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Does Christianity abolish the many in favor of the one?

What is the Christian attitude toward race, ethnicity and peoplehood?

Such things do not determine human worth any more than other aspects of social position do. Nonetheless, it seems important to me to recover a Christian conception of legitimate particularism. Such a conception would necessarily include some degree of ethnic identity and loyalty and therefore ethnic boundaries. Without such a conception Christianity becomes a this-worldly universalism like Islam or the various modern totalitarianisms. It loses the recognition of the necessity and goodness of the concrete and particular that is, I think, essential to it.

The view that ethnic boundaries are illegitimate, which is implied by the view that racial discrimination as such is wrong, is radically new in Christianity. The historic church never thought it was wrong to have particular attachments or recognize differences among groups of people. To some extent the early Church tailored Christianity to fit each society and people. Such efforts have been revived today—recent Roman Catholic discussions of “inculturation,” for example, presume that cultural particularity is important to spiritual life and insist that it be respected. If cultural particularity is good, though, boundaries among peoples with distinctive ways of life—ethnic boundaries—can’t be all bad.

The Christian embrace of particularity isn’t a fluke. The story of Babel treats this-worldly universalism and the demand for a single universal people, society and law as a sort of idolatry. And Christ himself explicitly recognized the continuing existence and validity of the nations. (Jean-Marc Berhoud goes into the details in his The Bible and the Nations.)

Christianity does not flatten things out and make them all conform to a single comprehensive scheme. The doctrines of Creation and Incarnation tell us that God made the here-and-now in all its particularity, called it good, and became physically present in it with all the specificity that implies. The unity Christianity gives is therefore a transcendent unity that applies even when there are obvious distinctions of unquestioned validity. When Paul said that Greek and Jew, slave and free, male and female are all one in Christ (Galatians 3:26-28). he didn’t want to abolish Greeks and Jews any more than he wanted to abolish men and women.

In many ways Christianity is at right angles to earthly social order. Grace completes nature, but does not abolish it. The temptation of Christ makes it clear that Christianity is not about political rule, solving economic problems, or the conquest of natural necessity. Unlike Islam and Judaism it has no concrete legal code, it explicitly recognizes the relative autonomy of Caesar, and it’s said to be a kingdom “not of this world.” If it recognizes that there are kingdoms other than itself why would it want all those kingdoms to get together and create a universal all-pervasive this-worldly order of things? Why would it suddenly decide that Babel was a worthy effort?

Christianity therefore lives at ease with earthly distinctions, much more than with earthly monoliths. It was after the concrete administrative unity of the Roman Empire was abolished through the appointment of multiple emperors that Christianity became its principle of transcendent unity. And that’s what Christianity was for the following 1600 years—a principle that gave Europe an overall civilizational unity while maintaining and on the whole respecting its practical diversity.

The rejection of Christianity has led to various schemes by Nazis, communists, Eurocrats and so on to replace the transcendent unity and concrete diversity of Christian Europe with pragmatic this-worldly unity. Nationality, local and particular loyalties, variations among peoples, and this-worldly boundaries thrived in Christian Europe. They are treated as monstrosities to be destroyed in the newly anti-Christian West. So why view them as opposed to Christianity?

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Comments

Some (hopefully) clarifying responses:

“The only way procedural nondiscrimination makes any sense to me is if the attribute (say race) in fact has no actual consequences that it is morally OK to consider in the decision.”

Not quite. There may be actual consequences to a race-based decision or policy, but a non-discrimination law is saying that these consequences, whatever they might be, are *less important* than the consequences of not having such a law. It is not saying that such consequences do not exist.

“Some laws are symbolic and not functional. What they require is somewhat like good manners.”

In all honesty, I haven’t thought much about what a better system of anti-discrimination laws would look like. This conversation is helpful in that regard. But I’m thinking of something with a little more teeth than laws against spitting on the sidewalk.

“They don’t stop you from doing what you want, if that’s what makes sense to you, but sometimes they require you to be a bit indirect or not go quite as far as you might otherwise go to avoid public offense.”

Example: If 20% of the business owners in my city wanted to exclude the members of an unfavored race from walking through their front doors—as a matter of policy—then I would probably favor a law preventing them from doing what they wanted.

“The contradiction lies in treating formal antidiscrimination as something critical and at the same time as something that has no tangible consequences whatsoever beyond a general admonishment to be nice.”

That’s a good point, but as I mentioned above, I do think some anti-discrimination laws should have teeth.

“Something can’t be critical and have no consequences at the same time.”

But the message itself may have consequences even if the law is never actually enforced.

“In order for a formal antidiscrimination law - a law that categorically disallows discrimination based on race, for example - to be of this sort we have to stipulate that actual substantive racial discrimination is (like sodomy) an intrinsic moral wrong.”

I disagree. There are lots of good laws that do not stipulate the offense to be “an intrinsic moral wrong”. Take the highway speed limit, for example. There is nothing intrinsically immoral about driving 70 mph instead of 65 mph, yet legal speed limits make the world a better place and I’m glad we have them.

Discrimination by race is not always immoral (though sometimes it is), yet the common good of a community might still be served by anti-discrimination laws in some areas.

“People are logical and generally attempt (with varying degrees of objective success) to be consistent with the things they state as critically important principles.”

Exactly. A law such as the one I just proposed is stating that non-discrimination by race, in that specific context, is a critically important principle for the good of the community, and that people should conduct themselves accordingly.

The motivation of antidiscrimination laws are not hidden behind pragmatic arguments of some higher communal good. Anything, even killing every sickly infant, can be argued to have communal good. No, the motivation is the belief race does not or should not matter. Dr. Jack Wheeler’s idea of the fear of the Evil Eye might be the core psychological motive. The antidiscriminator wants to disassociate himself from the powerful and beautiful race so as to avoid the wrath of his less powerful and less beautiful tribal members, even if such insight is not acceptable to the antidiscriminator. Core beliefs are extremely difficult to change, or so I understand.

It is difficult to see how antidiscrimination laws on the one hand must have teeth but on the other hand not be enforced. If one is in for the penny of having antidiscrimination laws preclude explicit discrimination then one is in for the pound of having them apply to “nudge, nudge…wink, wink” de facto discrimination.

Speed limits do say speeding is intrinsically wrong. They are scientific standards based on the moral premise that says one must not harm others through reckless behavior. Moreover, speed limits are not arbitrary such as might exist in tennis or football. Consider the grieving widow who is unlikely to think it legal mumbo jumbo for her lawyer to contend a speeder was engaged in an immoral act when he killed her husband while speeding after leaving a white-only club.

I have not seen it shown that discrimination is inherently wrong. The burden of proof is still on those that claim it is wrong.

Antidiscrimination laws are not critically important to a community. American society flourished under discrimination laws.

Mr. Culbreath writes:
“Exactly. A law such as the one I just proposed is stating that non-discrimination by race, in that specific context, is a critically important principle for the good of the community, and that people should conduct themselves accordingly.”

At the very least, quibbles aside (and Mr. Murgos is right that speeding through a populated area is an intrinsic moral wrong irrespective of the law), it seems that Mr. Culbreath and I have now agreed that there is no such thing (or at least no such stable thing) as a merely procedural or formal antidiscrimination law. Said succinctly there is only legal discrimination and legally required reverse-discrimination; there is no such thing as a standoffish objective requirement for nondiscrimination.

I agree that there may in principle be particular cases where legally required reverse-discrimination is a moral good; but I think it is important to be honest that that is what is being advocated. So if those who advocate such a law in a particular case are honest, they will explicitly call their proposed law a reverse-disctrimination law rather than an anti-discrimination law, and they will make no pretenses to being against discrimination per se. Otherwise they are just perpetuating the big lie.

For example, a law that requires restaurants to admit patrons irrespective of race could legitimately be called the “Christian Charity among the Races in Public Business Act”; but calling it the “Nondiscrimination in Public Business Act” is intrinsically dishonest.

I wrote:
“For example, a law that requires restaurants to admit patrons irrespective of race could legitimately be called the “Christian Charity among the Races in Public Business Act”; but calling it the “Nondiscrimination in Public Business Act” is intrinsically dishonest.”

I suppose this might not be as obvious to others as it is to me. Such an act is not a requirement for non-discrimination; it in fact is a taking of property rights away from the business owner; a deliberate discrimination against the business owner that will affect his economic situaiton, etc in order to advance what is thought to be a greater social good: a different racial and ideological profile of customers.

Another example would be a law that requires a printer who offers his services to the public to print any legal material rather than just material that he doesn’t find morally objectionable. Race matters, and forcing a certain racial profile on a restaurant affects everything about it as a business and a living. Content matters, and forcing a certain content profile on a printer affects everything about it as a business and a living.

In both cases the object in dispute—the race of the patrons and the material to be printed—does in fact matter. But the property rights of the business owner are deliberately set aside for what is thought to be a greater public good.

Again, I have no objection to that in principle, in the abstract - in each case my approval depends on the substantive good (or in some cases evil) being pursued. What I object to is that in both cases it is done dishonestly in the name of formal antidiscrimination rather than honestly in the pursuit of a stated, out-in-the-open substantive good. If we quit using the nonsensical language of formal nondiscrimination it would force us to honestly confront the substantive goods that we are putting the guns of the police behind, and require us to face the full implications of our political acts.

Mr. Murgos: I have not been ignoring your comments, but for the moment, I think we are too far apart to discuss the issue with profit in the comment boxes. I do not deny the possibility that a particular race might become so violent and dangerous *as a race* (i.e., I don’t mean a group of neighborhood thugs) that other races might be entitled to exclude them from their community as a matter of policy. I don’t know that any such race exists today.

“At the very least, quibbles aside (and Mr. Murgos is right that speeding through a populated area is an intrinsic moral wrong irrespective of the law …)”

I wish you would take a little more time understanding the point. Driving 70 mph is *not* an intrinsically moral wrong. We allow law enforcement officers to do it, some nations and states have allowed citizens to do it, and some still do. Driving at all is a hazard, and the hazard increases with speed: the legal limit is rather arbitrary and based upon what most people regard as common sense.

“… it seems that Mr. Culbreath and I have now agreed that there is no such thing (or at least no such stable thing) as a merely procedural or formal antidiscrimination law.”

I’m not quite sure what you mean. Good laws require good motives and good results, and the need for procedure and public formality might be included among them. Perhaps I am missing your point.

“Said succinctly there is only legal discrimination and legally required reverse-discrimination; there is no such thing as a standoffish objective requirement for nondiscrimination.”

True, if the law is viewed subjectively. A man needs bread to live, but you don’t want to sell it to him because you don’t like his race. A law that requires you to sell him bread might be called “reverse discrimination” as far as your desires are concerned. But as far as the community or state is concerned it is still a law of non-discrimination.

“So if those who advocate such a law in a particular case are honest, they will explicitly call their proposed law a reverse-disctrimination law rather than an anti-discrimination law, and they will make no pretenses to being against discrimination per se.”

I’m really not getting your point here. I would probably favor a law that requires grocers to sell bread to their customers without discriminating by race. I don’t think calling this “non-discrimination” is dishonest in the least.

“I suppose this might not be as obvious to others as it is to me.”

Quite so.

“Such an act is not a requirement for non-discrimination;”

Of course it is.

“… it in fact is a taking of property rights away from the business owner;”

Granted. As is every coercive law that applies to a business.

“… a deliberate discrimination against the business owner that will affect his economic situation”

Then you would have to call every law that has an economic impact upon a business “discrimination against the business owner”. Very well. Laws are usually coercive and intended to discriminate against someone’s desires somewhere. Otherwise there would be no need for them.

” … in order to advance what is thought to be a greater social good:”

Right.

“… a different racial and ideological profile of customers.”

That might be the result, but it would not be the intent of a good non-discrimination law. (It is undoubtedly the intent of the law today, and I don’t agree with it.) The intent would be simply to ensure that a resident of my city who enters a restaurant is not denied services solely because of his race.

“Another example would be a law that requires a printer who offers his services to the public to print any legal material rather than just material that he doesn’t find morally objectionable.”

That’s a very bad example. Race is not an action, it is not something one does, and it does not have intrinsic moral qualities. As Mr. Kalb has said, “race is not a principle of action”. Race is something one *is*. Therefore it cannot and should not be made illegal. Furthermore, public life should be ordered to reflect the reality that race in itself is morally neutral.

“Race matters …”

Sometimes, race matters a lot. Sometimes, race matters a little. Sometimes, race does not matter at all. And sometimes, when race matters a little, it still doesn’t matter as much as other things and should take a back seat.

”, and forcing a certain racial profile on a restaurant…”

No one is talking about forcing a certain racial profile on a restaurant. The law might force a change in the racial profile of a restaurant’s patrons, but that change might be large or small, and precisely what that change looks like is left up to other factors. No one is required to walk through the door.

“… affects everything about it as a business and a living.”

This is simply untrue. Why would you say such a thing?

“Content matters, and forcing a certain content profile on a printer affects everything about it as a business and a living.”

Content matters because content has moral and ethnical qualities. Race does not have moral or ethical qualities.

“In both cases the object in dispute—the race of the patrons and the material to be printed—does in fact matter.”

But they do not matter in the same way or in the same degree.

If I choose not to print for blacks because I hate blacks, then I am in fact committing a mortal sin and encouraging my community to do likewise. However, I am obliged as a Catholic *not* to print for an organization like Planned Parenthood because they are in the business of killing human babies.

“But the property rights of the business owner are deliberately set aside for what is thought to be a greater public good.”

That’s absolutely correct.

Mr. Culbreath writes:
“I wish you would take a little more time understanding the point. Driving 70 mph is *not* an intrinsically moral wrong.”

Driving recklessly is though. Mr. Culbreath seems to think that traffic laws are morally groundless because they set specific limits; I think that even if there were no traffic laws at all it would be possible to drive in a way that was morally wrong. Mr. Culbreath thinks I am ignoring his point; I am not ignoring it, it just strikes me as a rhetorical trick of no substance.

Every law - without any exceptions whatsoever - asserts an authoritative discrimination based on a particular moral understanding of things; traffic laws no less than antidiscrimination laws.

Mr. Culbreath also seems to assert that some epistemology applies to this discussion, wherein something that is subjectively a discrimination is not objectively a discrimination. I don’t understand his point; it seems to me that a discrimination is a discrimination, and that sure, one might subjectively think it is not one through self-deception. So it may be that Mr. Culbreath thinks I am suffering from some sort of self-deception. I think I’ll take a que from his response to Mr. Murgos, though, and beg off this discussion since I don’t think we are close enough in fundamental understanding of things to carry on a productive dialogue. As far as I can tell Mr. Culbreath’s view of the proper relation between the law and race is very much aligned with current laws and practices, but he denies that so I’ll have to leave it that I simply don’t understand his perspective.

Hello Matt.

You wrote, “I think I’ll take a que from his response to Mr. Murgos, though, and beg off this discussion since I don’t think we are close enough in fundamental understanding of things to carry on a productive dialogue.”

OK, but I thought we had actually made some progress.

“As far as I can tell Mr. Culbreath’s view of the proper relation between the law and race is very much aligned with current laws and practices, but he denies that so I’ll have to leave it that I simply don’t understand his perspective.”

Permit me to sum up my thinking thus far. I am opposed to racial quotas, affirmative action, and integration mandates. (Putting aside, for the moment, that you consider anti-discrimination laws to be a kind of forced integration.) Furthermore, I am opposed to anti-discrimination laws in the context of private employment and associations for a variety of reasons.

But since I do think it is good to avoid an overtly segregationist public sphere, and to ensure that all citizens have reasonable access to the things they need, I favor non-discrimination laws if they help to accomplish this end.

Although you once wrote that, if you were king, you could think of circumstances in which you would force racial integration, it appears in this discussion that you can think of no circumstances in which you would approve of non-discrimination laws. An interesting juxtaposition of opinions, to say the least.

“Although you once wrote that, if you were king, you could think of circumstances in which you would force racial integration, it appears in this discussion that you can think of no circumstances in which you would approve of non-discrimination laws.”

A so-called nondiscrimination law _is_ a forced integration law. The thing that I would definitely refrain from were I unfortunate enough to be king is dishonestly labeling a forced integration law as “anti-discrimination”. It isn’t the in-principle applicability of that substantive kind of law to some circumstances that I object to; it is the intrinsically deceptive labeling of it as anti-discrimination. Labeling it “anti-discrimination” implies that we are simply eliminating authoritative discrimination rather than trading one form of it for another, and it implies an above-the-fray God-like formal move rather than an in-the-dirt substantive moral move, even though all human political moves are without exception of the latter kind.

Some people don’t realize that there can exist a humane system of segregation in which both communities flourish, and I am beginning to think it stems from a belief in antiracism, which Mr. Kalb has criticized rightly. Some people think taking race into account is hate. So I wish Unadorned were here to give us some examples from his former life in Belgium.

No system is abuse-free, which is probably the primary reason Winston Churchill said the effect “democracy is a bad system of government, but it is the best there is.”

Every society will always have a minority. The fact that one could change oneself into a member of the majority by an act of will, does not render the ill treatment of the minority justifiable or acceptable. Not allowing Catholics into a Protestant Boy Scout troop is not hate although it might seem to some to be an unacceptably inefficient system in that failing to pool resources retards both groups. But that’s for the two groups to work out, not for the outsiders.

Segregation promotes responsibility on the part of both groups. If Catholics (I am one) wanted to tolerate a high percentage of violent criminals, it would help Protestants if Protestants kept Catholics at arm’s length. The Protestants would not be hateful if they segregated themselves. They would not need the presence of an expensive National Guard.

The degree to which people value race is illustrated by the previous desire of most whites in America before and during WWII to not even allow black people help them fight wars. The whites simply wanted to live without black society, not to do something to black society.

For new readers see Mr. Kalb’s article on antiracism: http://www.cycad.com/cgi-bin/pinc/apr2000/articles/jk_antiracism.html.

An idea is for a time out (which I recognize has a low probability of ever happening). Everyone go to their corners and cool down for awhile, and then, if they so choose, come together under terms worked out between the groups, not dictated by five people on the Supreme Court enforcing many unconstitutional civil rights laws.

Nonwhites would have to deal with their crime problems all on their own and without a supposedly racist overlord supposedly holding them back and exploiting them; although for many more years we would still be hearing about how slavery and, ironically, welfare giving liberals were the real cause and that things can’t get better unless the children of the causative individuals are required to pay for the solution.

Because of liberal propaganda, I suspect many people have not heard things like the above, which is why I am forging ahead even though it appears I am talking to myself. But I’ll stop now so as not to drive other bloggers from the preview list.

Personally I would (to understate it) be very wary of legally mandated comprehensive segregation for the same reasons I am very wary of the legally mandated comprehensive integration we have now: these sorts of things are almost always a disaster when imposed and administered by a bureacratic state. I don’t have any _intrinsic moral_ problem with them in substance though, as long as they are done honestly, in a way that calls a duck a duck. As an intrinsic moral matter I don’t have any problem with mens-only clubs/restaurants or Chinese-only clubs/restaurants or whatever. Mr. Culbreath seems to see such things as a personal offense of some kind against whomever is excluded, and as a moral offense against the group excluded; but I’ve never been offended by my personal exclusion from a women-only baby shower or whatever. I think the world is a richer, better place when exclusivity is a part of it, and in order to survive exclusivity has to have the support of the political order (at least to the extent that the political order doesn’t deliberately set about dismantling it). Racial exclusivity of this sort is every bit as morally legitimate as exclusivity by sex, by age, by culture, by nationality, by guild, by skill, or whatever. It is only homage to the modernist shibboleth, which equates political liberalism to virtue (when in fact political liberalism is a moral abomination), that makes people pervasively think otherwise. All of us Samaritans should emulate the good one, but to demand that we cease being Samaritans is nihilism.

Matt, as the founder of a boys-only chess club, rest assured that I have no problem with sex segregation policies whatsoever. In fact, there are many settings in which sex segregation is not only a good idea but is a moral obligation.

Racial segregation policies (all else being equal), however, are never obligatory and are almost always a bad idea. Putting racial differences on the level of sex differences strikes me as completely unsupportable.

Mr. Culbreath writes:
“Putting racial differences on the level of sex differences strikes me as completely unsupportable.”

Reasonable men can differ as to what is and is not prudent in that regard. My assertion in this discussion is that deliberate and authoritative segregation by either is not intrinsically morally wrong. That leaves plenty of room for disagreement over what is and is not a good idea in particular situations. I admit that I find deliberately, formally racially segregated situations for whites - a congressional white caucus corresponding to the congressional black caucus, for example - prudentially attractive, because they would represent a direct slap in the face to liberal modernism in a way that no sex-based segregation can provide. So while it is true that white pride and whites-only organizations can quickly degenerate into very unchristian things, and that traditionally protestant ones have been very quick to do so, I nevertheless find them prudentially attractive for Catholics at this time and in this place.

Again, though, reasonable men can differ about such things. What I wish to establish in this discussion is the far less difficult point that there is nothing intrinsically morally wrong with exclusively white organizations any more so than (for example) with exclusively male organizations.

Matt, you wrote:

“A so-called nondiscrimination law _is_ a forced integration law. The thing that I would definitely refrain from were I unfortunate enough to be king is dishonestly labeling a forced integration law as ‘anti-discrimination’. It isn’t the in-principle applicability of that substantive kind of law to some circumstances that I object to; it is the intrinsically deceptive labeling of it as anti-discrimination. Labeling it ‘anti-discrimination’ implies that we are simply eliminating authoritative discrimination rather than trading one form of it for another…”

Given the above remarks, I suppose there is more to say about the distinctions between discrimination and non-discrimination, and between non-discrimination and forced integration.

First, a non-discrimination law binds at least one party to non-discrimination. Hence, the name. It’s really that simple, and it isn’t dishonest. Although I do agree that a non-discrimination law is simultaneously discriminatory with respect to at least one party’s choices and desires, that is a consequence of the law but not the justification for the law. I see no reason to name a law for one of its consequences rather than its justification.

Second, you are right that non-discrimination laws can result in forced integration. But a requirement not to discriminate is not the same as a requirement to integrate to any specific degree. It is entirely possible that a school, for instance, might comply with non-discrimination laws and yet experience little or no change whatsoever in the racial composition of its students. While I might support the imposition of non-discrimination laws with respect to the school, I would not support the forced integration of the school, nor would I support coercive measures to “diversify” the student body by adjusting non-racial admissions criteria.

The short answer is that yes, I do consider doing something and then disclaiming responsibility for its consequences through rhetorical tricks as fundamentally dishonest, so no, I wouldn’t do that as king. The notion seems to be that we can break the dam and then say hey, it isn’t *I* who am responsible for the flood; *that* was gravity. All *I* did was break the dam.

Not interested.

“Disclaiming responsibility through rhetorical tricks”? Who’s disclaiming responsibility? If I were king, I’d pass the law, calling it by a name that relates to its raison detre, and accept responsibility for each of the consquences that we have discussed thus far—consequences that should be acceptable to all but the most fanatical racialist ideologues.

You are really hung up on the semantics here. To use a rather extreme example, building the railroads in Northern California sent 2,000 Chinese laborers to their deaths. Yet, in spite of the tragic consequences that were entirely forseen, it is still proper to call them Railroad Projects and not Death-to-Chinese-Laborer projects.

Well, to my way of thinking I am hung up on honesty not on semantics. The purpose of so-called anti-discrimination laws is to force racial integration on institutions large and small that would otherwise resist it. Why not just say so?

It isn’t that it is wrong always and everywhere to do such a thing; it is just wrong always and everywhere to do such a thing dishonestly, while pretending to not be doing it.

Supposedly the semantic escape hatch is that if no minority individuals whatsoever want to play then there won’t be any actual forced integration. If there weren’t any water behind the dam then it wouldn’t flow downhill, so I am not responsible for the water flowing downhill when I break the dam. I wouldn’t personally want to stand before God and engage in that sort of excuse-making. If I were king and I decided that there was a one-sided racism problem in certain institutions, and I made the prudential decision to force the racists to allow minorities into their institutions in order to break the back of that racism, I’d just say forthrightly that that was what I was doing.

The Chinese railroad labor example doesn’t work (though there are probably other moral problems with it), because the point to building the railroad has nothing to do with the Chinese laborers. Robots would do just as well. The point to the anti-discrimination law is to crush the wills of the presumed-racist institutions and individuals to whom it applies. A better analogy would be if building the railroad were an indirect but purposeful way to punish and execute criminals; and if I did that as king I would tell the truth about it too, I wouldn’t pretend that it was a nice optional work program for good citizens as I forcibly marched them to their deaths.

Surely Mr. Culbreath must see that the point is more than merely semantic?

Mr. Culbreath wrote:
“…consequences that should be acceptable to all but the most fanatical racialist ideologues.”

If Mr. Culbreath wants to have a civilized discussion about the specific sort of forced-racial-integration laws and attendant bureacracy that he advocates he ought to refrain from saying that only the most fanatical racialist idealogues could disagree with him. Perhaps I’ve misunderstood him, because if anyone who disagrees with him is a foaming-at-the-mouth racialist fanatic then his participation in the discussion at all is more than a little puzzling.

If a white student walks up to a school with a colored only sign, is refused admission because he is white, sues the school under a nondiscrimination law, gets a judge to force the school to admit the white student, then the nondiscrimination law is a forced integration law.

I think we’ve both burnt out on this topic for the time being. I’m giving it a rest. Thanks for the lively discussion.

“Thanks for the lively discussion.”

Likewise. By the way, you might want to change your blog URL to point to blog-city rather than blogspot. And thanks again for that brilliant piece on a young man finding a wife, that was truly inspired.

Thanks Mr. Culbreath, Matt, Mr. Murgos, and the others.

Mr. Murgos wrote, a few posts above,

“For new readers see Mr. Kalb’s article on antiracism: http://www.cycad.com/cgi-bin/pinc/apr2000/articles/jk_antiracism.html .”

Thanks to Mr. Murgos for reminding me of that article by Mr. Kalb. I hadn’t seen it in about a year. Re-reading it now, I am struck by its absolute brilliance. That’s the only word for what that article is: brilliant. It is a classic which will still be read many decades from now.

The blogosphere just doesn’t get any better than Jim Kalb and Lawrence Auster.

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