otherwise difficult for separate communities to carry on
their life through institutions of practical importance, such as schools
and places of employment?
>If you examine exclusive communities, they may have a certain cohesion,
>but they certainly tend to be backward and intolerant.
To the extent backwardness is due to lack of outside stimulation the
effect would be replicated by an all-inclusive culture that by
definition would have no outsiders and no outside. On the other hand,
many progressive communities (the Greeks come to mind) have managed to
avoid the vices of absolute exclusivity while preferring their own
members to others.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Fri Sep 17 17:35:03 EDT 1993
Article: 7104 of sci.philosophy.meta
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.meta,rec.arts.books
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination
Date: 17 Sep 1993 16:28:59 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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Distribution: inet
Message-ID: <27d6mc$gdv@panix.com>
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9191 sci.philosophy.meta:7104 rec.arts.books:61344
fjc@atl.hp.com (Frank Casper) writes:
> If I understand Mr. Kalb correctly then the upshot is that
> all so-called rights devolve down to personal or corporate
> preferences. Hence, it would seem, the only right is the
> right to prosecute preferences.
I don't think so. I commented on the argument that it's wrong to
discriminate on grounds like ethnicity in contexts like employment
because such discrimination does not rationally advance any permissible
purpose by pointing out situations in which such discrimination appears
to do just that. My examples did assume that certain preferences were
legitimate (for example, a preference for working with compatible people
or for integrating one's working life with the life of a particular
community). I neither assumed nor concluded that the right to prosecute
preferences is the only right or even that in general there is such a
right.
It's true, of course, that people who do believe in the right to
prosecute whatever preferences one happens to have are likely to find my
examples more significant that some people who don't believe in that
right.
> I think an equally "plausible" argument can, has, and should be
> made for the conception of rights as inalienable, not liable to
> preference of any sort, and the correlate obligation to
> institute and protect those rights.
That may be so, and if you think it worth the time and effort by all
means present such an argument. An argument that such rights include
the right not to be subjected to sex or race discrimination in
employment and the like would certainly be relevant to this thread.
> It always amazes me how many of us there are who
> live in and take advantage of institutions that advance and protect
> their rights and then generate plausible arguments as to why
> this probably should not be done because it violates some matters of
> taste.
Some of the people who generate such arguments may believe that the
things that are being advanced and protected are not really rights, and
that the effort to advance and protect them causes more harm than good.
Others may think that the arguments usually presented on behalf of such
things are bad arguments and want to explore what the relevant
considerations really are.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Sep 19 09:28:10 EDT 1993
Article: 795 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: What Counter-revolution?
Date: 19 Sep 1993 09:27:46 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 63
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cla04@keele.ac.uk (A.T. Fear) writes:
>you could do nastier things to barbarians because they were less human.
>Plato (Rep.5.470) assumes that there is a natural state of war between
>Greeks and the rest of mankind.
Do any of the Greeks say that the barbarians are less human? That
doesn't seem to have been the view of Homer or Herodotus, at least not
as to all barbarians.
In the _Republic_ Socrates speaks of the value of accustoming "Greeks to
spare Greeks, foreseeing the danger of enslavement by the barbarians",
and says that "the Hellenic race is friendly to itself and akin, and
foreign and alien to the barbarian." (Paul Shorey trans.) Those sound
more like points of practical politics than of ontology.
>[The Carthagenian constitution] is however the *only* non-Greek
>constitution A deigns to look at and that wasn't for a lack of
>alternatives.
It is one of the three "justly celebrated" constitutions he discusses at
length.
In general, he thought barbarians were more slavish than Greeks (1252b,
1255a, 1285a), which may in part have been why he was less interested in
their political institutions. He does mention the Persians, the
Egyptians and the aboriginal Italians here and there in passing (1284b,
1313a, 1329b) without suggesting that their relevance to the discussion
is reduced on account of their race.
The main point I would make is that Aristotle thought there was a single
political science that applied both to Greeks and barbarians and that
"Greek" and "barbarian" were not important categories within that
science.
>Perhaps one problem here was the inability to see things such as the
>Persian monarchy as a way that rational men could live at all.
Herodotus thought the Persian monarchy could be rationally defended as a
form of government, or at least that's the impression I got from the
scene he presents in which Persian noblemen debate what form of
government they should choose, and my understanding is that Xenophon (of
whom I have read very little) admired Cyrus greatly.
> 212 - [granting of universal Roman citizenship] was done by Caracalla,
>allegedly for taxation reasons. However even then the law was not
>universal. Very different punishments for the same crimes were allocated
>with regard to social class. The upper classes got to die in
>considerably less unpleasant ways than the lower classes.
I thought the extension under Caracalla was the last of a long series of
extensions, a circumstance that suggests deeper causes than immediate
financial problems. I also thought that for some time before that
stoicism had exercised considerable influence on legal thought. You are
right, of course, that class distinctions were recognized, but if the
distinctions were the same throughout the Empire they could not have
expressed any very particular way of life or social order.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Sep 19 16:06:48 EDT 1993
Article: 9214 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: rec.arts.books,talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: By the author of WAVERLEY
Date: 19 Sep 1993 13:40:07 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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Xref: panix rec.arts.books:61427 talk.philosophy.misc:9214
egnilges@ACM.ORG writes:
>the strange PostModern glorification of careerism as a positive virtue
What's strange about it? I find it profound.
If you reject the notion that there are standards that transcend both
individual will and social attitudes and practices, then the two obvious
possibilities are to fit into society to the greatest degree possible
(thereby securing the support of society for what you do) or to defy
society to the greatest degree possible (thereby asserting the
superiority of what you do over what other people do). A rather clever
union of the two possibilities can be achieved by rising to a dominant
position in society and using that position to subvert existing social
institutions. Since pure careerism is destructive of the institutions
within which it is carried on, the careerist by practicing it can
realize that union of possibilities from the beginning.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Sep 19 21:31:27 EDT 1993
Article: 797 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: conspiracies
Date: 19 Sep 1993 19:16:41 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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Message-ID: <27ip8p$mbp@panix.com>
References: <1993Sep19.175129.4390@news.cs.brandeis.edu>
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deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>cannot the same objections be raised at non-conspiracy theories - i.e.,
>Marxism, deconstructionism, Freudianism, and various other 'social
>sciences' which advance theories based not on conspiracies between
>individuals, but rather on certain invisible forces which are said to
>exist - dialectical materialism, "dead white males", the mind/psyche,
>"social progress", or even God or the Devil. In other words, what is the
>difference between saying that a cabal is conspiring to make history
>happen the way it does, and saying certain forces are causing this?
Occam's razor suggests that a theory based on things like "capitalism"
or "consumerism", that can be largely reduced to things that are
observable or otherwise knowable like predominant type of business
enterprise or uses of leisure, should be preferred when possible to
theories that are based on things that are more recondite. So if you
don't need to assume an invisible conspiracy that's good at hiding
evidence to explain events, but can instead talk about "historical
forces" that can be reduced to things that don't seem problematic,
you're probably better off doing the latter.
That's a general point about theory choice. A more specific point about
conspiracy theories is that they usually don't give enough weight to how
hard it is to organize people to carry out a successful campaign for
some particular end, let alone do so secretly.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Sep 19 21:31:39 EDT 1993
Article: 9223 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: rec.arts.books,talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: By the author of WAVERLEY
Date: 19 Sep 1993 19:04:42 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 17
Message-ID: <27ioia$kk7@panix.com>
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Xref: panix rec.arts.books:61439 talk.philosophy.misc:9223
jmc@SAIL.Stanford.EDU (John McCarthy) writes:
>Here is Adam Smith's "glorification of careerism as a positive virtue".
>
>
> It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer,
> or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their
> regard to their own self interest. - Adam Smith, Wealth of
> Nations, book 1, ch. 2. p. 18
Did Adam Smith say he wrote _Wealth of Nations_ solely from his regard
to his own self interest?
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Sep 19 21:31:41 EDT 1993
Article: 9224 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: rec.arts.books,talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: By the author of WAVERLEY
Date: 19 Sep 1993 19:14:14 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 28
Message-ID: <27ip46$m0o@panix.com>
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Xref: panix rec.arts.books:61440 talk.philosophy.misc:9224
zeleny@athena.mit.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:
>You seem to be neglecting the inherent limitations of institutionalized
>subversion. The institution is bound to prevail in the end by dint of
>superior endurance, its chartered values only occasionally augmented,
>but not in any way overturned, by the cunningly constrained pose of
>defiant grandstanding, characteristic of the egregious adepts of
>solipsistic self-affirmation through self-refutation.
An institutionalized subverter with a clear head might deal adequately
with those limitations by mixing some irony into his subversion,
especially if he shares the usual implicit confidence of comfortable
people that his current way of life will last indefinitely. Admittedly
the irony devalues the subversion, but as long as he can devalue the
institution yet more he still comes out ahead. Not a perfect solution,
but heroism and a middle-class lifestyle don't mix easily.
On the other hand, institutions and ways of life don't always last
forever, especially if enough of their leaders take pride in having
rejected them. Not that the leaders aren't shocked when the crash
comes. (I believe France and Russia provide examples, although I don't
claim to be well-informed about the history of either country.)
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Sep 20 09:17:31 EDT 1993
Article: 7135 of sci.philosophy.meta
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.meta,rec.arts.books
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination
Date: 20 Sep 1993 07:08:12 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9243 sci.philosophy.meta:7135 rec.arts.books:61473
tp0x+@cs.cmu.edu (Thomas Price) writes:
>Whatever the nature of the humanistic ideals, they are better championed
>by individuals speaking qua individuals than by the political or social
>structure -- as I believe you have as much as said once or twice.
The personal is the political, though. If a significant number of
individuals speak out, the speaking out becomes a social practice that
affects political and (still more) social structures. That is
especially true in a society that idealizes consent and maximum
satisfaction of individual preferences.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Sep 21 11:46:49 EDT 1993
Article: 799 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: conspiracies
Date: 21 Sep 1993 09:49:35 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>However, it is also true that many abstract theories are based on false
>assumptions or false observations, or incorrect conclusions draw from
>verifiable observations. What I was trying to get at was that many of
>these lapse over into conspiritorial-style thinking, in that these
>theories start to 'hide evidence' or otherwise misinterpret it to
>explain events.
It's possible to hold any view as a crank, and it's possible for a crank
to incorporate rationality into his approach to things.
As an aspiring extremist, I suppose I should also put in a good word for
crankery. Logic tells us very little about what to believe, and the
evidence we have for our beliefs is contradictory and subject to varying
interpretations, so we would have too few beliefs even to carry on daily
life if we only believed things we could demonstrate by logic and
evidence. So in order to carry on life in an orderly fashion we have to
ignore some evidence, interpret other evidence in a forced way, and
believe things for which we have no evidence. A reasonable person and a
crank differ in that the former has better judgment regarding what to
believe, but distinguishing between the two is itself a matter of
judgment rather than the application of a clear rule.
>Another examples of misinterpretaion: Freud had the habit of ascribing
>all kinds of mental problems to those who questioned his theory.
>Likewise, Plato assumed that when one learned the truth, one would
>automatically adopt the proper behavior, and evidence that this was not
>so simply meant that the subject had not really 'learned' the truth.
But if you have a theory that you believe is true you are likely also to
have a theory of why not everyone agrees with you that tends to make you
look better than people who disagree with you. I'm not sure anything
can be done about that. Some participants in this newsgroup might have
theories about why neocons hold the views they do that are based in part
on deficiencies of some sort in neocons.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Sep 21 11:46:53 EDT 1993
Article: 3159 of alt.society.conservatism
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: soc.culture.usa,alt.fan.rush-limbaugh,bit.listserv.politics,alt.politics.usa.republican,alt.society.conservatism
Subject: Re: FRC: On the Horizon (fwd)lt.fan.dan-quayle
Date: 21 Sep 1993 09:51:21 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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jhinton@magnus.acs.ohio-state.EDU (John E Hinton) writes:
>Former National Organization for Women (NOW) prexy Molly Yard praised
>China one-child policy [ . . . ]
Does anyone know when and where? I would think she would be more
careful about maintaining the "woman's right to choose" theory of
abortion.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Sep 21 19:41:03 EDT 1993
Article: 15763 of talk.politics.theory
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,misc.education,alt.politics.libertarian,alt.politics.radical-left
Subject: Re: Technology to the rescue (was Re: School Voucher facts)
Date: 21 Sep 1993 17:43:14 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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Xref: panix talk.politics.theory:15763 misc.education:10745 alt.politics.libertarian:8955 alt.politics.radical-left:3703
pauld@cs.washington.edu (Paul Barton-Davis) writes:
>I find it quite believable that CAI is "more effective" at drill
>learning and self-directed exploration of textual and pictoral
>information sources; these are not, and never will be, all that
>education is about. Education is as much about learning about dialogue,
>about social skills and hopefully, mechanical skills that a computer
>could never teach (perhaps a robot, but thats a *very* long way away
>unless you want robot-led classes in walking; the students would outdo
>the teacher in a matter of months).
I think young people mostly learn dialogue and social skills informally,
from family, friends and neighbors. The learning of mechanical skills
is very much ad hoc. Presumably classrooms and teachers have been most
helpful with those parts of education that are done best if they are
formalized. Since those appear to be the parts of education to which
CAI could most easily be adapted, it does seem that CAI could deprive
the large and expensive systems of formal education to which we are
accustomed of much of their point. That result would be in line with
the usual disaggregating tendency of recent advances in information and
communications technology.
A concrete way of making the same point would be to say that CAI could
make homeschooling a lot easier and therefore a lot more attractive to
many people, and the effect might be great enough to affect the general
pattern of how education is carried on. For example, there might be
enough homeschoolers to reduce funding for public education
significantly, which would cause public schools to cut back on their
functions and the amount of homeschooling to rise yet more.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Wed Sep 22 06:15:54 EDT 1993
Article: 7156 of sci.philosophy.meta
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.meta,rec.arts.books
Subject: Re: Zeleny and Homosexuality
Date: 21 Sep 1993 20:25:05 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 40
Distribution: inet
Message-ID: <27o611$7qa@panix.com>
References: <27bj7s$2a0@senator-bedfellow.MIT.EDU> <1993Sep21.110752.6118@uoft02.utoledo.edu>
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9273 sci.philosophy.meta:7156 rec.arts.books:61612
gsmith@uoft02.utoledo.edu writes:
>> And I have been forced painfully to admit that organisations, too,
>> may (both ethically and legally) discriminate against homosexuals.
>
>The same reasoning applies to, for instance, blacks.
The situations are distinguishable in that homosexual conduct, unlike
blackness, is a component of a way of life. So it would be more
understandable for an organization intended to be a vehicle for a
particular way of life to exclude homosexuals as such than blacks as
such. (It's true, though, that ways of life are often ethnically based,
so I would be inclined to extend the same reasoning to blacks.)
>The conclusion is that trying to abolish Jim Crow was a mistake.
Not if "Jim Crow" has the usual meaning of a system of discrimination
commanded by law and further supported by thuggery that the legal system
refuses to suppress.
>You can't let organizations discriminate, and then say "an entire
>society may not" [ . . . ]
If the support for discrimination of a particular sort is so general
that permitting organizations to discriminate will result in the entire
society doing so, it's hard to see how legal rules forbidding
discrimination could be adopted.
>Funny that you two are precisely the privileged class [ . . . ]
Do you hope to benefit from legislation prohibiting discrimination
against homosexuals? If so, it seems that an _argumentum ad hominem_
would work as well against you as against members of what you call the
privileged class.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Wed Sep 22 17:36:52 EDT 1993
Article: 801 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: conspiracies
Date: 22 Sep 1993 16:40:18 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 54
Message-ID: <27qd7i$ran@panix.com>
References: <1993Sep20.150520.23370@news.cs.brandeis.edu> <27n0pf$s1@panix.com> <1993Sep22.135000.8303@news.cs.brandeis.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>Using your criteria, I've come to the conclusion that on at least some
>issues, the dominant culture (in media, academia, politics, etc) is a
>crank culture, because the proper judgment for deciding what to believe
>is entirely lacking [ . . . ] on issues such as race, gender, culture,
>religion, etc.
I'd agree that the dominant theories on the issues you mention are crank
theories. The Jared Taylor book is helpful on that point with respect
to the race issue. I'm not sure what conclusions to draw from that.
Maybe every government depends to some degree on a mixture of force and
fraud, and a government ostensibly based on consent and squeamish about
using force will favor fraud. So in America our ruling class secures
consent to their rule by ensuring that the dominant political theories
are theories that (although patently false) make their rule necessary.
Does that sound like enough of a conspiracy theory to fit into this
thread?
To some extent the causation runs the other way, though -- for a variety
of reasons people have trouble today thinking seriously about political
ideals other than radical egalitarianism. Once accepted as an ideal
radical egalitarianism calls a ruling class of a certain sort into being
which then believes that it is right and finds it in its interest to
promote the ideal that has made it powerful.
>I suppose what I am getting at here is that I am suspicous of precise,
>well-thought out philisophical systems that become, in effect, "closed
>systems" which exclude, rather then explain, reality.
A system that explains things too completely and finds reasons to ignore
opponents does arouse suspicion. Marxism and Freudianism come to mind.
Lots of other people (for example, Randians and PC types) seem to make a
specialty of personal attacks on opponents as well. I don't think Plato
(who you mentioned) was guilty, though.
>Getting back to conspiracy theories for a moment...one thing that
>strikes me as bizarre is the great number of left-wing conspiracy
>theories out there, that are accepted as viable explanations of current
>events, without having to suffer the oprobrium thrown at their
>right-wing counterparts.
Life ain't fair. What you have to bear in mind, though, is that nothing
right-wingers say need be taken at face value because even if it seems
superficially plausible on one point on another it's all motivated by
greed and bigotry. So they really have no right to be in politics at
all, and anything they get is good enough for them.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Wed Sep 22 17:36:57 EDT 1993
Article: 9298 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination
Date: 22 Sep 1993 16:42:45 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 21
Message-ID: <27qdc5$rq1@panix.com>
References: <27k2us$m4m@panix.com> <27q13q$dc9@senator-bedfellow.MIT.EDU>
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9298 rec.arts.books:61695 talk.politics.theory:15820
zeleny@athena.mit.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:
>|The personal is the political, though. If a significant number of
>|individuals speak out, the speaking out becomes a social practice
>|that affects political and (still more) social structures.
>
>You are begging the question of the legitimacy of indiscriminate
>satisfaction of individual or collective preferences.
I didn't deal with the question at all. My own understanding of
politics is that its proper purpose is to advance the common good rather
than collective preferences. It also seems to me that the difficulty of
separating the personal from the political makes it difficult to define
an abstract right of privacy that would legitimize the indiscriminate
satisfaction of individual preferences.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Fri Sep 24 11:32:17 EDT 1993
Article: 9332 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.meta,rec.arts.books
Subject: Re: Zeleny and Homosexuality
Date: 24 Sep 1993 11:28:57 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 71
Distribution: inet
Message-ID: <27v3np$j7g@panix.com>
References: <1993Sep21.110752.6118@uoft02.utoledo.edu> <27o611$7qa@panix.com> <1993Sep23.151144.6189@uoft02.utoledo.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9332 sci.philosophy.meta:7211 rec.arts.books:61870
gsmith@uoft02.utoledo.edu writes:
>> The situations are distinguishable in that homosexual conduct, unlike
>> blackness, is a component of a way of life [ . . . ]
>> (It's true, though, that ways of life are often ethnically based,
>> so I would be inclined to extend the same reasoning to blacks.)
>
>Being gay is as much or as little a "way of life" as being black, as
>you began to notice.
By "way of life" I understand a pattern of habitual conduct shared with
other people. So conduct is logically relevant to way of life in a way
that physical traits are not. Even a tendency toward homosexual conduct
strikes me as relevant to capacity to participate in a way of life in a
way blackness does not. So the two situations can be significantly
distinguished, and you seemed to deny that two other posters could do
so. (Whether they actually would or not, I don't know.)
>It's less of a way of life than being a Mormon,
It does seem that less is specified by saying someone is homosexual than
by saying someone is a Mormon. On the other hand, I could understand
someone saying that the way of life of most Mormons is less different
from that of most other Americans than the way of life of most
homosexuals is.
>and discrimination against Mormons is generally against the law in the
>US.
Agreed.
>If the Pickrick Restaurant doesn't want to serve blacks, your argument
>says that that is OK. But that is Jim Crow.
The policy of a single restaurant does not constitute Jim Crow. For a
recent discussion of the relationship between Jim Crow and state action
(laws intended to maintain segregation, together with a failure to apply
the ordinary criminal law to racist thuggery), see Richard Epstein's
_Forbidden Grounds_. (Basically, he claims that the relationship was
essential. If anyone knows of a good critical discussion of Epstein's
and similar claims, please let me know.)
>> If the support for discrimination of a particular sort is so general
>> that permitting organizations to discriminate will result in the entire
>> society doing so, it's hard to see how legal rules forbidding
>> discrimination could be adopted.
>
>Kindly tell me about the history of civil rights from Brown vs the Board
>of Education until today. If you do, you will answer your own question,
>the answer to which you already know.
The South in 1955 would not have adopted legal rules forbidding
discrimination. Nor would the North have done so in 1925. Presumably
the rules were adopted at the point opposition to racial discrimination
among the public and elites in American society as a whole had grown to
the point that most people thought it was a very bad thing. Do you
think that growth in opposition to discrimination would have stopped in
1955, or that it would have had no effect on the conduct of employers
and so on, if government had remained neutral?
>You might want to think about the difference between the south now
>and the south in 1955.
You might think about the relative acceptance of homosexuality in 1955
and today. It seems to me that even in the absence of
anti-discrimination legislation there has been a marked change.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Fri Sep 24 11:32:18 EDT 1993
Article: 9333 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination
Date: 24 Sep 1993 11:32:08 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 67
Message-ID: <27v3to$jpc@panix.com>
References: <27q13q$dc9@senator-bedfellow.MIT.EDU> <27qdc5$rq1@panix.com> <27sf0o$nvj@scunix2.harvard.edu>
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9333 rec.arts.books:61871 talk.politics.theory:15881
zeleny@husc7.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:
>Any consensual interaction performed in private is exempt from the
>purview of politics. Demonstration: politics being the practice of
>striving for the definition of a body politic and attaining consensus
>between its members, its concerns no longer apply in any situation that
>maintains consensus within a definite group.
Suppose the members of a group get together secretly and watch movies,
listen to music, read books and engage in philosophical discussions that
are radically at odds with the cultural and philosophical tastes and
prepossessions of their compatriots, and have a marked affinity to those
of certain foreign societies. It seems to me that such conduct might
well affect the quest for definition of a body politic and the
attainment of consensus among its members.
>|My own understanding of
>|politics is that its proper purpose is to advance the common good
>|rather than collective preferences. It also seems to me that the
>|difficulty of separating the personal from the political makes it
>|difficult to define an abstract right of privacy that would
>|legitimize the indiscriminate satisfaction of individual
>|preferences.
>
>Unless you propose to define the common good on the basis of a
>divine fiat, I fail to see how you can advance it without appealing
>to collective preferences.
No more than I can determine the truth as to matters of fact without
appealing to the beliefs people actually have. Nonetheless, truth is
not the same as some sort of aggregation of beliefs. Similarly, it
appears to me that the good a society ought to pursue is not (as least
as a logical matter) the same as an aggregation of the preferences of
its members. I would have thought that someone who wants to define a
right of privacy valid against social disapprobation would want to say
that the good a society should pursue is different from collective
preferences.
I'm somewhat lost. Conceivably, the good of a society might be the
aggregation of the goods of its members. Is it your view that someone's
good is the same as his preferences? If so, would a homosexual
lifestyle be the good of someone with that sexual preference? Or do
reject the notion of "goods" altogether and prefer to talk about rights?
>As regards separating the personal from the political, consensual
>activities taking place behind closed doors could hardly be deemed
>political without doing violence to the term.
Aristotle thought the state was made up of households (_Politics_,
1253a), and households mostly have to do with consensual activities
taking place behind closed doors. I don't think he's off by himself on
that issue. Political society is made up of people who are what they
are in large part because of the upbringing they received in households.
Also, whether the point of politics is the common good or aggregate
preferences, to the extent the good or preferences are realized in
people's day-to-day lives the realization is likely to have something to
what takes place in households. So observing that as a matter of
English usage "political" is not usually applied to things like family
life is a long way from showing that such things are not highly relevant
to politics.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Fri Sep 24 11:46:53 EDT 1993
Article: 9334 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination
Date: 24 Sep 1993 11:35:30 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 28
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9334 rec.arts.books:61872 talk.politics.theory:15882
feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Michael Feld) writes:
>>My own understanding of
>>politics is that its proper purpose is to advance the common good rather
>>than collective preferences.
>
>Oh, cries of sarcastic derision, richly deserved. In a moment's
>unreflective whim you reject, without argument, most of social contract
>theories that are central to disputes about our political and legal
>duties.
How does a statement about my understanding reject anything except
inconsistent statements about my understanding? (Not that derision may
not be richly deserved.)
I don't really understand what contracts add to the discussion, since
presumably what everyone would contract to do is set up the best
society. (To put it another way, if I think X would be the best society
then I'm also going to think that's the society an
appropriately-designed constitutional convention would pick.) So why
not talk directly about what the best society is and forget hypothetical
contracts?
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Sep 25 13:30:30 EDT 1993
Article: 9352 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination
Date: 25 Sep 1993 11:21:20 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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References: <27v442$k93@panix.com>
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9352 rec.arts.books:61954 talk.politics.theory:15928
feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Michael Feld) writes:
>Much of social contract theory concerns the sort of state that
>rationally selfish people would construct.
So it assumes people of a certain sort subject to certain motives,
including a particular definition of rational selfishness. Do you think
that begs any questions?
(I'm at a loss how to respond to people who say nice things on usenet,
by the way. Perhaps Mr. Zeleny or some _semblable_ or _frere_ will show
us? More likely not . . . )
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Sep 25 13:30:31 EDT 1993
Article: 9353 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination
Date: 25 Sep 1993 11:27:17 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9353 rec.arts.books:61956 talk.politics.theory:15929
zeleny@husc7.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:
>||politics being the practice of
>||striving for the definition of a body politic and attaining consensus
>||between its members, its concerns no longer apply in any situation that
>||maintains consensus within a definite group.
>consider the above argument as normatively, rather than factually valid.
I'm not sure what you mean. If politics is a practice with a particular
end it seems that it is necessarily concerned with matters that
factually bear on that end, unless it is part of some more general
practice that limits the things it may concern itself with. If that's
right, what is the more general practice? What does that more general
practice tell us in this connection?
>Otherwise get ready for the slippery slope to take you down to
>Jean-Jacques and his quaint notion that all political associations are
>inherently seditious.
Yes, if you think the purpose of politics is the definition of a body
politic and consensus therein. That particular slippery slope goes
away, though, if you think that politics is the practice of realizing
the human good, to the extent it can be realized through collective
action backed by legal sanctions, and that the human good includes
things like friendship with particular persons and some degree of
self-rule.
>The point is not how to determine the common good, but what are the
>legitimate means of pursuing it.
It sounds as if you want some formal criterion having no connection with
the concept of the good that limits what government can do. Is that
right? For my own part, I don't think such a criterion is possible but
would be interested in proposals.
I would be inclined to say that you shouldn't destroy the good in
pursuing it, that the common good of a society includes the possibility
of a good life for its members, and that a good life includes at least
some degree of self-rule and other things that governments tend to
destroy when they act.
>I am deeply skeptical of the notion that the goals of politics should be
>set consonant with the nebulous task of the identification and pursuit
>of "the common good" of its constituents.
I judge a form of government by considering whether it advances the
common good of the governed. If it seems to make the people and their
lives better, then I approve of it. If it makes those things worse then
I disapprove of it no matter how many formal requirements it satisfies.
It follows that I understand the ultimate goal of politics to be the
common good.
By so saying I don't say anything about the appropriate form, purposes
or powers of political institutions. Those are practical matters that
(along with the content of the common good) are determined as a
practical matter by history and tradition, together with whatever
theorizing people find illuminating, rather than by the decision of some
legislator.
I agree that it would be a very bad thing to be governed by a Board of
Commissioners of the Common Good empowered to issue and cause to be
obeyed whatever directives they think advance the common good. It seems
to me that it would be good, though, for people in government to have
some notion of the common good and to act in a way they think is
consonant with that good, and for political discussions to refer
ultimately at least implicitly to a notion of the common good.
>It is my personal view that my private good can be best pursued in a
>society that concerns itself primarily with the protection of my rights.
If the only parts of the common good that people recognize and agree on
are things like self-rule and personal security, then presumably those
are the only parts of the common good it makes sense for the government
to try to advance. It's hard to advance something collectively when
people collectively don't know what it is. Maybe that's the position
we're in in America in 1993.
A danger with limiting the goals of government to a small piece of the
common good, especially in a society that believes in defining goals
clearly and acting vigorously to achieve them, is that the part can be
taken for the whole and a great deal of the common good can be
sacrificed to the parts we have agreed to recognize. My response is to
favor a government that does less over one that does more. So if as a
practical matter we're going to have a thin conception of the common
good I prefer libertarianism to activist modern liberalism. (Which has
the advantage, by the way, of putting me in the mainstream in the
*.politics.* rant groups.)
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Sep 26 11:17:11 EDT 1993
Article: 7262 of sci.philosophy.meta
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.meta,rec.arts.books
Subject: Re: Zeleny and Homosexuality
Date: 26 Sep 1993 09:30:56 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 40
Distribution: inet
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References: <27uukq$pp8@ariel.ucs.unimelb.EDU.AU> <27v5oa$956@scunix2.harvard.edu> <283gap$gi4@ariel.ucs.unimelb.EDU.AU>
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9364 sci.philosophy.meta:7262 rec.arts.books:62018
jcollier@ariel.ucs.unimelb.EDU.AU (John Donald Collier) writes to
Mikhail Zeleny:
>Your harrassment has become so well known that it was not difficult for
>me to show that you violated MIT's anti-harassment rules. Since
>harassment is generally considered to be immoral, I think the burden of
>proof is on you to show that you are not being immoral. Until you can
>prove that (say to the standards set by MIT), then I suggest you just
>stop taking this line that homosexuals are immoral.
Mr. Collier's attempt to silence Mr. Zeleny raises a number of questions
in my mind. I'm more interested in people's views on the general issues
than in whether the particular action was good or bad, so the questions
are not specifically directed to Mr. Collier and I would be grateful for
comment from anyone interested in the issues:
What are the relevant anti-harassment rules at MIT and are they at all
typical? To the extent they apply to speech unaccompanied by other
conduct, to what fora do they apply? Would they be violated by any
assertion that certain types of sexual behavior are wrong? By such an
assertion accompanied by arguments that most people reject? By the
foregoing accompanied by terms of opprobrium for the behavior in
question and persons who engage in it? If an argument by a radical
feminist to the effect that heterosexual intercourse is an instrument of
patriarchal domination were made in a manner that seemed offensive and
irrational to most hererosexual men, could she be subject to sanctions?
Also: is it likely that the rules would be violated by assertions that
consensual non-sexual (political, economic, social) interactions between
people are wrong? If not, is there something special about the role sex
plays in human life? If there is something special about sex, why isn't
free inquiry and discussion about the moral aspects of sex (and even
heated debate in which people abuse each other and make bad arguments)
something that ought to be protected, at least from the standpoint of a
liberal academic institution?
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Sep 27 11:28:01 EDT 1993
Article: 9386 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination
Date: 27 Sep 1993 11:27:14 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 173
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9386 rec.arts.books:62085 talk.politics.theory:15996
wojdylo@maths.uwa.oz.au (INFIDEL) writes:
>[Politics] may well be necessarily concerned with other things as well,
>if you believe in just process.
Which comes first, one's beliefs about just process or one's beliefs
about the good life? It seems to me unlikely that someone would
consider a process just that on reflection he thought less likely to
lead to a good life than some other process. (How, such a person might
ask himself, could political arrangements that deny people the good life
be just?) For example, someone who thinks that as a factual matter
liberal political institutions lead to a society made up of people who
are interested only in consumer goods and their careers, and that
something better is possible, isn't likely to turn his back on that
possibility on the grounds that the liberal political process is
uniquely just.
The processes people prefer and their notions of the good life are
connected. Presumably, people who believe that the good life consists
in defining and pursuing the goals one defines for oneself will have a
view of just process that emphasizes the consent of the governed.
People who believe that the good life is based on principles that
require special talent and training to understand will have a view of
just process that gives special power to guardians who have successfully
undergone the necessary training. People who combine the two views and
believe that special intelligence and training are required to
understand fully the value and implications of autonomy might believe in
government by a combination of elected representatives who stand for the
principle of consent and guardians (maybe like the American judiciary)
with a theoretical grasp of the true demands of autonomy. People who
believe that the good life is the life of godly virtue in this world
leading to the beatific vision in the next, and that cooperation of the
will is necessary to salvation, might favor a political process that
combines rule by guardians and government by consent in some other
fashion.
>They have a parliament even in Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ever heard of
>Karadzic?
I'm not sure of your point. Since they have a parliament, to that
extent they are following procedures that are just from a liberal
standpoint.
>No one nation or group owns the political process. Even Sir Karadzic can
>partake of the political motions to legitimize his whims to the
>gullible.
If the point is that bad results can come out of a process that looks
good on paper, I agree.
>Well, I do believe that the US Senate adheres to some semblance of protocol.
>What do you think are the values underlining voluntary acquiescence to such?
A whole complex of things. The idea of political arrangements
established by a society of free and equal individuals, which might in
turn be based either on the notion that people are truly free and equal
in some way or on a sense that it's easier as a practical matter to
assume that they are free and equal than to try to sort out who is
superior to whom. Respect for tradition and the political
understandings accepted within one's own society. Desire for personal
success defined by reference to the standards that people actually hold
leading to the habit of going along with whatever system actually
exists. The belief that cooperation leads to general prosperity and
amity in which the people whose interests one represents are likely over
time to do better than they would if they tried to get more by breaking
the rules. The belief that policy is likely to be more intelligent and
more acceptable to the governed, and therefore more likely to bring
about good results, if it is arrived at after widespread consultation,
discussion and consent in accordance with orderly procedures.
Presumably some of the same values underlie voluntary acquiescence in the
protocols of the College of Cardinals, while others are different.
>all you see is the goal of "The Good", without an inkling of ...
>something else.
To say that "the good life" is the fundamental political conception is
not to say that it is the only political conception.
>History is littered with "nice guys" who've pursued the goal of the
>"common good" to the exclusion of all else.
People who try to come up with ideal political procedures without regard
to the likely substantive consequences of those procedures sometimes
come to grief as well. (Incidentally, why is everyone saying I'm a nice
guy all of a sudden? To make a sly etymological point? Because nice
guys finish last? I consider comments on imputed personal
characteristics a form of harassment and if it continues I may feel
called upon to take vigorous action . . . )
>Actually, in a democracy, it is in the interests of a government to act
>"for the common good"; so if they are in fact destroying something, it's
>under the delusion of acting otherwise.
At least from the standpoint of immediate survival, it seems more in the
interest of a democratic government to act in the interest of the
majority as the majority understands that interest than for the common
good.
>Moreover, I suppose there are mechanisms in the US which limit the
>amount of damage a government can do to important documents such as the
>constitution. You tell me.
The amendment process appears intended to prevent changes in the
constitution without concurrent popular supermajorities. Most
constitutional changes come about through changes in judicial doctrine,
though. The limitations on such changes in doctrine (or for that matter
on failures to change doctrine) are rather informal, and mostly have to
do with the relation between such doctrine and the views of governing
elites.
>By the criterion of "common good in the form of the Health System", the
>US has never had a good government. Choose your criterion, and the
>present government either wins or loses your bouquet.
Perfectly true. I wouldn't expect someone who thought that the good
life consisted in living in a society with a health system unlike that
of the US to think highly of the U.S. political system. That's an
extraordinarily odd definition of the good life, by the way.
>You obviously would have no qualms about the present government
>buggerizing the constitution in such a way as to "make the people and
>their lives better", according to the current tastes of the people.
Why say that? The current tastes of the people might be wrong. Maybe
the good life is something that has to develop socially through the
experience and reflection of many people over time, and that kind of
development won't happen unless people are cautious and respect
established procedures.
>#If it makes those things worse then
>#I disapprove of it no matter how many formal requirements it satisfies.
>#It follows that I understand the ultimate goal of politics to be the
>#common good.
>
>The conclusion, even if it's right, does not follow at all from what you
>have said.
If the criterion for a good political order is the common good, then why
wouldn't one say that the ultimate goal of politics is the common good?
>#A danger with limiting the goals of government to a small piece of the
>#common good, especially in a society that believes in defining goals
>#clearly and acting vigorously to achieve them, is that the part can be
>#taken for the whole and a great deal of the common good can be
>#sacrificed to the parts we have agreed to recognize. My response is to
>#favor a government that does less over one that does more. So if as a
>#practical matter we're going to have a thin conception of the common
>#good I prefer libertarianism to activist modern liberalism.
>
>Your argument for libertarianism is hopelessly specious
Please explain.
>and, as this post shows, based on mistaken assumptions as to the nature
>of the political process.
I find some of your remarks cryptic. Others seem based on the
assumption that when I say "the ultimate goal of politics is the common
good" I mean "everyone should decide what he thinks is good and pursue
that as directly as possible using whatever means come to hand" rather
than "the common good is the criterion for a good political system".
Even given an understanding of the common good, I would agree that an
understanding of the political situation, the nature of the political
process and many other things are necessary for intelligent political
action.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Sep 27 11:32:26 EDT 1993
Article: 9387 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination
Date: 27 Sep 1993 11:32:13 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9387 rec.arts.books:62086 talk.politics.theory:15997
wojdylo@maths.uwa.oz.au (INFIDEL) writes:
>Question: can "the common good" include putting Jews in concentration
>camps,
It's hard to imagine how it could. For one thing, the good of Jews is
part of the common good. What do you have in mind?
>Are the Serbian people blameless in re-electing Slobodan Milosevic in
>last year's Serebian presidential elections?
Why think so? The common good of the Serbs is not the same as whatever
a majority of Serbs want. Maybe the point is that a policy might favor
the common good of the Serbs but be very bad for non-Serbs. A response
might be that one's own good includes one's natural end as a rational
being, which includes treating other rational beings as ends in
themselves and not as means only.
>By dint of being democratically elected, a government has mandate to
>advance the interests of the particular groups it represents (in
>Australia, the Liberal party is traditionally concerned with business,
>the Australian Labour Party with social justice). It is possible to
>fulfill this role while advancing the "good" of the nation.
Sure. The best approximation of the common good might come out of a
process in which representatives of particular goods contend and
compromise, and that participating in the process as such a
representative would therefore be legitimate. Presumably that kind of
arrangement would last longer and work better if the participants are
able on occasion to step back and consider the common good. In order to
do that they would have to consider the common good the ultimate goal of
their activity.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Sep 28 10:15:54 EDT 1993
Article: 7302 of sci.philosophy.meta
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.meta,rec.arts.books
Subject: Re: Zeleny and Homosexuality
Date: 28 Sep 1993 07:23:20 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 25
Distribution: inet
Message-ID: <2896r8$ci0@panix.com>
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9405 sci.philosophy.meta:7302 rec.arts.books:62167
jcollier@ariel.ucs.unimelb.EDU.AU (John Donald Collier) writes:
>I'm glad you don't need such protection. Some people do.
Why aren't KILL files sufficient protection for such people?
There were people who were having discussions with MZ on various topics
who now find that they can no longer carry on those discussions,
apparently as a result of your actions.
>By the way, your complaint is with MIT, not me. I just pointed out
>that MZ was stealing their resources.
You pointed out the content of some of MZ's postings as well. A
judgment that MZ should be deprived of net access because of that
content was essential to your action and very likely MIT's as well. You
wouldn't have acted as you did in the absence of that judgment, and it
appears from your account of the MIT anti-harassment rules that such a
judgment was made by MIT as well and would have been sufficient by
itself for them to act as they did.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Sep 28 16:14:22 EDT 1993
Article: 7306 of sci.philosophy.meta
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.meta,rec.arts.books
Subject: Re: Zeleny and Homosexuality
Date: 28 Sep 1993 10:51:25 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 20
Distribution: inet
Message-ID: <289j1d$9s4@panix.com>
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9410 sci.philosophy.meta:7306 rec.arts.books:62181
jcollier@ariel.ucs.unimelb.EDU.AU (John Donald Collier) writes:
>Other people can use kill files effectively. Some people don't know how,
>or else need to know that prejudicial nonsense will not be tolerated
>past some point.
Systems administrators who receive complaints from people who object to
postings presumably could tell the complainants how to use a kill file
rather than deprive the poster of net access.
As to what means of communication does there arise a need to know that
prejudicial nonsense will not be tolerated? In the case of a periodical
distributed to subscribers through the mail, might similar needs justify
the postal authorities in prohibiting the inclusion of material that is
outrageously offensive to some subscribers?
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Sep 28 21:40:44 EDT 1993
Article: 9424 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination
Date: 28 Sep 1993 18:12:30 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 89
Message-ID: <28acse$o90@panix.com>
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9424 rec.arts.books:62222 talk.politics.theory:16051
zeleny@husc7.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:
>politics being the practice of
>striving for the definition of a body politic and attaining consensus
>between its members, its concerns no longer apply in any situation that
>maintains consensus within a definite group.
How about situations that maintain consensus within a definite group but
also tend to make the group a drain on the larger society? Swapping sex
for crack might maintain consensus within a group of acquaintances but
also tend to lead to AIDS, drug addiction, crack babies, petty theft and
other things that make life harder for the neighbors.
>I take politics to be no more than the practice of facilitating the
>human good, whose realization must be left up to the individual.
The "facilitation" may include a lot. For example, my upbringing and
education have a lot to do with my ability to realize goods, and I had
no control over the very important early stages of those things. Those
early stages depended mostly on my family, so if politics has to do with
non-consensual things that facilitate the realization by individuals of
the human good it appears that family life is political.
Also, a great many of the goods we realize exist in connection with
social institutions and are therefore hard to view simply as "goods
whose realization must be left up to the individual". For example, it
seems to me that one important good is durable bonds to other particular
individuals that can be relied on without regard to the passing
inclinations of the parties. I don't think individuals can easily
conjure up such connections for themselves in the absence of social
standards (such as standards regarding family life) defining certain
relations as durable and obligatory.
>Is there any more to the common good of a society than a good life for
>its members?
I don't think so. However, a good life for a member of a society may
include participation in a society that has qualities (dignity? unity
in diversity? orientation toward a common understanding of the good?)
that can't be reduced to features of the lives of its members
separately.
>Do you propose to set universal criteria for judging the goodness of
>the lives of others?
No more than I propose to set universal criteria for beauty. I don't
think I can deal with other people rationally and ethically, though,
unless I have some notion of what things would be good for them.
>it seems that you have already ruled on the appropriate form, purposes
>and powers of political institutions, to the extent of ruling out my
>preference for non-interference of the political in the personal.
I'm somewhat unclear how the non-interference of the political in the
personal could be carried out. (See above.) Assuming you had a system
for doing so satisfactory to you, I might agree that your system would
define the best form of government available under particular
circumstances.
>What about the good of those who take "the common good" to embody a
>pernicious notion of freedom through restraint?
False notions of what is good or what is true can be harmful, but I
don't see how we can act rationally without making assumptions as to
both. In a constitutional government (I approve of constitutional
governments, by the way) views as to the nature of the common good don't
get translated immediately into government action.
>it may behoove you to conclude that, inasmuch as the goals of self-rule
>and personal security do not constitute a basis for the common good,
>your notion of the proper political goals may be out of touch with the
>times, or even worse.
What the times demand is a difficult question. Why not start by asking
very general questions about the nature and purpose of politics? When I
speak of the goals of politics, by the way, I am not necessarily
speaking of the goals of particular political institutions, which may be
much more limited.
>You might equally well call yourself a Rawlsian, without incurring the
>same popular advantage.
I know too little of Rawls to comment. Valuing popularity is an
American characteristic, possibly an American vice.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Wed Sep 29 10:20:09 EDT 1993
Article: 9432 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination
Date: 29 Sep 1993 08:06:09 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9432 rec.arts.books:62269 talk.politics.theory:16075
wojdylo@maths.uwa.oz.au (INFIDEL) writes:
>In most of what follows, I can't see that you're driving at a particular
>point [ . . . ]
You may have the same problem following my thought processes that I have
with yours. No doubt part of the problem has been that we are talking
at cross purposes.
>Today is the last time I'll act as your "thoughts doctor".
The discussion isn't likely to repay much more effort. I thank you for
your comments, though.
>Can you think of an alernative to the "liberal political process"?
There are obviously a great many alternatives. For my own part, I have
no radical reforms to propose.
>Note that various forms of wealth tax, death duties and other "lefty"
>ideas are completely consistent with the "liberal political process".
Of course.
>Does your alternative system allow such broad scope of policies, from
>all sides of the political spectrum?
What alternative system? It's worth noting, by the way, that the
broader the spectrum of permissible government policy the more
government policy can be used as a means to promote the dominant group's
version of the good life. On the other hand, constitutional limitations
on the spectrum of permissible policies can be used as a means to
promote the view of the good life held by the group that dominates
constitutional interpretation.
>One question: how does this notion of "good life" -- as a sort of
>transcendental belief -- differ from the positive beliefs already
>around, such as: "Australians let us all re-joice, for we are young and
>free..."
I think of the notion of the good life mostly as a matter of recognizing
that some positive beliefs as to value are better than others and that
part of acting rationally is acting in accordance with a systematic
understanding of values (that may be implicit or explicit).
>It seems that you're reformulating something that is well known.
To that extent what I say is clearly right.
>Don't you have any faith in your nation?
Not a lot. Should I? If so, what kind of faith?
>#If the criterion for a good political order is the common good, then why
>#wouldn't one say that the ultimate goal of politics is the common good?
>
>It's too vague to be of much interest.
Then why do people bother disagreeing with it? I have been making two
claims in recent posts in this thread: (1) the ultimate goal of
politics is the common good, and (2) there is no clear conceptual
difference between the personal and the political. I haven't gotten
agreement on either. Maybe all the former is is a statement of what
sort of explanation I need to feel that I understand an overall
political position.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Wed Sep 29 11:55:39 EDT 1993
Article: 9433 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination
Date: 29 Sep 1993 10:26:43 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9433 rec.arts.books:62272 talk.politics.theory:16077
wojdylo@maths.uwa.oz.au (INFIDEL) writes:
>Just what is it about our way that allows us to have faith in it?
If you want to maintain the possibility of questioning the rightness of
your own way you may find the conception of a good that is the proper
criterion and goal of action and cannot be reduced to opinion or
preference a useful one.
>NB: "good of the nation" may be extended to "good of a community of
>nations", and so on; the contention by JK is that the concept of *common
>good* can add unity to a spurious collective (such as "nation" or
>"united nations").
Why do you say those are spurious collectives? To the extent a
collective ("the set of all human beings with given names beginning with
'J'") is spurious it of course becomes hard to define a common good. A
nation is a collection of people who live together, who are dependent on
each other and who share common institutions and history. A community
of nations is a collection of nations with a history of mutual dealings
and influences that can't easily choose not to continue that history and
can't prosper without cooperation. How is either spurious?
In each case it seems to me you can see the view of the common good
accepted as authoritative by looking at the intent and consequences of
institutions and their policies.
>I think that my objection to your notion of *common good* as a political
>notion stems from your imbuing it with idealist qualities (e.g. it is
>the good which every rational being recognizes notwithstanding
>differences of values),
The common good of a group of rational beings includes whatever the good
of rational beings as such might be. Any particular group will have
more in common than status as rational beings, though. Also, the
specific conception of the common good a group accepts as politically
authoritative develops in the course of the group's history and of
course reflects group values. The specifics of a group's values and way
of life, the accepted conception of the common good, and the notion that
the common good is something that transcends the actual values and way
of life of the group all affect each other.
>rather than as a system to better manage self-interest of its
>constituents.
"Self-interest" sounds like something people define for themselves. How
do the Serbs define their self-interest? Is it simply a question of
whether they will get away with doing what they want to do?
>In a society which is still pervaded by a significant stream of common
>values (e.g. Japan), a notion of *common good* certainly does benefit
>processes of negotiation [ . . . ]
Yes. Since free societies can exist only to the extent successful
negotiation, compromise and cooperation are possible, it seems to me
that a society not pervaded by a significant stream of common values is
unlikely to be a free society for long.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Wed Sep 29 19:46:48 EDT 1993
Article: 9438 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination
Date: 29 Sep 1993 17:29:44 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9438 rec.arts.books:62315 talk.politics.theory:16089
feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Michael Feld) writes:
>>The common good of a group of rational beings includes whatever the good
>>of rational beings as such might be.
>
>Mebbe; mebbe not. Recall Nozick on this point:
>
> "Is there really one kind of life which is best for each of [an
>extremely diverse list of] people? Imagine all of them living in any
>utopia you've ever seen described in detail. Try to describe the
>society which would be best for all of these persons to live in."
The quoted language at the top seems clearly true. No doubt your point
is that "whatever the good of rational beings as such might be" doesn't
amount to much because even if we only take human beings (and not all
rational beings) into account we're so different from each other that
there is nothing that would be good for all of us.
I suppose one way to handle the point would be to say that my good
includes both my good as a moral agent (e.g., to treat others as ends
and not means only) and my non-moral good (health, exercise of talents,
whatever), that my good as a moral agent requires me to support a social
order that promotes, facilitates and protects the good of people in
general because to do otherwise would be to treat other people as means
and not ends, and that my good as a moral agent trumps my non-moral
good. It would follow that my good would include supporting a social
order that is good for most people even though essential features of
that order (e.g., a prohibition against certain forms of revenge against
people who disagree with me) thwart my strongest inclinations and deny
me the exercise of my greatest talents.
Comments? I suppose it's worth pointing out that the diversity of the
people in the list didn't arise in abstraction from the societies they
lived in. Presumably, in a good society people would tend to grow up
with good characteristics that have a place in the society. What you
think good characteristics are would of course affect your judgment of
the goodness of a society.
Maybe it's also worth repeating that to say that notions like "the
common good", "the good life" and "the good society" define the ultimate
goals and criteria of politics is not to say that they stand for things
that as a practical matter can be pursued very directly.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Thu Sep 30 10:39:20 EDT 1993
Article: 9447 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination
Date: 30 Sep 1993 08:55:14 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9447 rec.arts.books:62384 talk.politics.theory:16125
wojdylo@maths.uwa.oz.au (INFIDEL) writes:
>I'll start off by pontificating that I admire [ . . . ]
More niceness!
>The causal connection between your upbringing/education and ability to
>realize goods is, I suspect, not as well defined as you think it is.
>You're assuming a correspondence theory between cause and effect; I'd
>love to see just what that is.
We were talking about facilitating the realization of goods. My
assumption is that a good upbringing facilitates the realization of
goods even though it doesn't guarantee it. People from families in
which there is generosity and love or in which people value beauty are
likely to find that their realization of the goods characteristic of
close human relations or the fine arts is thereby facilitated. On the
other hand, children who grow up in a chaotic or coldly conventional
home environment are likely to have a much harder time realizing goods.
At least that's what I see around me. Have your observations been to
the contrary?
>#Also, a great many of the goods we realize exist in connection with
>#social institutions and are therefore hard to view simply as "goods
>#whose realization must be left up to the individual".
>
>Not at all, if one views it as an individual's duty to realize the good
>_despite_ the connection with the social institution. To what extent,
>after all, is the individual to use society as a crutch for his own
>inadequacies?
It's my duty to realize the good even if my arms and legs have all been
chopped off and I am subject to recurrent bouts of profound depression.
Nonetheless, it seems wrong to view human goods as generally independent
of qualities of body and mind. The same goes for human goods and
society.
>What if social standards, even ostensibly "good" ones, or even
>"underground" ones, are a hindrance to the individual understanding
>himself?
What if the things you eat and drink give you hardening of the arteries
and cirrhosis of the liver? Life is not possible without food and
drink, and human life is not possible without reference to social
standards. Without social standards you couldn't even think
articulately, let alone understand yourself. Also, it seems to me that
most of the things that one might want to understand about oneself
(beliefs and values, for example) are things that have an important
relation to one's membership in a particular society with particular
standards.
>#However, a good life for a member of a society may
>#include participation in a society that has qualities (dignity? unity
>#in diversity? orientation toward a common understanding of the good?)
>#that can't be reduced to features of the lives of its members
>#separately.
>
>If so, the individual is justified in resigning himself to relying on
>the dignified community to cover for his wretchedness.
To say that through participating in a community we make goods
attributable in the first instance to the community into our own goods
is not to say that such goods are enough to make our own lives good.
>How is he supposed to improve himself?
The same way anyone improves himself. Of course, he has the additional
motive of wanting to be a worthy member of a community that he values.
>How can one treat people as though one knows what's good for them,
>whilst at the same time treating them as ends in themselves?
To treat someone as an end in himself is to treat his proper ends (that
is, his good) as one's own. I can't imagine how I could do that if I
had no idea what his good was.
>#I'm somewhat unclear how the non-interference of the political in the
>#personal could be carried out.
>
>It is carried out by striving for it.
I don't know what to strive for, though.
>Try to imagine the difference between what is and what ought to be.
"What is" I can see around me; "what ought to be" is the good. I
recognize the distinction.
>The question is made even more difficult if one tries to find value in
>the facts of one's environment.
I agree that value does not reduce to the facts of one's environment.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Fri Oct 1 12:46:31 EDT 1993
Article: 7363 of sci.philosophy.meta
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.meta,rec.arts.books
Subject: Re: Zeleny and Homosexuality
Date: 1 Oct 1993 09:14:20 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 45
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9464 sci.philosophy.meta:7363 rec.arts.books:62481
jcollier@ariel.ucs.unimelb.EDU.AU (John Donald Collier) writes:
>Why pictures and stories containing erotic pictures and consensual sex
>are deemed more offensive than abusive and hate mongering literature, I
>am not quite sure. Hate seems better than sexual love.
The difference in treatment is plainly not attributable to a judgment as
to relative badness. If a man betrayed his country to the Nazis and
then went off to answer a call of nature, censors would more likely
suppress a detailed depiction of the latter act than of the former. It
seems to me that the distinction relates at least in part to the acts
people feel are public or private. Treason and abuse are essentially
public acts and sex is quintessentially private, or so people tend to
feel in America today (and I believe in most other times and places as
well). So erotic pictures are felt to violate "privacy", understood as
a system restricting the attention people pay to certain aspects of
life.
Your complaint, of course, is not that MZ was depicting abuse (you would
have had no objection to that) but that he was engaging in it. I
imagine that most people who would suppress erotic pictures would also
be willing at least in principle to suppress abuse. One difficulty with
doing so is that abuse is often intertwined with language dealing
substantively with public concerns, the very sort of language it seems
most important to protect from the standpoint of traditional arguments
justifying free speech.
>these six claims [advanced to justify barring homosexual soldiers] have
>negatively in common is that none of them is based on the ability of gay
>soldiers to fulfill the duties of their stations. What they have
>positively in common is that their force relies exclusively on current
>widespread bigotted attitudes against gays.
Homosexual people feel a sexual attraction to persons of the same sex.
Many heterosexual people feel a visceral aversion to homosexuals, or at
least feel inclined to hold them at arm's length, not take them
seriously, and so on. How can a liberal, who does not judge people's
tastes, know that the former feelings should be accommodated and the
latter should not?
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Oct 2 08:38:52 EDT 1993
Article: 817 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: sniff
Date: 2 Oct 1993 08:29:33 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 33
Message-ID: <28js7d$meo@panix.com>
References: <1993Oct1.203817.27796@news.cs.brandeis.edu>
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deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>all this talk of spam reminds me of some very silly parties of my
>mispent youth as a Berkeley undergrad...
A spam party? Sounds truly disgusting. If you made it a spam and
fluffer-nutter party people would at least have a choice.
>if anything constructive (as opposed to humorous) can be gotten out of
>this CFR/Trilateral silliness, it is that various paranoids such as the
>Birchers have at least (assuming their quotations are accurate) drawn
>attention to the *stated* intentions of these groups (notice: what kind
>of conspiracy would openly state its goals?), and to its wide ranging
>membership.
Does anyone care about this stuff other than a few wierdoes? People who
become informed about it by the usual means (college and graduate
school, employment with an elite institution, reading the _New York
Times_) are members of the New Class who think it's the way things
should be. Quirky autodidacts may come to different conclusions, but
quirky autodidacts have a habit of formulating and expressing their
conclusions in a way that makes them sound even crazier than they are.
Maybe the problem is the way almost all of our intellectual life has
become institutionalized in universities and think tanks, which rely on
grants from the same network of public and corporate donors. (If I go
on a little longer maybe I'll be able to develop a conspiracy theory!)
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Oct 2 08:38:55 EDT 1993
Article: 7383 of sci.philosophy.meta
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.meta,rec.arts.books
Subject: Re: Zeleny and Homosexuality
Date: 2 Oct 1993 08:38:06 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 55
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9477 sci.philosophy.meta:7383 rec.arts.books:62557
Daniel@hebron.connected.com (Daniel Solomons) writes:
>>>>
>Homosexual people feel a sexual attraction to persons of the same sex.
>Many heterosexual people feel a visceral aversion to homosexuals, or at
>least feel inclined to hold them at arm's length, not take them
>seriously, and so on. How can a liberal, who does not judge people's
>tastes, know that the former feelings should be accommodated and the
>latter should not?
><<<
>
>Perhaps it is a question of minding one's own business. That is, if
>people decide to follow up on a mutual sexual attraction, their acts are
>of benefit to them and of no harm to anyone else.
How can a liberal, who doesn't second-guess people in their views of
what is important to them, know that what homosexuals do is none of the
homophobe's business? It seems to me that from a liberal standpoint the
homophobe is perfectly able to define his own business.
To expand: a way of life is defined by what it rejects as well as what
it expects. There exist ways of life in which sex is viewed as part of
an overall system of things rather than an activity that one carries on
primarily for its own sake. But in order to become part of a system of
things particular sex acts have to be judged from a standpoint outside
themselves, which is to say that some consensual sex acts have to be
judged to be wrong. For example, a system of sexual morality that links
sex to some version of the monogamous patriarchal family may reject
practices such as adultery and homosexuality.
>From this perspective, it seems that the belief that it is bad to judge
consensual sex acts engaged in by other people to be wrong is based on
the belief that no way of life (or at least no way of life that has
anything to say about sex) should be viewed as binding on any person who
does not freely adopt that way of life. That belief seems clearly
wrong, though. "Live and let live" is itself a way of life that someone
might not choose to adopt. Also, man is a social animal and the ways of
life available to him necessarily depend on his society. If I want to
choose the _Ozzie and Harriet_ way of life, or a way of life based on
loyalty to throne, altar and sword, I'm not going to be able to do it in
a thoroughgoing liberal state. So it seems that the liberal dream of a
society that makes no substantive value choices on behalf of its members
is hopeless, and like every other social order a liberal social order is
forced to make substantive decisions about the good life, the common
good, and so on.
(Sorry for the harangue, but I mostly use the net to clarify my own
thoughts. Any comments from others are a bonus, and I thank you for
yours.)
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Oct 3 11:52:18 EDT 1993
Article: 9484 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination
Date: 3 Oct 1993 11:52:04 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9484 rec.arts.books:62595 talk.politics.theory:16225
zeleny@husc7.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:
>Freedom has its price. Why single out the price of privacy, over the
>price of the rights to free speech, security, or the keeping and bearing
>of arms?
Freedom has its price, and so do other things. Different people judge
the price and the value received in return differently. One might judge
the price things merit by reference to a conception of what sorts of
lives are most worth living. I'm not sure how else to go about it, and
in particular I'm not sure how you go about it in this connection.
Your "anything consensual behind closed doors is OK" theory doesn't fit
the usual notion of privacy in discussions of civil liberties, which
seems to relate to the view that certain types of activities are
personal no matter where they take place. Suppose I bribe an official
behind closed doors to do something within the range of his discretion.
Is that protected under your view? If not, how does it differ from
other breaches of trust behind closed doors, such as adultery? Suppose
Mr. and Mrs. X make a baby behind closed doors. Is that unprotected
because physical interactions with other people will occur as a direct
consequence of their act unless something intervenes? Also, it seems
that the War on Drugs could go on even if your criterion were
universally accepted, since the movement of the drugs in commerce would
be unprotected.
>There is a lot to be said for absolute equality of opportunity, as
>mandated by the statutes of Plato's Callipolis. There goes the
>political aspect of your family life.
For my own part, I view that kind of equality of opportunity as an
extreme example of the sacrifice of substantive good to formal justice.
Plato recognized that family life is political, so he absorbed it into
his political order. He did the same with other things (like music)
that you seem to want to protect from government interference on the
grounds that they fall outside the proper subject matter of politics.
On this point I understand Plato better than I understand you.
>Although I remain at a loss trying to determine your starting point, I
>still harbor a glimmer of hope that you will not end up in the camp of
>Pat Buchanan & Co, extolling the transcendental merits of the American
>"family values".
A quick way to get an idea of my starting point might be to review
Plato's account of political devolution in books viii and ix of the
_Republic_.
Where I end up depends on how I manage to sort things out. The goals of
reactionaries tend to be neither coherent, realizable nor
transcendentally valuable (except by comparison), but I sympathize with
them in many ways.
>Ernest Gellner claims that the monopoly on education has become as
>characteristic of the modern state, as the Weberian monopoly on the
>legitimate use of violence. So the society has definite means to
>inculcate its standards in the minds of impressionable youth. Beyond
>that, there remain such old favorites as tax incentives for
>conscientious breeders.
The monopoly on education involves a great deal of compulsion. Should I
infer that you think it's appropriate for the state to use extensive
compulsion to promote a particular conception of the good life, as long
as the means do not include rules regarding what people do behind closed
doors? One thing Plato's republic and Gellner's modern state do is
reduce the number of things that take place behind closed doors so that
life can be better regulated by public authority. You seem to recognize
that your criterion permits that.
>Whatever cannot be reduced to the aspects of individual lives, is bound
>to become a burden on the lives of all.
Scholarship is a common enterprise aiming at the establishment of truth.
Since truth cannot be reduced to aspects of individual lives should the
whole thing be given up as a burden?
Maybe participation in scholarship should be voluntary, so that (for
example) scholarship ought not receive government subsidies or other
special privileges. But it seems that we are all required to
participate in the state, which is a common enterprise aiming at
something or other (justice? the common good? liberty, equality and
fraternity?). If so, what is the thing the state aims at and how does
that thing reduce to aspects of individual lives?
>>I don't
>>think I can deal with other people rationally and ethically, though,
>>unless I have some notion of what things would be good for them.
>
>Fine, as long as you, as an individual, abstain from imposing your
>notion of the good on your neighbor.
To the extent my actions affect my neighbor in ways to which he doesn't
consent I don't see how that can be avoided. Mr. Collier's notion of
the good may include reading all the posts in philosophy newsgroups and
not seeing anything he considers homophobic. If so, you have imposed
your notion of the good on him.
>But I see no way to ensure that the society at large will be able to
>exercise due restraint in promulgating its official notion of the common
>good.
Politics is always a risk. I don't see how society can avoid having an
official notion of the common good. For example, "maximizing the equal
ability of each individual to realize whatever desires he may have"
strikes me as a notion of the co
Do let me know if you have comments of any kind.
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