Items Posted by Jim Kalb
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Oct 9 04:29:07 EDT 1993
Article: 7575 of sci.philosophy.meta
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From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.meta,rec.arts.books
Subject: Re: Zeleny and Homosexuality
Date: 8 Oct 1993 20:18:15 -0400
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9629 sci.philosophy.meta:7575 rec.arts.books:63022
fjc@atl.hp.com (Frank Casper) writes:
>|> Suppose someone thought
>|> that in order to have a politically free society with happy citizens you
>|> need most children to grow up in stable households with two parents of
>|> different sexes and that the best way to bring about that desirable
>|> situation is to have fairly definite sex roles that children are
>|> socialized into and an accepted definition of "marriage" that requires
>|> the parties to be of opposite sexes. Assuming that view had been
>|> arrived at rationally it would be right for a person holding it to
>|> oppose homosexual marriage.
>
> Jim Kalb was responding to a question that I
> had asked. The question was something like the following,
> is it right to politically disenfanchize gays merely on
> the basis of moral opinions regarding their sexual preference?
> Mr. Kalbs answer, that you have quoted, seems to provide an
> affirmative answer, so long as the views that justify it
> are arrived at "rationally".
I don't understand why you identify opposing homosexual marriage with
political disenfranchisement of homosexuals. I didn't say that
homosexuals would be unable to vote, organize, speak in support of their
views, and so on. Does opposition to marriage between a man and two
women, a father and his daughter or a man and his horse constitute
political disenfranchisement of those with a penchant for bigamy, incest
or bestiality?
> It also raises the
> question, better put to Mr. Kalb, as to whether reason is all
> there is to the matter? That is to say, just because a view
> is rationally arrived at, does that make it right?
A view that is rationally arrived at can of course be wrong.
Nonetheless, it seems that the person who holds it does not do wrong in
holding it.
> Again, I ask
> the question, is it right to discriminate against gays merely
> on the basis of moral opinions regarding their sexual preferences?
Your question seems to be whether even if continuing the system of
thought and feeling that considers homosexuality worse than
heterosexuality, and expresses that judgment by giving special
privileges to certain heterosexual couplings that are denied to
otherwise similar homosexual couplings, would be beneficial to society
overall, justice demands that homosexual couplings be treated equally.
I don't see why, but you seem to be of the opposite view. Why?
(I take it that unlike Mr. Solomons you have no trouble with the notion
of arriving rationally at judgments relating to the consequences of
social policy.)
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Oct 9 05:43:22 EDT 1993
Article: 9636 of talk.philosophy.misc
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From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination
Date: 9 Oct 1993 05:42:49 -0400
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9636 rec.arts.books:63049 talk.politics.theory:16434
zeleny@husc7.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:
>I believe that all multiple conceptions of justice must converge to a
>single legitimate structure, whose implementation in principle will be
>neutral between all conceivable legitimate conceptions of the good.
I would be inclined to agree if "justice" were (perhaps arbitrarily)
defined as paying each thing its due and so could be violated by acting
without regard to goods other than personal autonomy. Also, I'm not
sure how one could arbitrate among conflicting wills without taking a
view as to what things are valuable other than the triumph of will as
such.
>The pursuit of happiness is a right, not a good.
It is no doubt good as a general thing that such a right be recognized.
I'm simple-minded enough to think of that as one good among others.
>while my personal decision to stick various objects in my body is indeed
>likely to affect the good of my neighbor, it is extremely unlikely to
>abridge his political rights.
How about injecting yourself with plague bacilli before visiting the
baths, or performing a brain operation on yourself that tends to make
you run amok now and then?
(If attempted slippery slopes bore you, you can ignore the last
question. I seem to be reduced to making statements about my feelings
about things, so my guess is that the discussion has gotten as far as it
is likely to get.)
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Wed Oct 13 13:53:22 EDT 1993
Article: 9765 of talk.philosophy.misc
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From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination
Date: 13 Oct 1993 10:29:56 -0400
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9765 rec.arts.books:63372 talk.politics.theory:16543
m220amze@oak.math.ucla.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:
>Do you make a distinction between rights and goods?
Not a very deep one. I think of the good of a thing as the proper end
of that thing. A man's good as a rational animal is to recognize his
own proper ends and live voluntarily in a way that realizes them. So
telling a man what to do is generally inconsistent with the realization
of his good as a rational animal and therefore requires a justification.
Of course, it's conceivable that someone could advance my good as a
rational animal by thwarting my will. If I wanted to become a heroin
addict, and someone stopped me, most likely the compulsion would help
preserve my ability to recognize and realize my own goods. Also, I have
essential features other than rationality. I am a social, sexual and
mortal animal, so it seems that part of my good is to participate in
social arrangements that overcome death through reproduction and
childrearing. If so, it appears that voluntarily undermining such
arrangements because I mistakenly conceive it my good to do so would be
no part of my good and I could be kept from doing so without injury.
(What the arrangements should be, and what constitutes undermining them,
depend on a variety of biological, social and historical circumstances.)
So my theory of a right of autonomy as an ultimate ethical principle is
quite weak. The notion of rights has more application, it seems to me,
in connection with the institutions of particular societies. Given that
it is conceptually possible for me to force you to be free or for you to
know my good better than I do (I don't know how any sort of authority
can be justified apart from such possibilities), there are obvious
difficulties with giving a single person or group of persons the
unrestricted power to determine and enforce what is good. I think of
rights of autonomy as restrictions on the power of those in authority to
prescribe what is good for others. The appropriate restrictions are
different in different times and places, somewhat as the appropriate
definition and distribution of political power generally differs in
accordance with circumstances.
A question -- what is the difference between a state that treats the
equal satisfaction of individual preferences as the highest good and
acts in every way it can to realize that good and a state that only
protects the equal right of each individual to form and pursue his own
conception of the good? I understand how the two are different if the
latter state is guided by a conception of property rights prior and
superior to itself and the former is not, but otherwise they seem
similar to me.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Wed Oct 13 16:11:32 EDT 1993
Article: 9780 of talk.philosophy.misc
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From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination
Date: 13 Oct 1993 14:25:51 -0400
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9780 rec.arts.books:63396 talk.politics.theory:16549
azlerner@quads.uchicago.edu (asia z lerner) writes:
>>what is the difference between a state that treats the
>>equal satisfaction of individual preferences as the highest good and
>>acts in every way it can to realize that good and a state that only
>>protects the equal right of each individual to form and pursue his own
>>conception of the good?
>
>Wouldn't the significant difference be that in the first case someone in
>authority has to assume the knowledge of what is good, and in fact, the
>existance of some normative good (e.g. "good of the majority", "two
>garages", "chicken in every pot"), while the second system does not
>assume such knowledge? Or at least, te assumption is that individuals
>are the primary judges of what is good for them, but that the decision
>is not made on a level higher than the individual level?
I think that difference is very likely what's intended. But what would
the one state do that the other wouldn't? It seems to me that each
would look at actual preferences and existing resources and try to
establish the scheme that uses the latter in the way that most advances
the equal satisfaction of the former. (That's assuming the state
doesn't view itself as bound by a prior system of property rights in
resources.) Any other system from the standpoint of the first state
would fail to realize the highest good and from the standpoint of the
second state would include oppressive social structures that unjustly
disfavor the preferences of some people.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Oct 18 11:57:08 EDT 1993
Article: 63744 of rec.arts.books
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From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.meta,rec.arts.books
Subject: Re: Zeleny and Homosexuality
Date: 18 Oct 1993 07:06:37 -0400
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:9995 sci.philosophy.meta:7897 rec.arts.books:63744
zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:
>I take it that there can be no more solid ground for moral viewpoints,
>than personal preference for distinguishing good and evil.
This might conceivably mean any of the following:
1. We have views on morals because we have a preference for
distinguishing good and evil, just as we have views on mathematics
because we have a preference for distinguishing truth from falsehood in
mathematics.
2. Each of us grounds his moral judgments on his personal moral
experience, just as each of us grounds his judgments on physical objects
on his personal sensory experience.
3. A moral viewpoint is simply personal preference systematized.
Which (if any) do you mean?
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Oct 18 11:57:10 EDT 1993
Article: 63745 of rec.arts.books
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From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.meta,rec.arts.books
Subject: Re: Poetry, Gay Youth Suicide
Date: 18 Oct 1993 07:17:10 -0400
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mettw@newt.phys.unsw.edu.au (Matthew Parry) writes:
> Suicide is the expression of repressed feelings [ . . . ]
Between 1960 and 1980 the suicide rate among white Americans aged 15 to
19 increased 139.5%. (Source: _Vital Statistics of the United
States_.) If your view is the whole truth, it appears that the
struggles during that period against repression and in favor of
emotional openness were useless against some powerful tendency in the
opposite direction.
I would connect suicide to social and spiritual incoherence rather than
to repression as such. Your explanation and mine may be consistent,
since in a state of incoherence one would experience any sort of
restraint as arbitrary external repression. I suppose my theory is also
consistent with the "weakness of will" theory, since a strong will is an
ordering principle and conversely spiritual chaos makes it difficult to
will anything.
It's worth noting, by the way, that during the same period homicide and
accidental death rates also rose sharply. My interpretation of the
increase in the rates of all forms of violent death is that when people
don't know what they're doing they do crazy and destructive things.
(The foregoing ignores principled suicide, as in the case of bushido,
since it does not seem to be what is at issue.)
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Oct 18 14:44:56 EDT 1993
Article: 63766 of rec.arts.books
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From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
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Subject: Re: Poetry, Gay Youth Suicide
Date: 18 Oct 1993 12:52:47 -0400
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azlerner@quads.uchicago.edu (asia z lerner) writes:
>>Between 1960 and 1980 the suicide rate among white Americans aged 15 to
>>19 increased 139.5%. (Source: _Vital Statistics of the United
>>States_.)
>
>What about the survey techniques? Could it be the case, for
>instance, that suicide was more readily reported/aknowledged
>bet. 60-80, than in the previous period?
They were whatever goes into the source cited. Since accidental deaths
and homicides also went up a great deal, it appears that we are not
dealing with a change in the way a constant situation was reported.
Also, other measures of disordered personal lives among those in the
group in question (delinquency, illegitimacy, drug and alcohol use) went
up sharply during the period as well.
>>a strong will is an
>>ordering principle and conversely spiritual chaos makes it difficult to
>>will anything.
>Notice, that the notion of "strong will" usually refers to an inherent
>quality in the organism, while in the above passage you seem to imply
>that it is, somehow, socially induced, or to be more precise, socially
>reduced.
"Will" seems to refer to a faculty that every rational being has that
enables such a being to choose his actions without reference to
non-rational innate or socially induced inclinations. It seems to me
that one could accept the validity of such a conception and still
believe that the habit of exercising that faculty, characteristic of
those with a "strong will", can like other habits be promoted or
inhibited by social circumstances.
>If, indeed, you take "strong will" to be inherent, than of course it
>still would be true that chaotic and troublesome circomstances will
>raise the statistical likelyhood of suicides, but that's not because the
>average amount of "will" has gone down, but because suicide-inducing
>pressure has gone up.
The chaotic and troublesome circumstances I had in mind had to do with
people's beliefs, habits, attitudes and relations to other people,
understanding of themselves and the world and so on. If by "will" you
mean a logically pure faculty that is untouched by all that, then what
you say is true. In any case my point remains, that the increase in
suicide-inducing pressure can not be identified with an increase in
"repression" as that word is normally understood.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Oct 23 09:09:38 EDT 1993
Article: 831 of alt.revolution.counter
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From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: Is there more to life than politics?
Date: 22 Oct 1993 06:33:54 -0400
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rickertj@athena.cas.vanderbilt.edu (John Rickert) writes:
> (In what follows, "politics" should be taken in its usual, modern
>sense rather than in the broader, Classical sense. Politics as it is
>conceived here should conjure up images of political parties, elections,
>legislation, officials, and the like.)
>
> Consider personal affairs in the widest sense. These include a
>man's relations, committments, loyalties, and so forth to his family,
>his church, his home and nation, and also his political affairs. In
>this view, political relations are a proper subset of all the
>personal affairs relating to an individual. There is a contrary
>view, however, which is almost exclusively Liberal, that all personal
>affairs are political. Every kind of relation is subjugated to the
>political: decisions about buying food or clothes or books are guided
>not really by the evident quality of these items, but rather by their
>relation to the political (in the sense given above). When everything
>becomes political, hometown and family are mere accidents of birth
>that carry no particular responsibility or call for loyalty. When
>everything becomes political, the transcendent is lost, and the church
>can find legitimacy only in its promotion of the social gospel. When
>everything becomes political, art and literature lose enduring value
>and are left with only a relative usefulness in the measure that they
>accord with the political. Everything is political; everything.
>Friendship is just another form of discrimination.
I usually think of the causation as going the other way. When dominant
elites come to believe that nothing is transcendent, and that there are
no enduring values that can (for example) be embodied in art or
literature, they come to believe that actual social institutions are the
only possible source of values other than individual wills. When they
also come to believe that the particular setting one is born into,
including home, family and similar loyalties, is to be shucked off as an
irrelevancy, they come to identify the center of operative social power
as the social institution that is the source of all value. "Operative
social power" is, of course, politics in your sense.
Causation does go both ways. The modern state has a near-monopoly of
formal education, either directly through the state schools or
indirectly through the mass of regulations and grant requirements that
private schools must comply with to survive. In addition, it seems
generally true that political regime, and therefore the cultural outlook
of those who control the state, influence culture. That principle
should apply with special force to the activist modern state.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Oct 23 09:09:39 EDT 1993
Article: 832 of alt.revolution.counter
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From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: Is there more to life than politics?
Date: 22 Oct 1993 06:37:36 -0400
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deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>Anyway, the old liberalism seemed to be a repudiation of 'politics' in
>favor of either lassez faire free market capitalism, or Benthemite
>utilitarianism, or some combination of these, with the understanding
>that politics were subordinate to these conceptions, and might possibly
>be done away with altogether (a la anarchism and libertarianism).
Would you say that any school of thought that holds that there could be
experts on the public good and how to achieve it repudiates politics?
If so, many non-liberal political thinkers have repudiated politics,
Plato for example. I suppose mediaeval thinkers who thought it was the
function of the king to defend pre-existing right repudiated politics as
well.
It seems to me that the people who don't repudiate politics in your
sense include political romanticists who think of politics as the
creative and expressive activity of a people, and maybe Aristotelians
and others who think of the means and specific goals of politics as
matters on which reasonable men differ and therefore necessarily require
discussion and cooperation. Would you agree that a utilitarian who
didn't believe in the hedonic calculus could fall into the latter
category and therefore not repudiate politics? How about a Catholic
Integrist who believed that the ultimate goal of politics is a given but
political activity is a matter of practical wisdom regarding which there
will always be a variety of reasonable views?
>(I would predict that the American attack on racial and ethnic identity
>will lead to the downfall of the American 'empire' in a fashion
>analogous to that of the USSR and Yugoslavia, BTW).
In Eastern Europe they say that it's easier to make an aquarium into
fish soup than fish soup into an aquarium. One concern I have is that
if egalitarianism degrades people then the more widely it is accepted
and the more vigorously it is enforced by the governing classes the more
brutal the eventual reaction will be. If liberals view their enemies as
Nazis then to the extent liberals control things -- in particular the
forums in which discussion is carried on -- their enemies will
eventually become Nazis.
>Thus, an argument can be made that the way to deal with conservative
>agendas in regards to social issues - abortion, homosexuality, drugs,
>etc. - is not to make such things illegal, but simply to remove the
>artificial govt. constraints which prevent people from excercising the
>power of enforcing social stigmas against such things.
One issue that people who call themselves libertarians differ on is
whether government action is legitimate that discriminates against but
does not illegalize behavior of the sort liberals believe is covered by
the right of privacy (e.g., no funding for abortion, no homosexuals in
the military).
>How does one go about transcending politics? The cyncical might remark
>that the left has gone after power while the right was content to
>philosophize. Hopefully a process of transcending politics will not
>leave us even more powerless.
To transcend politics is to recognize that there are things that are
more important than politics. That may or may not put one at a
disadvantage relative to those who care only about power. I would say
that the disadvantage is mostly a short-term one, which is not to say it
is not important and often dispositive.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Oct 23 09:09:55 EDT 1993
Article: 10142 of talk.philosophy.misc
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From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: rec.arts.books,talk.philosophy.misc,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination
Date: 23 Oct 1993 09:08:43 -0400
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wojdylo@maths.uwa.oz.au (INFIDEL) writes:
>If you really want to come up with something interesting, tell me just
>how following Confucius' teachings can lead to a Bill of Rights.
It doesn't seem likely to. On the other hand, the effect of a document
like the Bill of Rights is whatever those responsible for interpreting
and applying it think it should be. So it seems that Confucius'
emphasis on the habits and outlook of those in authority, which has a
great deal to do with their political and cultural traditions, was not
misplaced.
Maybe your point is that a liberal individualist tradition is better
than a familial, communal and hierarchical tradition. The proof of the
pudding is in the eating, no doubt, and liberal individualist societies
have been strikingly successful in many ways. On the other hand, the
principle that success doesn't last forever may apply with special force
to a regime that prides itself on being progressive, dynamic and always
changing. To the extent the changes are toward greater consistency one
would expect them at some point to become changes for the worse.
Also, tastes differ. I would expect someone who liked the notion of
"honor" to be dissatisfied to that extent in a liberal individualist
order. You seem to know something about life in the English-speaking
countries, in the Far East, and in Eastern Europe. Where do you find
the most and the least to admire in the people? Do you see a connection
between the characteristics you find admirable or the reverse and the
forms of social and political organization?
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From rec.arts.books Sat Oct 23 17:01:24 1993
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From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: rec.arts.books,talk.philosophy.misc,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination
Date: 23 Oct 1993 09:08:43 -0400
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Xref: panix rec.arts.books:64072 talk.philosophy.misc:10142 talk.politics.theory:16716
wojdylo@maths.uwa.oz.au (INFIDEL) writes:
>If you really want to come up with something interesting, tell me just
>how following Confucius' teachings can lead to a Bill of Rights.
It doesn't seem likely to. On the other hand, the effect of a document
like the Bill of Rights is whatever those responsible for interpreting
and applying it think it should be. So it seems that Confucius'
emphasis on the habits and outlook of those in authority, which has a
great deal to do with their political and cultural traditions, was not
misplaced.
Maybe your point is that a liberal individualist tradition is better
than a familial, communal and hierarchical tradition. The proof of the
pudding is in the eating, no doubt, and liberal individualist societies
have been strikingly successful in many ways. On the other hand, the
principle that success doesn't last forever may apply with special force
to a regime that prides itself on being progressive, dynamic and always
changing. To the extent the changes are toward greater consistency one
would expect them at some point to become changes for the worse.
Also, tastes differ. I would expect someone who liked the notion of
"honor" to be dissatisfied to that extent in a liberal individualist
order. You seem to know something about life in the English-speaking
countries, in the Far East, and in Eastern Europe. Where do you find
the most and the least to admire in the people? Do you see a connection
between the characteristics you find admirable or the reverse and the
forms of social and political organization?
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From rec.arts.books Sat Oct 23 19:57:51 1993
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,rec.arts.books,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination
Date: 23 Oct 1993 17:11:21 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 38
Message-ID: <2ac6lp$8s2@panix.com>
References: <1993Oct12.235707.21286@math.ucla.edu> <29h3d4$g1n@panix.com> <2a88ep$u3@uniwa.uwa.edu.au>
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:10196 rec.arts.books:64188 talk.politics.theory:16737
wojdylo@maths.uwa.oz.au (INFIDEL) writes:
>>A question -- what is the difference between a state that treats the
>>equal satisfaction of individual preferences as the highest good and
>>acts in every way it can to realize that good and a state that only
>>protects the equal right of each individual to form and pursue his own
>>conception of the good?
>Personally, I think that the highest good entails slicing open the
>bellies of namby-pamby cunts, gooks, chinks, dikes, wogs, daigos,
>poofter cunts, and fucking four-eyed losers who deserve to get it
>anyway. How are you going to stop me?
The first state would stop you because your individual preferences could
not be satisfied equally with those of the people you mention, while the
second state would stop you because realizing your conception of the
good would deprive the others of the equal right to pursue their
conceptions of the good. What's the problem? (You appeared to believe
that the first state had a problem that the second didn't.)
Many people who theorize about politics would apparently rather talk
about "rights to pursue one's conception of the good" than "rights to
satisfy one's preferences". Some such people also seem to think that
inequality in property is fundamentally bad, and that the state has no
right to dispute the values people place on things. My problem is that
I can understand the distinction between a right to pursue a conception
of the good and a right to satisfy a preference only to the extent there
is a strong justification for unequal property (so that there is a
fundamental distinction between a right to pursue and a right to
satisfy) and also a principled way to distinguish conceptions of the
good from mere preferences.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From rec.arts.books Sat Oct 23 20:00:38 1993
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.meta,rec.arts.books
Subject: Re: Honor and Unhappiness
Date: 23 Oct 1993 17:08:04 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 20
Distribution: inet
Message-ID: <2ac6fk$8k8@panix.com>
References: <1993Oct21.172727.19886@midway.uchicago.edu> <2a7j2a$ove@uniwa.uwa.edu.au>
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:10193 sci.philosophy.meta:8071 rec.arts.books:64187
wojdylo@maths.uwa.oz.au (INFIDEL) writes:
>[ . . . ] in a group oriented society where there are no recognized
>(objective) universals, it's either all or nothing for the group: brute
>politics is the law [ . . . ] in the ultra traditional Confucian ways of
>yore, guilt played only a minor role in an individual's thought about
>himself. If you could get away with something away from the "eyes of the
>world" (which amounted to "the eyes of Japanese") then you'd go ahead
>and do it -- hence the stories of Japanese businessmen going wild
>overseas.
Would you say such an outlook has much to do with the views of Confucius
himself?
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Oct 23 20:05:49 EDT 1993
Article: 837 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: politics
Date: 23 Oct 1993 20:05:44 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 32
Message-ID: <2acgso$s3d@panix.com>
References: <1993Oct22.170723.21879@news.cs.brandeis.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>I am perhaps thinking of a slightly broader definition of 'politics'
>here then others are using, even if we stick solely to laws and
>government. That is to say, I consider the attempt to eschew politics
>in a particular realm to itself be a political decision. In other
>words, not to decide is to decide, not to act is to act, etc. So the
>attempt to banish politics is an illusion.
One could say that the Administration's current policy of not hiring
assassins to eliminate open opponents of liberalism is political in
nature. But if by custom or constitutional decision the action of
government is limited to particular modes and spheres it seems
misleading to characterize particular instances of inaction outside
those modes and spheres as political. Since there are infinitely many
things government could attend to, not all of which would benefit from
the attention, there have to be principles defining what things are the
government's responsibility. It seems to me that to say something is
political is normally to say it is one of the comparatively few things
that as a matter of accepted principle it pays for the government to
concern itself with.
I would also say that principles limiting the action of government are
valuable things and should not lightly be put in question. Broad
definitions of "political", I think, are often used to do so.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Oct 23 20:07:10 EDT 1993
Article: 838 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: Is there more to life than politics?
Date: 23 Oct 1993 20:06:59 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 30
Message-ID: <2acgv3$sde@panix.com>
References: <9310191717.AA10739@athena.cas.vanderbilt.edu> <2a8d5g$mec@panix.com> <1993Oct22.165535.21391@news.cs.brandeis.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>Social norms is not a concept that libertarians seem capable of dealing
>with in the context of politics, since their goal is to achieve a
>'culturally neutral' polity, not realizing that this is a contradiction
>in terms.
I don't think that's true quite across the board, although it does seem
to be true of the people on the net. I think Murray Rothbard and John
Rockwell [?] have a magazine that's been mentioned in _Chronicles_ in
which they present views that are libertarian but culturally
conservative. The netsters I've seen comment on them think they're
scum. Charles Murray's political ideal seems to be very close to
libertarianism, in part because he thinks that people who start off
acting in their self-interest will end up transcending self-interest
through the creation of social norms as long as the welfare state
doesn't spare them the need to do so.
>I guess what I am driving at is that, since there are some things more
>important then politics, it may, on occasion, be necessary to use
>politics to protect these things from those who are using politics to
>undermine them.
Sure.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Oct 23 21:31:17 EDT 1993
Article: 3307 of alt.society.conservatism
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.fan.rush-limbaugh,alt.society.conservatism
Subject: Re: Family Values and Divorce
Date: 23 Oct 1993 20:09:36 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 31
Message-ID: <2ach40$suu@panix.com>
References: <2a9ipc$5dh@toads.pgh.pa.us>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
Xref: panix alt.fan.rush-limbaugh:47256 alt.society.conservatism:3307
joslin@cs.pitt.edu (David Joslin) writes:
>Presumably divorce is contrary to Family Values, and I would assume that
>the divorce rate is doing more to erode the family than (for example)
>Gay Rights. Then why is divorce mentioned so much less frequently by
>proponents of Family Values than (for example) Gay Rights?
The battle lines shift with the times. At one time divorce carried much
more of a stigma than it does now and there was conservative opposition
to legal reforms making divorces easier to get. That's why people went
to Las Vegas to get them.
Now that battle has been lost (it isn't practical to carry it on when
there are as many divorces as there are) conservatives can console
themselves by saying that a person who has been married and divorced has
shown his acceptance of the traditional family as an ideal even though
he failed to achieve that ideal on a particular attempt. To go the
further step of full acceptance of gay rights would be to reject the
traditional family as something that is socially preferred and to make
it purely a matter of private choice, and that's something conservatives
generally are not willing to do. The difference is the difference
between accepting that someone has done a particular thing you think is
bad and accepting that someone bases his way of life on something you
think is bad.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Oct 24 13:21:19 EDT 1993
Article: 8104 of sci.philosophy.meta
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Honor and Unhappiness
Date: 24 Oct 1993 12:27:33 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 58
Distribution: inet
Message-ID: <2aeadl$kkv@panix.com>
References: <1993Oct24.001721.23624@midway.uchicago.edu> <2adpv1$a2@panix.com> <1993Oct24.145602.16296@midway.uchicago.edu>
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:10239 sci.philosophy.meta:8104
azlerner@quads.uchicago.edu (asia z lerner) writes:
>A seppuku demonstrates a preference for a physical "bad experience" over
>a spiritual "bad experience" wouldn't you say so?
No. If seppuku were understood as a way of minimizing bad experiences
why wouldn't they choose an easier way of doing it?
My understanding (I am no expert on things Japanese) is that you don't
commit seppuku because you've weighed possible future experiences and
chosen the one you like most. You do it because it is required by your
conception of what it is to be honorable, which is part of your
understanding of what it is that gives life meaning. So your motive is
a conceptual one having to do with the principles that make your life
what it as something that matters rather than a prudential one having to
do with how to make your life pleasant.
>>Another is whether doing something out of a sense of honor is the same
>>as doing something to avoid humilitation.
>
>Since honor is avoidance of humiliation, among other things, I
>would say that the answere to this one is "yes".
Do you think people who are concerned with honor understand honor as a
desire to avoid unpleasant experiences?
> A third is whether all
>>suicides in shame cultures are done out of a sense of honor. On all
>>three issues I think the answer is no.
>
>??? Japan is supposed to be the quintessential shame culture. Are
>you saying that seppuku is NOT done out of a sense of honor, after
>all?
No, just observing that seppuku is not the only kind of suicide in
Japan. In my post I gave examples of suicides in a shame culture with
motives other than honor.
>>Maybe they relate to whether someone who commits suicide has carried out
>>a decision for which he should be respected or whether he has given in
>>to a weakness. For me the most illuminating way to think about that
>>issue is to ask whether one would be willing to tell the person that it
>>would be right for him to commit suicide or whether one would try very
>>hard to dissuade him and think it a terrible waste of a life if he went
>>ahead and did it.
>
>Rather depends on wether the onlooker is concerned about the person's
>honor, or the person's life.
Sure -- how you judge the things people do and how you advise them when
asked depends on how you judge the importance of the things at stake.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Oct 24 20:16:34 EDT 1993
Article: 8118 of sci.philosophy.meta
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Honor and Unhappiness
Date: 24 Oct 1993 19:27:59 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 73
Distribution: inet
Message-ID: <2af31v$m6u@panix.com>
References: <1993Oct24.145602.16296@midway.uchicago.edu> <2aeadl$kkv@panix.com> <1993Oct24.182731.23432@midway.uchicago.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:10250 sci.philosophy.meta:8118
azlerner@quads.uchicago.edu (asia z lerner) writes:
>>>A seppuku demonstrates a preference for a physical "bad experience" over
>>>a spiritual "bad experience" wouldn't you say so?
>>
>>No. If seppuku were understood as a way of minimizing bad experiences
>>why wouldn't they choose an easier way of doing it?
>
>But it really makes no sense to conflate a bad spiritual experience
>and a bad physical experience into one term ("bad experience") when
>talking about Seppuku.
If so, then the language first quoted above makes no sense.
>you say :
>
>1) You don't commit seppuku because you've weighted possible
>future experiences and chosen the one you like most.
>
>2) You do it [seppuku] because it is required by your conception
>of what it is to be honorable.
>
>I see the two sentences as perfectly compatible. Your conception
>tells you that it would be honorable to commit seppuku. You still
>can act on your conception, or not (btw - out of all the military
>commanders of Japan in WWII, only a small number, I think 2,
>commited seppuku). If you choose to do it, it is because you have
>weighted the comparative attractions of life without honor and
>honorable death, and decided for the first.
You seem to believe that to reflect and then act is to compare possible
future experiences and to act to bring about the future experiences
toward which one feels the strongest attraction. That seems wrong to
me, because it seems to me there is a kind of rational action that need
not take into account future experiences. A trivial example would be
doing an arithmetic calculation and writing down the answer. The motive
for writing down what one believes to be the correct answer may be the
practical one of improving one's future experiences, but it need not.
One might write down the correct answer simply because it is correct and
one values correctness as such.
Here's a science fiction example. Suppose a Martian who you trusted
completely told you that he could tell by means of his super-advanced
technology that you were going to live a rather unhappy life. Because
he was such a nice guy, he offered to turn you into a brain in a vat
that would subjectively experience a totally illusory but very happy
life. You would not know you were a brain in a vat because among other
things you would forget the decision to become a brain in a vat and your
vat experiences would seem entirely continuous with your real
experiences. If you can imagine not taking the Martian up on his offer
you can imagine reflective action that rejects future experience as the
sole criterion.
To go on to our hero, the inventor of seppuku. My guess is that he
didn't understand what he was doing as comparing future situations and
picking the one he found he liked best. Instead, he asked himself what
he was and said "I am a warrior who lives as a warrior and dies as a
warrior". Then he analyzed his "warrior" concept to see what action
would best fulfill the requirements of that concept and decided that
seppuku was just the thing. Then he committed seppuku as a matter of
being true to what he was, rather than to bring about some ulterior end.
One might view our hero's action as similar to a choice in the previous
example to live an unhappy real life rather than a happy illusory life
as a brain in a vat in that both reflect a choice of the true over the
pleasant.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From rec.arts.books Tue Oct 26 14:51:51 1993
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: rec.arts.books,talk.philosophy.misc,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination
Date: 26 Oct 1993 09:10:49 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 54
Message-ID: <2aj7kp$gq9@panix.com>
References: <2a4utp$6j3@uniwa.uwa.edu.au> <2abacr$7a8@panix.com> <2ai3mf$srh@spam.maths.adelaide.edu.au>
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Xref: panix rec.arts.books:64510 talk.philosophy.misc:10317 talk.politics.theory:16808
jaskew@maths.adelaide.edu.au (Joseph Askew) writes:
>>>If you really want to come up with something interesting, tell me just
>>>how following Confucius' teachings can lead to a Bill of Rights.
>
>>It doesn't seem likely to.
>
>Confucians insist quite strong on the existence of an objective reality
>and morality.
Agreed.
>There is no doubt that Confuciansim and the Bill of Rights are
>compatible.
I didn't mean to suggest the contrary, only that if left to himself the
idea of a Bill of Rights would probably not occur to a Confucian. Also,
in the United States when people talk of the Bill of Rights they mean
the Bill of Rights interpreted in a way that I think *is* inconsistent
with Confucianism. (I don't know the situation in Australia.)
>Confucianism might be heirarchical, it is certainly familial but it is
>not communal in the sense I think you mean.
I think it is clearly hierarchical:
"The Master took four subjects for his teaching: culture,
conduct of affairs, loyalty to superiors and the keeping of
promises." _Analects_ vii, 24 (Waley trans.).
I was uncertain whether to use the word "communal", but "familial and
hierarchical" didn't seem to be enough because Confucius' concern was
with government, which he thought should benefit all under Heaven. So
he seemed to have a notion of the common good that we serve by acting
well, first in our relations with those immediately around us and then
in our relations with those who are more and more distant until the
entire society is benefited. Can you suggest a better word than
"communal" for that side of his thinking?
>Confucianism has provided reasonably stable and moderate government to a
>large section if not the majority of all people who have ever lived. I
>call that a success.
That sounds right. Confucius himself is one of my favorite people, but
I don't know enough about post-Confucius Confucianism or the history of
the Far East to defend Confucianism as it has actually existed against
any accusations someone might make against it.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Oct 26 14:54:03 EDT 1993
Article: 3357 of alt.society.conservatism
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.fan.rush-limbaugh,alt.society.conservatism
Subject: Re: Family Values and Divorce
Date: 26 Oct 1993 09:05:09 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 54
Message-ID: <2aj7a5$g4q@panix.com>
References: <2a9ipc$5dh@toads.pgh.pa.us> <2ach40$suu@panix.com> <2ahgvo$oit@toads.pgh.pa.us>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
Xref: panix alt.fan.rush-limbaugh:47841 alt.society.conservatism:3357
joslin@cs.pitt.edu (David Joslin) writes:
>If divorce is contrary to Family Values, then I would think that the
>more divorces there are, the more attention the issue should receive
>from the proponents of Family Values.
People pay more attention to what's achievable. They also feel more
strongly about losing what they have than about gaining what they
haven't. So if establishing new restrictions on divorce doesn't seem
attainable while maintaining current restrictions on homosexual marriage
does seem attainable Family Values types will focus on the latter. If
Pat Buchanan were appointed absolute dictator and he were willing to
accept such a position you would see new restrictions on divorce.
>Does it make sense for the proponents of Family Values to spend so
>much time worrying about how gay rights would erode Family Values,
>when the prevaling attitude toward divorce in this country is (in
>their eyes, I assume) doing orders of magnitude more damage? Isn't
>that like worrying about the gate being open after the fence has
>been destroyed?
Your metaphor is reversed. If traditional marriage is the enclosure
then no-fault divorce provides an open gate out of the enclosure while
recognizing gay rights would eliminate the enclosure altogether as
something worthy of special public recognition and support. Objecting
to tearing down the fence altogether when you don't undertake the
struggle to close the gate might show laziness, but it doesn't show that
you don't care about the enclosure and its beneficial functions.
>"Divorce on demand" leads to single-parent families, families with
>step-parents, and children that are shuttled back and forth between
>households. Not a very traditional family, right? So we can equally
>well say that allowing "divorce on demand" is a rejection of the
>traditional family as something that is socially preferred, and makes it
>purely a matter of private choice. But the proponents of Family Values
>seems willing to accept *this* alternative to traditional family values.
>Why?
I would think any proponent of Family Values would tell you the divorce
rate is a catastrophe and that no-fault divorce is a bad thing. One
thing to bear in mind, though, is that Family Values types, like
conservatives generally, aren't politically active by nature and tend to
become active only when someone else starts making changes they don't
like. That's the origin of the expression "reactionary". It wasn't
Family Values types who made gay rights an issue, it was gay activists
and their sympathizers who wanted to change the _status quo_. Nothing
similar is going on just now in connection with divorce.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Oct 26 14:54:11 EDT 1993
Article: 8162 of sci.philosophy.meta
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Honor and Unhappiness
Date: 26 Oct 1993 09:07:23 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 34
Distribution: inet
Message-ID: <2aj7eb$gf7@panix.com>
References: <1993Oct24.182731.23432@midway.uchicago.edu> <2af31v$m6u@panix.com> <1993Oct26.033110.10679@midway.uchicago.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:10316 sci.philosophy.meta:8162
azlerner@quads.uchicago.edu (asia z lerner) writes:
>Again, on one hand, you interpretation [of seppuku] could be right, on
>the other, mine could be correct.
The obvious reason for choosing such a stupefyingly painful and
difficult method of suicide is to exclude your "choosing the more
appealing of two experiences" interpretation in favor of my "acting in
accordance with the concept of honor" interpretation.
>>One might view our hero's action as similar to a choice in the previous
>>example to live an unhappy real life rather than a happy illusory life
>>as a brain in a vat in that both reflect a choice of the true over the
>>pleasant.
>
>??? Not sure how to understand your last passage, as you seem to be
>arguing against you position, since you are bringing an example
>were the actor does compare two possible futures, rather than act
>algorithmically.
The point of the "brain in a vat" example was that if you made up your
mind by comparing future experiences you would choose to become a brain
in a vat. Since it is possible that someone would choose an unhappy
real life over a happy vat life, and since such a choice does not seem
irrational, it appears that there are rational ways of making decisions
other than comparing future experiences. Both the decision to stay out
of the vat and the decision to commit seppuku seem to me good examples
of that latter type of decision.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Oct 26 18:11:05 EDT 1993
Article: 842 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: Is there more to life than politics?
Date: 26 Oct 1993 18:10:57 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 28
Message-ID: <2ak79h$jdd@panix.com>
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deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>> Charles Murray's political ideal seems to be very close to
>>libertarianism, in part because he thinks that people who start off
>>acting in their self-interest will end up transcending self-interest
>>through the creation of social norms as long as the welfare state
>doesn't spare them the need to do so.
>
>I'll go along with this reasoning up to a point, but all of this assumes
>that a neutral "state of nature" is somehow a real possibility, which is
>not the case.
The analysis can nonetheless be useful. I don't know how you can start
thinking about something as complicated as human society unless you
start by thinking about it in an oversimplified way. The idea is to ask
what would happen if you put a bunch of unconnected individuals together
who have only certain specified characteristics, and infer that if the
characteristics are ones that almost everyone has and that determine a
lot of human conduct (e.g., hunger, sociability, language) then the
things that happen in the hypothetical society will tend to happen in
real societies unless there is a reason they don't.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Oct 26 18:14:04 EDT 1993
Article: 843 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: politics
Date: 26 Oct 1993 18:13:48 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>>One could say that the Administration's current policy of not hiring
>>assassins to eliminate open opponents of liberalism is political in
>>nature.
>
>Tell that to the folks in Waco or in Idaho. :-/
Touche. Come to think of it, we haven't heard from some of the a.r.c.
regulars lately . . .
>The problem is that customary understandings of the Good have been
>otherthown and hence everything is up for grabs.
If everything is up for grabs then victory will go to the best grabbers
and the problem will be how to survive the dark ages. Not exactly a
political problem.
>I observe that many of the "politicalization" of things that
>conservatives complain about do not directly involve government -
>indeed, some of the worst occur where govt. is not directly involved at
>all - academia, the media, culture in general.
To politicalize something is to view it as essentially related to
contingent power relations that can appropriately be either supported or
countered by government action. For example, from a feminist standpoint
high heeled shoes are political because they are essentially related to
the power relationships of patriarchal society, which the government
should destroy root and branch.
>But failure to confront the fact that "politics" has indeed been
>expanded [ . . . ] seems to me to be symptomatic of a conservative
>mindset that can only grasp the concept of fighting rear-guard actions
>and trying to restore the status quo ante - a defensive posture unlikely
>to bring victory of any sort.
You can confront facts and respond by arguing vigorously in favor of
limitations on politics. One argument, of course, is that to put all
constitutional issues of the proper sphere and modes of politics up for
grabs is to accept civil war and tyranny. The difficulty, of course, is
getting general agreement on any particular limitations (the ones I
favor, for example). You'll never persuade everyone, but all you can do
is argue for the limitations you favor and hope to get enough people to
agree with you to define the mainstream.
>Now, you have mentioned a "cultural" strategy and I agree with you.
>However, are you not guilty of justifying a cultural struggle for
>*political* ends, as you once noted of G.R.E.C.E.'s cultural strategy?
The strategy relates to the political culture and its means and ends are
appropriate to that -- the general acceptance of a certain conception of
politics and the political.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Oct 26 18:14:19 EDT 1993
Article: 8182 of sci.philosophy.meta
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Honor and Unhappiness
Date: 26 Oct 1993 18:08:58 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 43
Distribution: inet
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Xref: panix talk.philosophy.misc:10338 sci.philosophy.meta:8182
azlerner@quads.uchicago.edu (asia z lerner) writes:
>We have just agreed, have we not, that it makes no sense to conflate the
>physically pleasant and the morally pleasant.
>
>Seppuku - a way to avoid spiritual pain at price of physical pain.
You seem to suggest in the first sentence that the physically pleasant
and the morally pleasant can not be weighed against each other, and in the
second sentence that the physically painful and the spiritually painful
can be weighed against each other.
>If the chooser prefers the "real" over the "unreal", than it's not the
>case that he doesn't concider future possibilities, it's that the
>criterium of the choice is not "pleasantness" but "reality".
My point is only that if reality is the criterion then the agent is not
making a decision based on perceptible qualities of future experiences
(like pleasure or pain) because reality is not such a quality.
>The vat situation does, in fact, allow a choice between pleasant/fake
>and unpleasant/real, while seppuku gives you the choice between two
>kinds of unpleasantness - that of the spirit and that of the body.
Again, I am not sure how your comment on seppuku here is consistent with
your sentence first above quoted.
I would say seppuku gives you a choice between (i) less unpleasant
(staying alive or taking sleeping pills)/false to your understanding of
what you are, and (ii) more unpleasant (committing seppuku)/true to your
understanding of what you are.
We seem to be repeating ourselves, or at least I am. Has the time come
to put the discussion aside for a while? If you want you can have the
last word. I have to go compose something abusing Michael Feld for
saying that something I posted sounded reasonable. (I don't want to,
really, but otherwise I won't live up to my conception of a true
participant in these discussions.)
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From rec.arts.books Wed Oct 27 12:15:36 1993
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: rec.arts.books,talk.philosophy.misc,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination
Date: 27 Oct 1993 09:51:16 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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Xref: panix rec.arts.books:64664 talk.philosophy.misc:10352 talk.politics.theory:16836
jaskew@maths.adelaide.edu.au (Joseph Askew) writes:
>>>Confucians insist quite strong on the existence of an objective reality
>>>and morality.
>
>I would claim that this is the most important step towards a
>Bill of Rights. Once the idea of an objective moral order exists
>what it does and does not require is an area open to speculation
>and ennumerating.
Many political thinkers (Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas) have thought there
is an objective moral order but have said nothing about the need for a
Bill of Rights. On the other hand, in American law schools both the
Bill of Rights and moral relativism are quite popular and people link
the two -- realism as to morals is thought to lead to a readiness to
tell other people what to do and therefore to political
authoritarianism, while general acceptance of moral relativism is
thought to lead to the adoption of a Bill of Rights to protect people's
ability to pursue their idiosyncratic tastes.
An objective moral order might consist of a system of rights, a system
of duties or a system of goods to be promoted. A moral order of the
first type seems naturally to lead to a Bill of Rights. A Bill of
Rights might also turn out to be useful in attempting to realize an
order of the second or third type, but that strikes me as a highly
contingent matter.
>What has the BofR ever stopped a government from doing?
An interesting question. It's worth noting that the effect of a BofR is
only what the responsible authorities think it should have. In the
United States the dominant view seems to be that the responsible
authorities are not bound by the text or any concrete historical
understanding of our BofR but may interpret it quite freely by reference
to their understanding of evolving social values and current
circumstances.
>>Also,
>>in the United States when people talk of the Bill of Rights they mean
>>the Bill of Rights interpreted in a way that I think *is* inconsistent
>>with Confucianism. (I don't know the situation in Australia.)
>
>Well we don't have one, but how is the US BofR incompatible with
>Confucianism? I don't remember them all myself but I don't see
>anything that would be opposed to C. principles.
It's the interpretation rather than the text. For example, the US BofR
is interpreted to say that the government can't make distinctions based
on certain sorts of family roles and relationships. Thus, the
government can't distinguish husbands from wives or legitimate from
illegitimate children. That seems to me inconsistent at least in
tendency with the Confucian view that the good society starts by
recognizing and cultivating family relationships, understood as rather
concrete sets of duties to particular people that one is usually born
into and that cannot be derived from principles of equal rights or
contract. (The US BofR does not in so many words forbid distinctions of
the sort mentioned. Rather, it says that nobody shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law, which has been
interpreted to prohibit various sorts of inequality of treatment.)
>Confucius states that charity begins at home (well not those exact
>words) and this idea is not very communal. He does say that the morally
>righteous gentleman has a responsibility to serve society in whatever
>way possible, but not that this comes at the expense of your own
>family.
All true.
>This is the very opposite of communal - your first responsibility is NOT
>to the larger group but to your local groups first.
The idea seems to be that your responsibilities to your parents and so
on are part of a larger system of things that brings about general
well-being. As you point out, you discharge your immediate
responsibilities before you go on to anything more grand, but it seems
to me that the overall system is needed to define and make sense of your
particular responsibilities to family and so on. Perhaps one could say
that the good of the world at large is brought about (and largely
constituted) by cultivation of the concrete social relations in which
each person finds himself.
Confucius' comments on rulers are worth noting in this regard. He
doesn't view their primary obligations as dynastic, and he comments that
a ruler who "not only conferred wide benefits upon the common people,
but also compassed the salvation of the whole State" would be a "Divine
Sage". _Analects_ vi, 28 (Waley trans.).
For some reason, no better word than "communal" comes to mind to refer
to the aspect of Confucius' thought that relates to the well-being of
society at large. Any other suggestions would be welcome, though.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From rec.arts.books Wed Oct 27 12:15:36 1993
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: rec.arts.books,talk.philosophy.misc,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination -- Confucianism and Bill of Rights
Date: 27 Oct 1993 10:10:26 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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Xref: panix rec.arts.books:64667 talk.philosophy.misc:10353 talk.politics.theory:16838
wojdylo@maths.uwa.oz.au (INFIDEL) writes:
>##I didn't mean to suggest the contrary, only that if left to himself the
>##idea of a Bill of Rights would probably not occur to a Confucian.
>
>Really? How about a Confucian living in the confused mess of a late 20'th
>century city ?
"When the Way prevails under Heaven, then show yourself; when it does
not prevail, then hide." _Analects_ vii, 13 (Waley trans.). An
exception would be a situation in which a gentleman thought there was a
prospect that he could cause the Way to prevail by his moral force.
Confucius and multiculturalism don't go well together.
How someone who valued the things Confucius valued would deal with New
York City in 1993, assuming he was stuck here and there was no prospect
that the Way would ever prevail but he nonetheless wanted to take part
in public life, is not a question I have a good answer for. Possibly he
would try to set up his own little Confucian community and take part in
public life only defensively. It's not clear to me that a Bill of
Rights would necessarily be part of his strategy, though, because he
would want to protect the independence and integrity of his Confucian
community and Bills of Rights are designed to protect individual
autonomy, which is not the same thing.
>##I was uncertain whether to use the word "communal", but "familial and
>##hierarchical" didn't seem to be enough because Confucius' concern was
>##with government, which he thought should benefit all under Heaven.
>
>Heaven is not a place, but a state of being.
I was under the impression that "all under Heaven" meant "China", "the
known world", or something of the sort.
>"Entire society" makes no sense to the traditional oriental mind. It's
>an ethnocentric abstraction you've been taught in primary school.
See my comment on "all under Heaven", and also the "Divine Sage"
quotation in my post responding to Mr. Askew. What do you think a
Confucian ruler of a state would concern himself with?
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Thu Oct 28 10:03:58 EDT 1993
Article: 10391 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: rec.arts.books,talk.philosophy.misc,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Unjust Discrimination -- Confucianism and Bill of Rights
Date: 28 Oct 1993 10:03:49 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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Xref: panix rec.arts.books:64787 talk.philosophy.misc:10391 talk.politics.theory:16863
jaskew@maths.adelaide.edu.au (Joseph Askew) writes:
>>any society contemplating a BoR that guarantees individual rights ipso
>>facto recognizes objective reality;
>
>Agreed. A society that does not recognise it will not contemplate a BoR.
There could be a society in which the dominant class of people did not
recognize objective moral reality and agreed that there would be a BofR
because each wanted to do his own thing and they were afraid that moral
absolutists might get into power and start ordering them around.
>>for, idealism entails that one holds
>>on to and consolidates one's power over others, one cannot cede it to another
>>individual and remain an idealist. A BoR is a release of one's power over
>>other individuals: it's a people setting each other free.
>
>This is an interesting definition of the word idealist.
For Mr. Wojdylo, an "idealist" seems to be someone who views his own
ideas as binding on other people. I'm not sure he distinguishes between
someone who thinks an idea is binding on other people simply because it
is his and someone who, because he considers an idea to be true, (i)
makes the idea his own and (ii) views it as binding on other people.
>So the Rectification of Names is materialist? How did this piece of
>quasi-Marxist European nonsense enter into this discussion?
For Mr. Wojdylo, "materialist" seems to mean "realist" as opposed to
"nominalist".
>The fact that the High Court should consider a Bill of Rights necessary
>is a sure sign that it is not.
Since the function of a BofR is to transfer power to the High Court it's
natural the High Court would think it a good idea.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Thu Oct 28 12:21:05 EDT 1993
Article: 64789 of rec.arts.books
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: rec.arts.books,talk.philosophy.misc,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Confucius and the Bill of Rights (was: Unjust Discrimination)
Date: 28 Oct 1993 10:10:49 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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Xref: panix rec.arts.books:64789 talk.philosophy.misc:10392 talk.politics.theory:16864
jaskew@maths.adelaide.edu.au (Joseph Askew) writes:
>>Many political thinkers (Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas) have thought there
>>is an objective moral order but have said nothing about the need for a
>>Bill of Rights.
>
>It is only a step! However these thinkers started to put limits
>on government action that lead to the idea of a Bill of Rights
>Recognising an objective moral order by its very nature limits
>the power and authority of government. Actions can be judged and
>there is a powerful concept of recourse to higher morality. A
>seminal concept in politcs.
I agree. A BofR is only one way of implementing that concept, though.
It seems to me that both Aquinas and the Confucians gave the higher
morality practical efficacy by making it the special concern of a
particular body of men (the clergy or the scholars) who did not as such
have political power but were the group from whom high-ranking civil
servants were drawn, and by declaring revolution legitimate if things
got bad enough. (I don't know whether Confucians ever said revolution
could be legitimate, but that's what the notion of a change in the
mandate of Heaven seems to amount to.) I suppose one could say that
Aristotle tried to limit power by institutional means (the preference
for a mixed polity) and Plato by inculcating reverence for unchanging
laws.
I think a BofR won't do much in the absence of appropriate social,
cultural and institutional conditions of the type the foregoing thinkers
were concerned with. My recollection is that the more acute disputants
in the debates over the adoption of the U.S. constitutions agreed with
that view. The authors of the _Federalist_ thought they had assigned
and distributed the powers of government in such a way that tyranny
would not occur, and a BofR would be irrelevant or worse (to put
explicit limits on tyranny in a constitution suggests that the
constitution should be read in such a way that the explicit limits
forbid something the government could otherwise do). The
antifederalists argued that given the powers the proposed federal
government had (for example, an unlimited power to tax and to raise
armies) it didn't matter what else the Constitution said because in
practice the federal government would be able to do what it wanted.
Both federalists and antifederalists were also very much aware of
particular conditions in the United States that made liberty a realistic
possibility (the general diffusion of property, the absence of armed and
dangerous neighbors, the particular religious traditions of the people).
Some arguments for the creation of a broad scope for judicial review by
means of a BofR do take these kinds of considerations into account. One
argument is that a broad scope for judicial review lets the Supreme
Court or maybe the elite of the legal profession play the sort of role
that Aquinas gave to the clergy and Confucianists to the scholars. I'm
doubtful that the argument is a good one because it seems to me that law
as such does not have enough ethical content for the legal profession to
be viewed as the ultimate custodians of the ethical basis of society.
Maybe that shows I'm not a Kantian. Another argument is that it divides
power and therefore prevents tyranny. That argument is weakened to the
extent various branches of the government (the Supreme Court, Congress,
federal administrative agencies) tend to reflect the views of a coherent
national elite. The current extraordinarily high rate of re-election to
Congress seems relevant to this issue because it suggests that Congress
has developed a certain independence from the views of the electorate.
(See _The United States of Ambition_, a recent book arguing that
currently the holders of elective office are simply the people who love
government and so are willing to make the necessary effort to get
elected.) A final argument is that judicial review confers a seal of
approval on the laws that increases the reverence in which they are
held. That might be true, but it doesn't tend to show that the laws so
revered will not in fact be tyrannical.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Thu Oct 28 12:21:07 EDT 1993
Article: 64791 of rec.arts.books
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: rec.arts.books,talk.philosophy.misc,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Confucius and the Bill of Rights (was: Unjust Discrimination)
Date: 28 Oct 1993 10:19:19 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 68
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Xref: panix rec.arts.books:64791 talk.philosophy.misc:10394 talk.politics.theory:16866
wojdylo@maths.uwa.oz.au (INFIDEL) writes:
>#A system of duties is what the Confucians are more likely to
>#turn out. Whether this works with a Bill of Rights is questionable
>#I guess.
>
>So, you obviously don't see rights as entailing obligations.
The issue would be whether obligations entail rights and whether the
entailed rights capture enough of the obligations so that it would be
appropriate to make a list of rights fundamental to a political system.
No doubt in some circumstances it would.
>##It's worth noting that the effect of a BofR is
>##only what the responsible authorities think it should have.
>
>Love the way you jump in to blame "responsible authorities". Do you
>expect the government to wipe your arse too?
>From a practical standpoint a BofR means what judges say it means.
Judges are responsible authorities.
>There's no guarantee that BoR will work out, certainly; but I bet you
>can't come up with examples of how it could fail.
A provision protecting freedom of speech from government interference
could be interpreted to forbid government action that contributes to
maintaining social structures leading to the marginalization of
homosexuals and other minorities and the consequent exclusion of their
views from public discourse. Someone complains that permitting the
government-regulated telephone system to carry Mr. Zeleny's posts
violates freedom of speech and the case comes before Judge John Collier,
who notes he is bound by the foregoing interpretation and that the
government's action in the case before him also appears to violate other
guarantees, such as the implicit guarantee of equal treatment that (as
in the U.S.) has been discovered to be part of the explicit guarantee of
due process and the implicit right to privacy that (again as in the
U.S.) had been discovered somewhere or other and that he holds includes
in Australia the right to sexual self-determination (note: in the U.S.
the right to privacy has been held to include the right to have an
abortion but in a much-criticized decision the Supreme Court has held it
does not include a general right to engage in consensual sodomy).
>##In the
>##United States the dominant view seems to be that the responsible
>##authorities are not bound by the text or any concrete historical
>##understanding of our BofR but may interpret it quite freely by reference
>##to their understanding of evolving social values and current
>##circumstances.
>
>The general course is set by the document, precedents set the
>particulars, as you say.
Precedents evolve and get reversed. The limitations on what the courts
do are mostly institutional -- judges get embarrassed and will
eventually lose authority if their decisions don't hang together in a
reasonably coherent system that in turn coheres with the considered
views dominant among national governing elites. What the document meant
originally is not particularly important. How could it be? The people
who wrote it don't have much influence on the process because they're
all dead.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Fri Oct 29 09:58:24 EDT 1993
Article: 64913 of rec.arts.books
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: rec.arts.books,talk.philosophy.misc,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Confucius and the Bill of Rights (was: Unjust Discrimination)
Date: 29 Oct 1993 09:57:52 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 87
Message-ID: <2ar7h0$jsp@panix.com>
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Xref: panix rec.arts.books:64913 talk.philosophy.misc:10414 talk.politics.theory:16891
wojdylo@maths.uwa.oz.au (INFIDEL) writes:
>[ . . . ] concrete relations with family and superiors form the core of
>the ethics. The latter is not objective to the extent that it forms a
>village/enterprise centred world view [ . . . ]
Concrete relations with family and superiors are central to the ethics,
but I don't think the ethics can be reduced to such relations:
As for Goodness -- you yourself desire rank and standing; then
help others to get rank and standing. You want to turn your own
merits to account; then help others to turn theirs to account --
in fact, the ability to take one's own feelings a a guide --
that is the sort of thing that lies in the direction of
Goodness. _Analects_ vi, 28 (Waley trans.).
It's true that Confucius didn't think that our ethical life typically
consists in direct and simple-minded application of the Golden Rule, but
it seems to me that for him concrete obligations exist within a setting
and the ultimate setting is one of objectivity. That is not to say that
actual Confucians are likely to have as broad a perspective as the
Master. That is also not to say that Confucius distinguished between
objectivity and the content of Chinese tradition. On the other hand,
I'm not sure he had occasion to do so.
>Since common law actions will give the BofR substance, it's the people,
>to a significant extent, who decide what it entails.
The U.S. BofR typically develops through the enterprise of advocacy
groups like the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, who seek out plaintiffs with
cases that will present the Supreme Court with an occasion to establish
or expand some legal principle with which they know the Court to have
some sympathy. If the group has judged the Court's mood correctly they
have a win. Unless they've grossly misjudged the Court's mood they are
not likely to have a clear loss since the Court can refuse to decide any
issue it doesn't want to decide. (It can refuse to decide any appeal by
refusing to grant _certiorari_ or issuing a summary affirmance with no
precedential value, and if it does take a case it can decide it on
narrow or otherwise doctrinally useless grounds.)
>Cases are added onto the body of common law; they refine the meaning of
>the original document. The Court is bound by the body of precedent.
That's more accurate as a description of what a court does in a system
in which Parliament is supreme. If a precedent is bad it is the
responsibility of Parliament to change it, so it's sensible for the
Court to view itself as bound by the terms of a document as refined by
its own precedents. If you have judicial review, though, so that
Parliament is bound by whatever the Court's interpretation of the
fundamental document happens to be, then the only body that can change
bad precedents is the Court itself and therefore the Court will view it
as part of its job to do so. Of course, the Court will also have the
exclusive power to decide exactly which precedents are bad and what
constitutes badness. Very likely inconsistency with a changed political
culture will be found to constitute badness, because otherwise the Court
will find itself coming out with decision after decision that it and
everyone it respects think are stupid, and if the Court decides to
change its doctrine to suit the times there's no one who can tell it not
to and the people the Court respects will praise them for it. What
doctrines suit the times are of course a matter for the Court to decide,
although as a practical matter the Court's views are unlikely to vary
much or long from those of national governing elites. What other
standard can the Court look to other than the views of the people it
knows and respects?
The net effect of all the above is that to establish judicial review is
to give increased power to national governing elites to the extent there
is a consensus among such elites, without much limiting how that power
will be used. The alarmed response to proposals for a new
constitutional convention in the United States bear out that view, I
think. It may of course be a good idea for national governing elites to
have lots of power, but it seems to me that it is that issue that is
fundamental and should be debated rather than (for example) whether free
speech is a good thing and deserves more extensive protection. The
protection could be granted by statute, so the real issue is the
distribution of power.
Incidentally, I'm not quite sure why someone who thinks "rectifying
names" is a piece of folly would think that a text like a BofR would
much restrain government action. If words mean only what people make
them mean then the same is true of a BofR.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Oct 30 20:53:49 EDT 1993
Article: 10445 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: money vs. labor
Date: 30 Oct 1993 18:47:53 -0400
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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sharvy@reed.edu (V Headshape) writes:
>Is there any moral distinction between a person's labor and what he
>exchanges it for? That is, if the state is justified in forcibly taking
>a person's money for, say, a food-stamp program, does it then follow
>that the state has a right to force labor for said food-stamp program?
Not automatically. It seems to me that one could believe that the state
has the right to compel people to support it economically and that a
food-stamp program is a permissible exercise of state power and still
demand that the state choose the method of compelling economic support
that least burdens the freedom of the people. A demand for money leaves
the people with more choices how they will satisfy the demand than a
demand for labor and so infringes freedom less. Courts deal with an
analogous issue in considering whether they will award specific
performance of a contract or only monetary damages. (In the absence of
special conditions they will only award the latter.)
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Oct 31 08:13:49 EST 1993
Article: 10453 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: money vs. labor
Date: 31 Oct 1993 08:11:09 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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sharvy@reed.edu (V Headshape) writes:
>>A demand for money leaves
>>the people with more choices how they will satisfy the demand than a
>>demand for labor and so infringes freedom less.
>
>An offer that you may choose your poison, rather than have your head
>whacked off, leaves you with more choices, but doesn't infringe your
>freedom any less.
If I were condemned to be executed and had the choice of decapitation or
drinking hemlock, and then I was told I was stuck with decapitation, I
would feel a deprivation.
If your point is that a death sentence is such a gross deprivation of
freedom that any freedoms that are left to you seem insignificant by
comparison, I suppose I agree. However, the freedoms that are left to
me when the government tells me I have to give them 30% or 50% of my
income seem quite substantial, and I would far prefer (from the
standpoint of retaining as much freedom of choice as possible) to be
required to give that proportion of my income to the government than to
spend that proportion of my economically productive time doing unpaid
work assigned me by the government.
I would agree, by the way, that the distinction between taxation and
forced labor is one of degree. So if some government program is
important enough, and imposing taxes and paying people for carrying out
the program is impractical, then forced labor could be justified. A
military draft in wartime would be an example. The essence of
government is compulsion for some public good, and I don't see any way
as a matter of ultimate principle to determine how much compulsion is
justifiable than through a judgment of how great the good is and how
much compulsion is actually needed. (In actual practice, of course, a
government official is and should be guided by the standards that have
grown up in his particular society rather than deciding based on his own
interpretation of the requirements of ultimate principle.)
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Oct 31 17:29:20 EST 1993
Article: 65059 of rec.arts.books
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.activism.d,alt.activism,talk.politics.misc,soc.culture.usa,rec.arts.books,alt.politics.reform,alt.politics.usa.misc,alt.politics.radical-left
Subject: Re: Orwell, was Chomsky -- Why no socialism in W. Europe?
Date: 31 Oct 1993 14:49:08 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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newman@garnet.berkeley.edu (Nathan Newman) writes:
>Income is not a return to assets; it is the method by which we as a
>society allocate housing, health care, and food.
"We as a society allocate" strikes me as metaphor, since there is in
fact no decisionmaker. To take the metaphor seriously, and demand that
the allocation consequences be fair that we treat as decisions by taking
the metaphor seriously, amounts to requiring that the allocation of the
goods you mention be administered by the government. Do you think life
would be better for people generally if that were done? Quite apart
from economist's arguments about the inefficiency of command economies,
it strikes me that there would be a rather serious danger of tyranny.
I don't think "yes, life would be better because it would be juster" is
a good answer. Since it would seem juster only as a result of taking
the "we as a society allocate" metaphor seriously, it seems something of
a bootstrap argument to treat justice as a reason for taking that
metaphor seriously.
>When you say it is better to allow children to go hungry so that
>Michael Milliken can make half a billion dollars in a year, you are
>making a statement about the worth of one person versus another.
To the extent it's true that a system that didn't give Michael M. much
scope for making lots of money would have fewer hungry children, that is
of course an argument for such a system. Of course, the system might
have other disadvantages. Also, administered economies often enough
succeed in keeping people from getting rich, but at the cost of
increased poverty and suffering for those who aren't rich. The odd
thing about the way you put it is that it seems to suggest that total
output is fixed, so that someone can get rich only by making others
poorer to the same degree.
>Stick the richest, most brillant person on a desert island by himself
>and their day-to-life will be no better than any average subsistence
>farmer. It is only the work of other people that make a creative
>invention worth anything. The idea that a single person creates
>anything of great wealth outside of a massive interdependence is what
>makes talk of "return to productive assets" so silly.
And stick an American factory worker on the same island and his material
standard of living will fall because (among other reasons) he can no longer
take advantage of all the inventors, entrepreneurs, managers and investors
who contributed to making his job in America comparatively so productive and
so remunerative. The fact of massive interdependence doesn't make the
notion of determining what each contributes to production a silly one. For
example, one might ask how much production would go down if someone stopped
making his particular contribution and identify that as the amount he ought
to be paid. (My impression is that in an absolutely perfect free market in
equilibrium in theory that *is* the amount he would be paid; perhaps some
economist can tell us whether I'm right on that point.)
>The rich take advantage of the work of others. Occasionally, their
>work is above average and they use that advantage to leverage a bit of
>wealth from every other person upon whom their work is dependent.
You use the word "leverage" here and elsewhere. What do you understand by
it? Usually, "leverage" refers to buying things on borrowed money, so that
the purchaser, in exchange for a much greater risk of losing his whole
investment, has a chance for a much greater profit. The classic leveraged
transaction is an unconstrained transaction at arm's length among people who
know what they're doing and agree as to the division of risks and rewards.
You seem to be using the term in a metaphorical sense to refer to some sort
of unfair advantage without explaining how the advantage arises.
>Real estate is a classic example of this. I can buy land cheaply.
>Without doing a damn bit of work, if other work hard and build stores,
>factories and homes in the area, suddenly I will be wealthier because
>of their work and the increase in property values. But it was other
>people's work, not my own, that made me rich in that case.
I'm not sure why this is more of an example of leveraging than someone
who finds that with particular skills and a particular degree of effort
he can make a lot more money in 1993 than he could have in 1943 or 1893.
It was things other people did and not anything he did that made the
difference.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Oct 31 20:54:15 EST 1993
Article: 10466 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: money vs. labor
Date: 31 Oct 1993 19:12:21 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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sharvy@reed.edu (V Headshape) writes:
>Suppose you are unemployed. Does it follow that the government has the
>right to force you to work for it (say, picking up litter from
>roadsides), given that the government has the right to confiscate what
>you'd exchange your work for were you employed, in order to, say, pick
>up litter.
As I mentioned, I think taxation is a lot better way than forced labor
for the government to get whatever resources it needs to do whatever it
does, because taxation places less of a burden on people's freedom.
Since picking up litter seems like something that could readily be taken
care of by hiring people to do it out of tax revenues I don't see the
need for the establishment of a corvee system.
Maybe the issue you're raising is what to do about people who benefit
from government but don't support it by paying taxes because they don't
have much income. If that strikes you as unjust and you want to do
something about it I would suggest a poll tax with the right to satisfy
the tax in kind (by labor) rather than a corvee system. Then people
could decide for themselves how to go about satisfying their obligation.
Incidentally, "the right to confiscate what you'd exchange your work
for" sounds like the right to take everything, which is not the kind of
tax I'm talking about. I agree that a right to take everything would be
very much like forced labor.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Nov 1 13:08:16 EST 1993
Article: 65125 of rec.arts.books
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.activism.d,alt.activism,talk.politics.misc,soc.culture.usa,rec.arts.books,alt.politics.reform,alt.politics.usa.misc,alt.politics.radical-left
Subject: Re: Orwell, was Chomsky -- Why no socialism in W. Europe?
Date: 1 Nov 1993 10:33:39 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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newman@garnet.berkeley.edu (Nathan Newman) writes:
>>>Income is not a return to assets; it is the method by which we as a
>>>society allocate housing, health care, and food.
>
>Every time we adjust tax rates, we as a society are making decisions.
>Every time we strengthen or weaken unions, we are making decisions.
>Every time we enforce non-discrimination laws, we are making decisions.
>
>Each of these adjust the incomes of different groups. Not perfectly
>but decisions are made.
In the United States various political decisions affect but do not
determine the income of various groups. The effect on the income of
particular individuals is in most cases not that great. In either case
the effects are not nearly as great as the effects of non-political
factors.
Often enough the effects aren't at all what was intended. For example,
environmental and zoning rules in California have greatly increased the
net worth of people who happened to own houses at the time the rules
went into effect and reduced the economic well-being of later arrivals
and the income of people in the construction industry. Minimum wage
laws help some low-income people by raising wage scales at the bottom
end but hurt others by making employers more reluctant to hire. Most
variations in income don't have much to do with such decisions in any
case. There was no political decision that Bill Gates or Michael Milken
should make tons of money in the 1980's, or that Donald Trump should
make tons of money in the early 80's and lose tons of money in the late
80's.
I don't see how the circumstance that we now have spotty government
intervention in the economy with erratic and unpredictable effects on the
income of classes and individuals reasonably suggests that we already have a
system of administered incomes that ought to be tightened up and
administered more justly, which is what the point your language first quoted
seems to lead to.
>The S&L bailout was one of the larger income redistribution schemes of
>recent years--a lot of big decisions there.
If you view it as an income redistribution scheme, who is it from and who is
it to? The extra cost is one of the reasons for increasing the top tax
brackets, so maybe it will end up being from top tax bracket taxpayers
generally to people who hold S&L securities, whoever they are. The real
problem, of course, is that the government stupidly guaranteed the S&L
securities in the first place. (The people who own the securities are only
getting back money they lent with a government guarantee of repayment, so
maybe it's unreasonable to think of them as beneficiaries of a bailout or
redistribution of income.) Maybe the real transfer was a gift to the real
estate industry of the right to borrow money at low rates through S&Ls
entitled to issue government-guaranteed CDs in amounts of up to $100,000. I
suppose the beneficiaries of that gift included the real estate industry and
everyone who deals with that industry (for example, everyone with a place to
live). How can it be determined, as a general thing, who got what benefit
and whether the beneficiaries are on average richer or poorer than those who
are now paying the bill, especially when the situation has contributed to
pressure for an increase in the top marginal rates?
>No one deserves more than they could produce by themselves on a desert
>island. Everything above that they owe to their participation in the
>rest of society.
If you think people should be as free as possible to do as they choose,
then it seems reasonable to think that each person should have the right
to get paid the amount by which the efforts he chooses to make increase
total social output. A man could have chosen to do nothing. Instead he
chooses to work and social output goes up $100. Why shouldn't he get
the $100? Who has more of a right to it than he does?
>[Examples of leverage are] monopolies granted by the government (called
>patents and copyrights),
What's objectionable about the idea of intellectual property?
>control by a small minority of available capital,
If this happened it would be a case of special privileges conferred on
some rich people at the expense of other rich people.
>control of limited Univerity resources for biotech or other orporate
>welfare systems for the well-placed. The list goes on.
I can't comment for lack of a clear idea what you have in mind.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Nov 1 20:44:19 EST 1993
Article: 65167 of rec.arts.books
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.activism.d,alt.activism,talk.politics.misc,soc.culture.usa,rec.arts.books,alt.politics.reform,alt.politics.usa.misc,alt.politics.radical-left
Subject: Re: Orwell, was Chomsky
Date: 1 Nov 1993 17:21:34 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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newman@garnet.berkeley.edu (Nathan Newman) writes:
>>In the United States various political decisions affect but do not
>>determine the income of various groups. The effect on the income of
>>particular individuals is in most cases not that great. In either case
>>the effects are not nearly as great as the effects of non-political
>>factors.
>
>What are "non-political" factors? Usually, that means the private deals
>that benefit the rich at the benefit of the poor outside the glare of
>public debate?
Some businesses grow and some shrink based on changes in technology and
consumer preferences, good or bad management and so on. Within any
business some do well and some do badly based on some combination of
talent, effort, ability to see opportunities and to adapt to
circumstances, and luck. You are certainly right that all these things
have to do with private deals (like someone taking one job rather than
another) that are outside the glare of public debate, and that the
people who benefit most from such deals almost by definition are the
people who get rich.
>Deregulation of the financial markets was a political decisions and
>without it Milliken could not have done what he did. Trump benefited
>from tax changes made in the later 70s and 1981, and he is the first to admit
>that the 1986 tax law killed him by making real estate speculation less
>profitable.
You are perfectly right that whatever the laws are define the conditions
under which someone can get rich, and that the laws can keep someone
from getting rich in a business by regulating it sufficiently or make a
particular line of business temporarily more profitable by granting it a
new subsidy or removing an old burden or make it temporarily less
profitable by doing the reverse. That doesn't mean that the laws
typically determine who in particular gets rich or poor or grant special
strategic advantages to particular people or classes of people. Milken,
Gates and Trump (especially the first two -- Trump started off with a
lot of money) didn't have opportunities that weren't available to any
number of other people. They were simply better than other people at
seeing and taking advantage of opportunities offered by changed
circumstances. (I'm talking about the legal things Milken did, which I
believe were sufficient to make him a very rich man.)
>The government brakes strikes in transportation all the time because it
>argues that just because truckers and railway workers are vital for the
>rest of the economy, that doesn't mean they should be able to demand
>higher wages by threatening not to do their job.
>
>Conservatives argue that the rich should get whatever pay their position
>gets them in the economy, but then support restrictions on unions that
>would hand higher wages to the most strategically place workers.
If the government gets involved in strikes in a particular industry they're
likely to get involved in setting rates charged customers as well. The
government regulates railway rates because, as you observe, it's considered
a strategically placed industry. They used to do the same for trucking, but
now they seem to rely more on competition to keep rates down in that
industry. And when was the last time the government broke a trucking
strike?
>>What's objectionable about the idea of intellectual property?
>
>It's a government-granted monopoly. It's absolutely anti-competitive and
>promotes a police state where the government must monitor people's home
>computers to find out whether they are breaking the law.
It's typical for the owner of property to monopolize the right to use the
property. I suppose the issues are whether recognizing intellectual
property is just and whether it is beneficial to society. It doesn't seem
unjust to me to say that the producer of some intellectual good should have
the right to control its use for a period of years, or to transfer that
right to someone (like to his employer in exchange for a salary). And to
the extent patent and copyright law encourage people to produce intellectual
goods and not keep them as trade secrets it seems likely that they benefit
society in general.
>Usually a copyright or patent takes the work of hundreds/thousands of
>programmers and hands right to that work for a set number of years to a
>different group of stockholders. That is a form of intellectual slavery
>that exchanges not just my work for a set of wages, but hands the fruit of
>that labor in perpetuity for that work.
If someone employs you to make something, whether it's a car or a computer
program, it's usual for the thing you make to become the absolute property
of your employer. I don't see anything different about intellectual
property in that regard.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Nov 2 06:51:34 EST 1993
Article: 10512 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.meta,rec.arts.books
Subject: Re: Poetry, Gay Youth Suicide -- Camus
Date: 2 Nov 1993 06:50:46 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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nikolay@husc8.harvard.edu (Philip Nikolayev) writes:
>> I read "every life is precious, especially other people's" drily, as
>> a maxim by which do-gooders like Jim Kalb live each day.
>
>The glib insinuation, at no extra charge, that it's stupid to see
>every human life is precious, is in itself a narcissistic,
>self-romanticising pronouncement.
Is the attribution of a maxim to a group someone defines in part by my
membership a glib insinuation that the maxim is stupid? (I don't object if
it is, I'm just trying to keep up with current modes of expression.)
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Nov 2 09:58:58 EST 1993
Article: 10513 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: money vs. labor
Date: 2 Nov 1993 06:54:25 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 32
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NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
sharvy@reed.edu (V Headshape) writes:
>I'm just wondering if the justification for taxation also justifies
>forced labor. That is, suppose the government decided that it would
>require you to labor for it, instead of giving it money. Whether that
>would be a more effective system is not the point: would it be equally
>ethical? Would it infringe individual rights more?
Why do you think effectiveness and ethics are unrelated? It seems to me
that government actions that restrict freedom require a justification
and one possible justification is that the action is more effective in
achieving some end than a less restrictive action would have been. I
think it plain that forced labor is more of a restriction on freedom
than taxation, so a government shouldn't resort to it unless it has a
good reason for preferring it to taxation. "It's more effective" might
constitute a good reason, depending on circumstances.
Maybe your question is whether there's any plausible theory of
government under which taxation would sometimes be OK but forced labor
never would. I can't think of one. The whole point of government is to
tell people what they must or may not do, and the grounds for the "must"
and the "may not" sometimes include the desirability of some practical
state of affairs. I'm not sure what the principle would be on which
government could forbid you to interfere with some state of affairs, and
even command you to contribute cash to bringing it about, but couldn't
tell you to do anything else to forward it.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Nov 2 12:48:11 EST 1993
Article: 16980 of talk.politics.theory
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,alt.politics.libertarian,alt.politics.radical-left
Subject: Re: The Spectre (was: Re: Liberalism and its discontents)
Date: 2 Nov 1993 10:25:20 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 20
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Xref: panix talk.politics.theory:16980 alt.politics.libertarian:11676 alt.politics.radical-left:5833
gcf@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) writes:
>| If
>| everyone were to work 25% less, there would be less of what
>| people want, and everyone would be that much poorer, even if we
>| legislated the same wages. (In essence, there would be an
>| instantaneous inflation of 25%.) ...
>
>Heh. The Labor Theory of Value rises again....
I thought the labor theory of value was the view that value is defined
by reference to labor, not the view that labor is the usual way people
bring valuable things into existence. I missed the recent discussions
on the subject, though.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Nov 2 21:23:51 EST 1993
Article: 16990 of talk.politics.theory
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,alt.politics.libertarian,alt.politics.radical-left
Subject: Re: The Spectre (was: Re: Liberalism and its discontents)
Date: 2 Nov 1993 21:23:21 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 43
Message-ID: <2b74mp$n26@panix.com>
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Xref: panix talk.politics.theory:16990 alt.politics.libertarian:11709 alt.politics.radical-left:5890
gcf@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) writes:
>The way _I_ see it, value is how much trouble someone is willing to go
>through to get something. Trouble is *labor.
Attempts to understand value by reference to labor seem backwards to me.
It is sensible for people to be willing to go through trouble to get
something they find valuable. It is irrational to think that something
is valuable simply because it is troublesome. (Not that people don't
sometimes think that way. In wartime the value people see in victory
sometimes goes up in proportion to the pain and suffering they have
endured so far.)
>The willingness to endure it is mediated through various social
>mechanisms until the *labor is performed. System iterates. (For those
>who tuned in late, the "*" in front of "*labor" is to remind readers
>that I also consider the accumulation, preservation, and manipulation
>of capital to be labor, as well as the support of community structures
>(customs, laws, the state, etc. etc.) which enable capital, wage
>labor, money, and so forth to exist.)
It sounds like you count as labor all factors of production other than
land and other natural resources, I suppose because they all constitute
stuff people do. That's fine, but it means that "exploited labor" could
include interest rates that are too low or a falling stock market.
>So value and *labor are practically the same thing, when we look at
>large aggregates, communities, and extended periods of time, which
>excludes work-is-play-to-me programmers and those who have a talent for
>finding gold bricks in their back yards.
The near-identity doesn't seem to apply across communities or across
time. There's a lot of labor in Bangla Desh today, and there was a lot
of labor in Europe in 1500, but not as much economic value as in the
United States in 1993 with people working 40 hour weeks. Also, there
are entire societies (Kuwait) where for a time people are able to live
on the gold bricks they find in their back yards.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Thu Nov 4 11:38:54 EST 1993
Article: 65507 of rec.arts.books
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: rec.arts.books,talk.philosophy.misc,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Confucius and the Bill of Rights (was: Unjust Discrimination)
Date: 4 Nov 1993 11:33:19 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 130
Message-ID: <2bbasf$i5k@panix.com>
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Xref: panix rec.arts.books:65507 talk.philosophy.misc:10581 talk.politics.theory:17027
wojdylo@maths.uwa.oz.au (INFIDEL) writes:
>if Confucianism is so objective, why is it that the people
>that died at Tiananmen Square all those centuries ago were rallying
>under the slogan, "Science and Democracy" ?
I can't speak for them. Rebellion against existing authorities is
likely to be carried on, especially at first and especially if the
authorities have been in control of education and public discussion for
a long time, in the name of goods the authorities claim to stand for.
>#The U.S. BofR typically develops through the enterprise of advocacy
>#groups like the NAACP Legal Defense Fund [ . . . ]
>
>Dahhh --- what about the jury, Sherlock.
Juries judge the facts and not the law.
>Higher courts seem to be more stable than your local supreme court, Ducky,
>which is not to say there isn't room for improvement.
Once people notice the amount of political power the institution of
judicial review gives to a court appointments to the court become a
matter of the political views of the appointee and things become less
stable.
>##Cases are added onto the body of common law; they refine the meaning of
>##the original document. The Court is bound by the body of precedent.
>#
>#That's more accurate as a description of what a court does in a system
>#in which Parliament is supreme.
>
>Utter bullshit. Read "Fuck the Draft", "Doe etc. versus U of Wisconsin",
>and others.
What those cases say about the binding force of precedent doesn't
matter. The first week of law school my constitutional law professor
(Thomas Emerson, a very well-known First Amendment scholar) described
the study of constitutional law as "the legal side of political science"
and told us that when we read a constitutional case we shouldn't pay any
attention to the line of reasoning the court claims to be following but
only to the fact pattern, the result and the slogan ("right of privacy"
or whatever). I didn't get the point and spent a very confusing year
trying to understand what courts were doing on the basis of what they
said they were doing. Eventually I caught on and everything became very
easy. (It also became conceptually repellent, so I spent my second and
third years studying legal history rather than current law to the extent
I could do so.)
The rhetorical advantages of claiming to be bound by precedent when
issuing a decision that might shock the bourgeoisie are obvious. Why
look for another explanation for what the Court said on the subject?
>Your pseudolegalistic babbling is tiresome.
Then you should skip my posts.
Speaking of pseudolegalistic babbling, one bad consequence of giving
judicial review a broad scope is the corruption of legal thought and
language. Power is one thing and correctness is another, and if the
exercise of power must routinely be shown to be required by correctness
then discussions of what correctness requires will lose their integrity
and therefore their value.
>The problem Kalb wrestles with in every intellectual venture of his, is
>his pondering about from whence comes "higher authority", since he has
>no conception of logic or historical perspective.
I'm not sure what your point is. It seems to me there are objectively
valid goods and to act rationally is to order one's conduct by reference
to such goods. We come to understand what those goods are through
reason and experience. The good is not a possession of any person but
some people understand it better than others. As a practical matter it
is necessary to have people with the power in certain cases to decide
the requirements of the good and to back that decision with force. Who
those people should be and what those cases should be are among the
fundamental issues of politics. Such fundamental issues are also
decided by reason and experience, which in politics mostly means
reflection on the political traditions of one's people with some
observation of current events thrown in. Confucius' thought strikes me
as a good example of that kind of activity.
The foregoing is no doubt simple-minded and platitudinous, but why does
it lack all conception of logic and historical perspective?
>#What other standard can the Court look to other than the views of the people it
>#knows and respects?
>
>How about integrity to its own logic?
If you think the court should have a lot to say about society, then you
aren't likely to be satisfied with having it maximize the coherence of a
fixed body of doctrine without consideration of the social consequences.
If you don't think the court should have much to say about society it's
not clear why you think constitutional rights and judicial review are so
important.
>The real issue is that some people believe they can fuck over others
>because their "rights" are more special.
So then what are the rights that are so special they deserve protection
and what do they imply in particular instances? I don't think those
questions can be answered without reference to a specific view on what
human life should be like.
>To them, the Constitution is a carte blanche to achieve their ambitions;
>too bad for the view, initiated by your founding fathers, that there
>exist for each individual certain inaliable rights which the Constitution
>*protects* -- NOT defines.
In the Declaration of Independence Jefferson talked about inalienable
rights and government to secure those rights (I thought he got the idea
from John Locke). When it came to the business of writing a
constitution, the Founding Fathers relied on limiting the general sphere
of competence of the government, and dividing its powers so it couldn't
do anything very far-reaching even within its sphere of competence
without a general social consensus. The Bill of Rights was an add-on to
make their handiwork more acceptable to the public. Today the BofR is
viewed as the only limitation on the actions of a government of
unlimited competence. The idea is that the government will take care of
everything, and if the idea of the government taking care of everything
alarms you don't worry because the BofR means that the things that alarm
you will be taken care of too, by the courts. That's not what anyone
had in mind in 1787.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Thu Nov 4 11:38:55 EST 1993
Article: 65509 of rec.arts.books
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: rec.arts.books,talk.philosophy.misc,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Confucius and the Bill of Rights (was: Unjust Discrimination)
Date: 4 Nov 1993 11:38:42 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 46
Message-ID: <2bbb6i$ith@panix.com>
References: <2ao1pl$b99@uniwa.uwa.edu.au# <2aokd7$ssi@panix.com# <2b9ql1$krs@uniwa.uwa.edu.au>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
Xref: panix rec.arts.books:65509 talk.philosophy.misc:10582 talk.politics.theory:17028
wojdylo@maths.uwa.oz.au (INFIDEL) writes:
>Or don't you think that there are any inaliable rights?
Rights that all human beings have in every society under all circumstances?
I'm sure some could be constructed. A right not to be subject to laws
motivated solely by self-seeking and malevolence? A right not to be treated
solely as a means to the satisfaction of the arbitrary desires of other
people? The ones that come to mind strike me as too abstract to be of much
practical use as rules to be applied by a tribunal that claims that it is
not making substantive political choices.
>#A provision protecting freedom of speech from government interference
>#could be interpreted to forbid government action that contributes to
>#maintaining social structures leading to the marginalization of
>#homosexuals and other minorities and the consequent exclusion of their
>#views from public discourse.
>
>So, you think the quasi-Marxists have a valid argument when they say
>"gays" [substitute your favorite oppressed minority] _should_ be
>protected under law from slander etc. i.e. you believe in a "right to
>be free of harrassment" ?
The issue is whether the BofR/judicial review machinery secures free
speech when the trend of elite thought is in the opposite direction. I
say it doesn't. Any conclusion can be cast in the form of an
interpretation of the BofR, and if the conclusion is one that strikes
the right people as the right answer substantively it will eventually
come to strike them as the right way to interpret the BofR as well.
>Obfuscatory bullshit, Kalb [ . . . ] Good one, Kalb -- it takes a
>foreigner to point out how your own system works [ . . . ] Utter
>bullshit. I'm not going to continue this line, you are too ignorant
>[ . . . ] Get real, Kalb [ . . . ] You are boring me.
Why did that old sparkle go out of our relationship? Maybe we should break
it off. As a parting suggestion, though, I urge you to look at how issues
of constitutional interpretation are discussed in major American law
reviews. I also urge you to consider carefully your own advice to Mr.
Nikolayev not to be so self-involved.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Thu Nov 4 13:15:22 EST 1993
Article: 10583 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: money vs. labor
Date: 4 Nov 1993 11:42:50 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 17
Message-ID: <2bbbea$jn4@panix.com>
References: <2b4f00$hh6@scratchy.reed.edu> <2b5hph$glb@panix.com> <2b9pnu$kp0@scratchy.reed.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
sharvy@reed.edu (V Headshape) writes:
>It is possible that
>labor would be more useful to the government than dollar bills, so
>imagine it. In that thought experiment, is forced labor justified by the same
>principles that justify taxation? ...If I understand you correctly,
>your answer is "yes."
That's basically right. Since government ought to treat freedom as an
important good the "more useful" should be "much more useful in some
important matter", at least if the forced labor is substantial.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Thu Nov 4 18:53:11 EST 1993
Article: 848 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: Nafta & _Chronicles_
Date: 4 Nov 1993 16:36:29 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 38
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References: <2bbhi2$ar8@balsam.unca.edu>
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kepley@photon.phys.unca.edu (Brad Kepley) writes:
>_Chronicles_ drives me crazy. I get about half way through each article,
>nodding my head and really enjoying the reading and by the end I'm ready
>to throw it in the trash. For instance, Thomas Fleming's article
>"Italian Lessons" starts out as a fine criticism of American political
>leaders but ends up asserting that "Manhattan conservative leaders" are
>"going about the business of selling their country to the highest bidder".
Editor Tom always writes as if he had a toothache. I still like his
comment a few issues back addressed to people who tell him they read his
book _The Politics of Human Nature_ and then confess they got it out of
the library instead of buying a copy: "Thanks for nothing." Sam
Francis has been getting bad-tempered lately, too. The "Letter from the
Lower Right" is loads of laughs, though, so maybe all is not lost.
Personally, I've always thought reacs ought to respect ancient wisdom,
like the ancient wisdom regarding the relative merits of vinegar and
honey for certain purposes. Also, it seems to me that being a political
extremist ought to make you happy: (1) you've stumbled into important
truths that no one else knows about, so you have the joy of possessing
valuable rareties, and (2) you know what the political good is and how
to get there, and the contemplation of each gives you enormous pleasure.
Some people don't see it that way, though.
On free trade, protectionism and Thomas Jefferson I think there are real
issues. TJ no doubt favored the former, but things were different then.
International trade and investment were not on the same scale. TJ
thought economic independence was favorable to freedom and virtue, and
it was Alexander Hamilton and not him who made economic development the
measure of all things. So it's not clear to me that the pro-NAFTA
forces have a better claim to TJ than Pat Buchanan does.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Fri Nov 5 07:56:31 EST 1993
Article: 849 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Racism, ethnocentrism or whatever
Date: 5 Nov 1993 07:50:40 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 107
Message-ID: <2bdi70$nqi@panix.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
Race relations seem in bad shape, in this country and elsewhere. I don't
think improvement is likely without honest and straightforward discussion.
The following thoughts are intended as an initial contribution to that
discussion. Comments?
Racism
"Racism" is broadly defined today to include the view that it is normal
and good to feel kinship with people whose ethnic heritage is similar to
one's own and sometimes to act on that feeling. That is the definition
I shall use in this discussion. When so defined, it appears that there
need be nothing wrong with racism. We all feel kinship with people who
are like us in some way and frequently act on such feelings. Family
ties are similarities of blood and upbringing, and if such similarities
admittedly have practical importance when they are close it's not clear
why it is wrong to feel they still matter when the ties are more
attenuated, as in the case of common race, culture and ethnicity.
The usual objections to racism don't distinguish it from other feelings
that tie people together and sometimes divide them. Many people view
racism as a kind of hatred that denies the humanity of those who are
different, but it's not clear why that sort of reproach applies to
ethnic loyalty more than loyalty to country or to a social movement, or
any other loyalty that is less broad than loyalty to all humanity.
Sometimes people claim that ethnic loyalties are bad because they lead
to conflict and ethnic conflicts are more bitter than other conflicts.
However, conflicts over economic advantage, political and religious
principle and state power appear to be no less frequent and bitter than
ethnic conflicts. Also, if ethnic conflicts really are particularly
bitter it seems to follow that ethnic loyalties are stronger and go
deeper than other loyalties, a state of affairs that would make it
pointless to assert that they are in principle a bad thing.
Putting the usual objections aside, the fundamental argument against
racism seems to be that ethnic loyalties have no substantial function
and therefore acting in serious matters on the basis of such loyalties
is irrational and bad. This argument is usually not made explicitly,
but very few things relating to race are ever discussed explicitly and
one must piece together the relevant considerations as best he can. The
idea (which is also the fundamental idea of liberal individualism) seems
to be that the goals we have as individuals can best be served by
establishing a political system that protects or advances such goals and
supporting that system through an ideology that validates it.
Accordingly, the argument seems to go, our rational loyalties are our
loyalties to political ideology and the state, and only those loyalties
are morally justifiable.
As so stated, the argument seems to be based on a view of man as an
animal that is originally non-social but establishes goals for himself
and consequently enters society in order to advance them. Such a view
seems wholly unrealistic to me. Man is an essentially social animal,
and the family and community he is born into, his upbringing and culture
of origin, and his involuntary ties to other people appear to be part of
what make him what he is, and are certainly more important than most of
the particular goals he consciously chooses. To me it seems natural and
right for a man to feel ethnic loyalty and sometimes to act to advance
or preserve his group's identity and way of life, simply because that
identity and way of life are part of what he is. It follows that in the
language of the present day I am a racist.
Having said that, the question remains what kind of ethnic loyalties are
appropriate and how those loyalties should be manifested in the United
States in 1993. Any answer to such a question must be fragmentary, but
some points seem reasonably clear. It seems plainly legitimate for
members of an ethnic group to try to live together in accordance with
their own way of life if they don't place additional burdens on others.
It follows that private racial discrimination in housing, education and
employment generally is legitimate since to engage in such
discrimination is simply to deal preferentially with people of similar
ethnicity. It also seems legitimate to take ethnicity into
consideration in voting. The conduct in office of a government official
is heavily influenced by what he considers important or trivial, by his
perceptions and assumptions about politics, human nature and the world,
and by his manners and style, all of which are heavily influenced by
ethnic background. For a man to prefer to vote for someone of his own
ethnic group is therefore to prefer to vote for someone he understands
and who will understand him, which is surely justifiable.
Other matters relating to the role of ethnic loyalties in politics are
murkier. Since a government based solely on pure reason is impossible,
every government must reflect evaluations and understandings that vary
from culture to culture. When there are several cultures in a territory
ruled by a single government, some attempt at accommodating minority
viewpoints is likely but what the government does will mostly reflect
the outlook of the dominant culture. How to keep the peace among
competing cultures and what sorts of accommodations make sense are
complicated matters for which there is no general solution. In the
United States today I would propose reducing the occasions for conflict
by (i) limiting immigration, possibly by reestablishing quotas based on
national origin, to avoid multiplying conflicts and allow the groups
already here to learn how to live with each other, (ii) taking advantage
of our federal tradition to allow local variations to be reflected
politically, and (iii) emphasizing our tradition of limited government
and informal or private ordering of affairs to minimize the importance
of the political aspects of cultural differences. When such methods of
avoiding conflict don't work, all I can suggest is to let the dominant
culture have its way with whatever accommodations to minorities it feels
it can make without the sacrifice of integrity. Any other solution
would require giving the final say to some group with a viewpoint
superior to every culture, which is impossible.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
Do let me know if you have comments of any kind.
Back to my archive of posts.